{"id":8477,"date":"2020-07-02T16:29:54","date_gmt":"2020-07-02T16:29:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/cz\/?p=8477"},"modified":"2020-07-04T16:44:37","modified_gmt":"2020-07-04T16:44:37","slug":"ke-scenari-ofenzivy-armady-rf-od-krymu-pro-vodu-polopaticky-rozbor-operacni-situace","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/cz\/ke-scenari-ofenzivy-armady-rf-od-krymu-pro-vodu-polopaticky-rozbor-operacni-situace\/","title":{"rendered":"Ke sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159i ofenzivy arm\u00e1dy RF od Krymu \u201epro vodu\u201c. Polopatick\u00fd rozbor opera\u010dn\u00ed situace"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nab\u00edz\u00edme \u010dten\u00e1\u0159\u016fm webov\u00fdch str\u00e1nek mezin\u00e1rodn\u00ed dobrovolnick\u00e9 komunity InformNapalm rozbor jednoho ze sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159\u016f mo\u017en\u00e9 eskalace boj\u016f na jihu a v\u00fdchod\u011b Ukrajiny. Tento rozbor zpracoval vojensk\u00fd analytik Artem Vasylenko<\/a>, kter\u00fd v\u00a0letech 2014 a\u017e 2015 pravideln\u011b zpracov\u00e1val vojensk\u00e9 svodky a analytick\u00e9 progn\u00f3zy situace kolem boj\u016f na Donbase, kter\u00e9 byly publikov\u00e1ny na webu InformNapalm. Redakce webu zve\u0159ej\u0148uje text bez \u00faprav se zachov\u00e1n\u00edm autorsk\u00e9 stylistiky.<\/em><\/p>\n

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U\u017e del\u0161\u00ed dobu jsem nepsal dlouh\u00e9 \u010dl\u00e1nky, nav\u00edc analytick\u00e9 s\u00a0vojenskou t\u00e9matikou. Zkus\u00edm to. Bude to asi t\u011b\u017ek\u00e9, ale nastal \u010das opr\u00e1\u0161it star\u00e9 zvyky. Tak\u017ee m\u011b moc nebijte.<\/p>\n

Zkusme si hned ud\u011blat jasno: v\u00e1lky se vedou o\u00a0\u00fazem\u00ed a o\u00a0zdroje (pr\u00e1v\u011b na onom \u00fazem\u00ed). To je cel\u00e9. Nic jin\u00e9ho nen\u00ed mo\u017en\u00e9. \u017d\u00e1dn\u00e9 preference \u017e\u00e1dn\u00fdch vl\u00e1dc\u016f nemaj\u00ed na v\u00e1lku vliv. Zeptejte se pr\u016fm\u011brn\u00e9ho statistick\u00e9ho obyvatele Moskovie, co si mysl\u00ed o\u00a0v\u00e1lce v\u00a0Ukrajin\u011b… Budete p\u0159ekvapeni. P\u016flka z\u00a0nich o\u00a0n\u011b\u010dem takov\u00e9m v\u016fbec nev\u00ed, druh\u00e9 p\u016flce je to \u00fapln\u011b jedno, a co je nejpodstatn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed, nikdo nespojuje Putinovy preference s\u00a0boji na v\u00fdchod\u011b Ukrajiny. Pr\u00e1v\u011b proto plat\u00ed: Bl\u00edzk\u00fd V\u00fdchod\u00a0\u2013 ropa a zemn\u00ed plyn, \u010c\u00edna a Indie, Severn\u00ed a Ji\u017en\u00ed Korea\u00a0\u2013 \u00fazem\u00ed. M\u016f\u017ee j\u00edt tak\u00e9 o\u00a0n\u00e1bo\u017eensk\u00e9 d\u016fvody p\u0159i\u017eivovan\u00e9 extern\u00edmi hr\u00e1\u010di (Libye), ale n\u00e1m to aktu\u00e1ln\u011b nehroz\u00ed.<\/p>\n

Pro\u010d se to d\u011bje u\u00a0n\u00e1s? \u017de by kv\u016fli \u00fazem\u00ed? N\u011bjak mi p\u0159ipad\u00e1, \u017ee ho\u0161i z\u00a0Moskovie je\u0161t\u011b maj\u00ed dost pr\u00e1ce na tom sv\u00e9m. Nebo kv\u016fli zdroj\u016fm? Ano, a jde o\u00a0vodu. Voda je v\u016fbec zaj\u00edmav\u00fd zdroj. Na jedn\u00e9 stran\u011b jakoby ji bylo dost, z\u00e1rove\u0148 je v\u0161ak nedostatkov\u00e1, co\u017e pr\u00e1v\u011b zp\u016fsobuje vysokou pravd\u011bpodobnost konflikt\u016f v\u00a0budoucnu (jako p\u0159\u00edklad si vygooglujte pr\u00e1v\u011b prob\u00edhaj\u00edc\u00ed konflikt mezi Egyptem a Etiopi\u00ed). Pokud jde o\u00a0n\u00e1s, pak pr\u00e1v\u011b nedostatek vody na \u00fazem\u00ed Krymsk\u00e9 autonomn\u00ed republiky by mohl zp\u016fsobit dal\u0161\u00ed eskalaci. P\u00ed\u0161e se o\u00a0tom mnoho, nebudeme se tedy na tom soust\u0159e\u010fovat. Z\u00e1le\u017e\u00ed na jednom: ur\u010den\u00ed p\u0159\u00ed\u010diny konfliktu umo\u017e\u0148uje odhadnout zam\u011b\u0159en\u00ed, kam nep\u0159\u00edtel soust\u0159ed\u00ed sv\u00e9 hlavn\u00ed snahy, a v\u00a0kone\u010dn\u00e9m d\u016fsledku se pokusit odkr\u00fdt pravd\u011bpodobnou povahu postupu.<\/p>\n

Je mo\u017en\u00e1 ofenziva od Krymu?<\/h2>\n

B\u00fdval\u00fd velitel jednotek USA v\u00a0Evrop\u011b Ben Hodges vyslovuje domn\u011bnku ohledn\u011b vysok\u00e9 pravd\u011bpodobnosti obsazen\u00ed hr\u00e1ze v\u00a0Chersonsk\u00e9 oblasti, co\u017e by odborn\u00edk\u016fm z\u00a0RF umo\u017enilo dod\u00e1vky vody obnovit. Je jasn\u00e9, \u017ee kontrola nad stavidlem pobl\u00ed\u017e obce Kalan\u010dak, kter\u00e9 bylo vybudov\u00e1no v\u00a0roce 2014, bude m\u00edt za n\u00e1sledek jen v\u00fdstavbu dal\u0161\u00ed hr\u00e1ze v\u00fd\u0161 po proudu. \u00dakolem RF je tedy p\u0159evzet\u00ed kontroly nad stavidlem pobl\u00ed\u017e Nov\u00e9 Kachovky a n\u00e1sledn\u00e1 ochrana vodovodu p\u0159ed sabot\u00e1\u017eemi. Ze shora uveden\u00e9ho vypl\u00fdv\u00e1, \u017ee vzd\u00e1lenost opera\u010dn\u00edho \u00fakolu \u010din\u00ed 60\u00a0km a dle klasick\u00fdch norem by k\u00a0jeho spln\u011bn\u00ed m\u011bla posta\u010dit vojskov\u00e1 skupina a\u017e v\u00a0rozsahu v\u0161evojskov\u00e9 arm\u00e1dy (arm\u00e1dn\u00edho sboru) a prov\u00e1d\u011bc\u00ed lh\u016fta D2 (p\u0159esn\u011b tak, m\u00e9n\u011b ne\u017e dva dny bude dle p\u0159edpis\u016f v\u0161evojskov\u00e1 arm\u00e1da RF pot\u0159ebovat, aby splnila opera\u010dn\u00ed \u00fakol do vzd\u00e1lenosti 100\u00a0km). Je tu v\u0161ak jako v\u017edy jedno \u201eale\u201c…<\/p>\n

Co p\u0159edstavuje lokalita, kde by se m\u011bl \u00fakol plnit? Jde o\u00a0rovinat\u00fd ter\u00e9n \u0161irok\u00fd 167\u00a0km od O\u010dakivske na z\u00e1pad\u011b a\u017e k\u00a0silnici R47 na v\u00fdchod\u011b a hlubok\u00fd 60\u00a0km. Je tu jen m\u00e1lo obydlen\u00fdch m\u00edst s\u00a0populac\u00ed p\u0159es 1000\u00a0obyvatel, lesn\u00ed porosty t\u00e9m\u011b\u0159 chyb\u00ed, nechyb\u00ed v\u0161ak hodn\u011b rozv\u011btven\u00fd syst\u00e9m zavla\u017eovac\u00edch kan\u00e1l\u016f. Co to znamen\u00e1? Chyb\u011bj\u00edc\u00ed s\u00eddla, jich\u017e voj\u00e1ci RF zpravidla pou\u017e\u00edvaj\u00ed jako \u0161t\u00edt\u016f pro operace sv\u00fdch jednotek (p\u0159ipome\u0148me si rok 2014), umo\u017e\u0148uj\u00ed Ozbrojen\u00fdm s\u00edl\u00e1m Ukrajiny pou\u017e\u00edvat d\u011blost\u0159electvo v\u00a0libovoln\u00fdch po\u010dtech a variac\u00edch, mo\u017en\u00e1 dokonce ani\u017e by se musely br\u00e1t v\u00a0potaz pravd\u011bpodobn\u00e9 ob\u011bti mezi civilisty (na rozd\u00edl od Donbasu). A tak\u00e9 s\u00a0ohledem na p\u0159\u00edtomnost zavla\u017eovac\u00edho syst\u00e9mu tvo\u0159en\u00e9ho \u017eelezobetonov\u00fdmi p\u0159\u00edkopy se sva\u017eit\u00fdmi b\u0159ehy, kter\u00e9 de facto zt\u011b\u017euj\u00ed pohyb techniky a lze je pou\u017e\u00edt jako opevn\u011bn\u00fdch lini\u00ed pro man\u00e9vrovatelnou obranu, je ofenziva mo\u017en\u00e1 jen v\u00a0n\u011bkolika m\u00e1lo sm\u011brech, a sice Armjansk\u00a0\u2013 Nova Kachovka pod\u00e9l T2202 nebo Heni\u010desk\u00a0\u2013 Kachovka pod\u00e9l R47, a to tak\u00e9 jen za p\u0159edpokladu, \u017ee se poda\u0159\u00ed p\u0159evz\u00edt kontrolu nad mosty p\u0159es kan\u00e1ly u\u00a0\u010caplynky, Novotrojicke a Zaozerne.<\/p>\n

Nav\u00edc by se velitel ofenzivn\u00ed skupiny musel po\u0159\u00e1d ohl\u00ed\u017eet na z\u00e1lohy Ozbrojen\u00fdch sil Ukrajiny, kter\u00e9 by mohly b\u00fdt p\u0159esunuty u\u00a0Chersonu a Nov\u00e9 Kachovky z\u00a0prav\u00e9ho b\u0159ehu (tento probl\u00e9m lze \u0159e\u0161it seskokem leteck\u00fdch v\u00fdsadk\u016f pobl\u00ed\u017e most\u016f) a myslet na kryt\u00ed sv\u00e9ho prav\u00e9ho k\u0159\u00eddla p\u0159ed proti\u00fatoky ve sm\u011bru Melitopol\u00a0\u2013 Petropavlivka (co\u017e je tak\u00e9 \u0159e\u0161iteln\u00e9 v\u00a0souvislosti s\u00a0mo\u017enost\u00ed z\u0159\u00edzen\u00ed obrann\u00e9 linie pod\u00e9l R47 a Kachovsk\u00e9ho kan\u00e1lu).<\/p>\n

Lev\u00e9 k\u0159\u00eddlo by nem\u011blo probl\u00e9my s\u00a0ohledem na zna\u010dnou kapacitu ukrajinsk\u00e9ho n\u00e1mo\u0159nictva (bez ur\u00e1\u017eky) a blokaci Karkinick\u00e9ho z\u00e1livu lodn\u00edmi \u00fato\u010dn\u00fdmi skupinami \u010cernomo\u0159sk\u00e9 flotily.<\/p>\n

Situace pro n\u00e1s nen\u00ed zrovna nejp\u0159\u00edzniv\u011bj\u0161\u00ed, nicm\u00e9n\u011b velkou komplikac\u00ed pro 22.\u00a0arm\u00e1dn\u00ed sbor, kter\u00fd je sou\u010d\u00e1st\u00ed rusk\u00e9 okupa\u010dn\u00ed arm\u00e1dy na Krymu (velitelstv\u00ed sboru s\u00eddl\u00ed v\u00a0Simferopolu), je, \u017ee by se muselo postupovat jen dv\u011bma \u00fazk\u00fdmi \u0161\u00edjemi u\u00a0Armjansku a Heni\u010desku. Kter\u00e9 jsou tak\u00e9 placat\u00e9 (viz shora k\u00a0d\u011blost\u0159electvu) a mohou b\u00fdt dost v\u00fdrazn\u011b blokov\u00e1ny brig\u00e1dn\u011b taktickou skupinou (tvo\u0159enou 1\u00a0samostatnou d\u011blost\u0159eleckou a 1\u00a0samostatnou d\u011blost\u0159eleckou brig\u00e1dou), kdyby se v\u0161e ud\u011blalo rozumn\u011b a v\u010das se p\u0159ipravily obrann\u00e9 linie. Co se t\u00fd\u010de vylod\u011bn\u00ed n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00edch v\u00fdsadk\u016f, samotn\u00fd v\u00fdsadek lze prov\u00e9st pouze v\u00a0m\u00edstech k\u00a0tomu vhodn\u00fdch (pro posuzovanou lokalitu jde patrn\u011b o\u00a0Zaliznyj port a Lazurne). Nav\u00edc pro vylod\u011bn\u00ed v\u00fdsadku je t\u0159eba se nejd\u0159\u00edv p\u0159ibl\u00ed\u017eit k\u00a0pob\u0159e\u017e\u00ed…<\/p>\n

Abychom pochopili, zda bude m\u00edt 22.\u00a0arm\u00e1dn\u00ed sbor dost sil a prost\u0159edk\u016f ke spln\u011bn\u00ed opera\u010dn\u00edho \u00fakonu, nahl\u00e9dn\u011bme do ve\u0159ejn\u00fdch zdroj\u016f.<\/p>\n

Str\u00e1nka se zpr\u00e1vou<\/a> o\u00a0prohl\u00e1\u0161en\u00ed ukrajinsk\u00fdch diplomat\u016f na p\u016fd\u011b OSN uv\u00e1d\u00ed orienta\u010dn\u00ed slo\u017een\u00ed skupiny RF na \u00fazem\u00ed Krymsk\u00e9 autonomn\u00ed republiky s\u00a0platnost\u00ed ke konci roku 2019.<\/p>\n

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Jsou-li zve\u0159ejn\u011bn\u00e9 \u00fadaje pravdiv\u00e9, m\u00e1 nep\u0159\u00edtel na Krymu jednu t\u011b\u017ekou brig\u00e1du pob\u0159e\u017en\u00ed obrany (126.\u00a0samostatn\u00e1 brig\u00e1da pob\u0159e\u017en\u00ed obrany Perevalne), kter\u00e1 m\u00e1 za\u0159azeny (https:\/\/cutt.ly\/7osV1qx<\/a>) dva motost\u0159eleck\u00e9 prapory a jeden tankov\u00fd, nav\u00edc k tomu prapor n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00ed p\u011bchoty (Feodosija). Sou\u010d\u00e1st\u00ed brig\u00e1dy je tak\u00e9 brig\u00e1dn\u00ed d\u011blost\u0159eleck\u00e1 skupina tvo\u0159en\u00e1 houfnicov\u00fdm (nejsp\u00ed\u0161e dv\u011bma) a reaktivn\u00edm odd\u00edlem.<\/p>\n

810. samostatn\u00e1 brig\u00e1da n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00ed p\u011bchoty ve slo\u017een\u00ed 3 prapor\u016f (z toho jeden v Krasnodarsk\u00e9m kraji) a samostatn\u00fd d\u011blost\u0159eleck\u00fd odd\u00edl.<\/p>\n

8. samostatn\u00fd d\u011blost\u0159eleck\u00fd pluk<\/a> tvo\u0159\u00ed 3\u00a0odd\u00edly.<\/p>\n

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Vedle shora uveden\u00fdch svazk\u016f p\u016fsob\u00ed na poloostrov\u011b tak\u00e9 1227.\u00a0pr\u016fzkumn\u00e1 brig\u00e1da, n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00ed sbor \u010cernomo\u0159sk\u00e9 flotily RF nebo cel\u00e1 sm\u00ed\u0161en\u00e1 leteck\u00e1 divize. Samostatn\u011b se jimi v\u0161ak zab\u00fdvat nebudeme, proto\u017ee jako hlavn\u00ed \u00fato\u010dn\u00e1 s\u00edla by p\u0159i operaci byly nasazeny 2\u00a0motost\u0159eleck\u00e9 prapory, 3\u00a0prapory n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00ed p\u011bchoty, 1\u00a0v\u00fdsadkov\u00fd \u00fato\u010dn\u00fd prapor n\u00e1mo\u0159n\u00ed p\u011bchoty a tankov\u00fd prapor, jim\u017e by m\u011blo zaji\u0161\u0165ovat kryt\u00ed 5\u00a0houfnicov\u00fdch odd\u00edl\u016f a dva reaktivn\u00ed. Na rovinu? Je to pon\u011bkud m\u00e1lo. Z\u00e1v\u011br? Rus\u016fm je jasn\u00e9, \u017ee by 22.\u00a0arm\u00e1dn\u00ed sbor pot\u0159ebovali pos\u00edlit minim\u00e1ln\u011b o\u00a0dv\u011b dal\u0161\u00ed motost\u0159eleck\u00e9 brig\u00e1dy. Nav\u00edc by n\u011bkdo musel nastoupit do letadel a prov\u00e9st v\u00fdsadek pobl\u00ed\u017e most\u016f u\u00a0Chersonu a Nov\u00e9 Kachovky. V\u00a0p\u0159\u00edpad\u011b realizace tohoto sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e bude k\u00a0pln\u011bn\u00ed tohoto \u00fakolu pravd\u011bpodobn\u011b vysl\u00e1n 108.\u00a0gardov\u00fd v\u00fdsadkov\u00fd \u00fato\u010dn\u00fd pluk ze 7.\u00a0gardov\u00e9 v\u00fdsadkov\u00e9 \u00fato\u010dn\u00e9 divize (Novorossijsk, https:\/\/cutt.ly\/Gos9L8R<\/a>). Pro\u010dpak? Proto\u017ee to m\u00e1 k\u00a0opera\u010dn\u00ed lokalit\u011b nejbl\u00ed\u017e.<\/p>\n

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K\u00a0\u00fasp\u011b\u0161n\u00e9mu dokon\u010den\u00ed operace v\u0161ak stejn\u011b nebude dostatek sil. Nav\u00edc od prav\u00e9ho k\u0159\u00eddla by mohli \u201ep\u0159ijet\u201c \u0161ikovn\u00ed ho\u0161i od Ozbrojen\u00fdch sil Ukrajiny, koho \u017ee tam m\u00e1me pobl\u00ed\u017e? M\u00e1me-li v\u011b\u0159it Google, u\u00a0Melitopolu s\u00eddl\u00ed 56.\u00a0samostatn\u00e1 motop\u011bchotn\u00ed brig\u00e1da (3\u00a0motop\u011bchotn\u00ed prapory\u00a0+ tr\u00a0+ brig\u00e1dn\u00ed d\u011blost\u0159eleck\u00e1 skupina), nemusela by tedy ani p\u0159ekon\u00e1vat Dn\u011bpr, sta\u010d\u00ed p\u0159ej\u00edt pochodem a od v\u00fdchodu za\u00fato\u010dit na k\u0159\u00eddlo ofenzivn\u00edho svazku. Co\u017e znamen\u00e1, \u017ee by se \u010d\u00e1st 22.\u00a0arm\u00e1dn\u00edho sboru i s\u00a0posilami pustila do ofenzivy ve sm\u011bru Heni\u010desk\u00a0\u2013 Melitopol, aby nechala Ozbrojen\u00e9 s\u00edly Ukrajiny zaj\u00edt chu\u0165 na nasazen\u00ed 54.\u00a0samostatn\u00e9 motop\u011bchotn\u00ed brig\u00e1dy, co\u017e je\u0161t\u011b v\u00edc m\u011bn\u00ed pom\u011br sil a prost\u0159edk\u016f v\u00a0n\u00e1\u0161 prosp\u011bch.<\/p>\n

K\u00a0\u010demu to cel\u00e9 p\u00ed\u0161u? O\u00a0samostatn\u00e9 operaci Ozbrojen\u00fdch sil RF v\u00a0krymsk\u00e9m opera\u010dn\u00edm prostoru nem\u016f\u017ee b\u00fdt \u0159e\u010d, jen by p\u0159i\u0161ly a\u017e o\u00a0dv\u011b brig\u00e1dy a st\u00e1hly se zp\u011bt.<\/p>\n

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Te\u010f mi n\u011bkdo z\u00a0expert\u016f v\u00a0ni\u017e\u0161\u00edch d\u016fstojnick\u00fdch hodnostech za\u010dne p\u0159edhazovat, \u017ee posta\u010d\u00ed jen v\u00fdsadek para\u0161utist\u016f… Polo\u017e\u00edm ot\u00e1zku: jak dlouho se dok\u00e1\u017ee na objektu udr\u017eet v\u00fdsadkov\u00fd prapor v\u00a0opera\u010dn\u00edm vnitrozem\u00ed, ne\u017e doraz\u00ed hlavn\u00ed s\u00edly? No pr\u00e1v\u011b…<\/em><\/p>\n

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U\u017e m\u00e1me tedy jasno, \u017ee tot\u00e1ln\u00ed invaze RF m\u016f\u017ee za\u010d\u00edt jen v\u00a0n\u011bkolika opera\u010dn\u00edch oblastech najednou, to je za prv\u00e9. Skupina na \u00fazem\u00ed Krymsk\u00e9 autonomn\u00ed republiky nedok\u00e1\u017ee splnit opera\u010dn\u00ed \u00fakol s\u00a0p\u0159evzet\u00edm kontroly nad lev\u00fdm b\u0159ehem Chersonsk\u00e9 oblasti, ani\u017e by byla pos\u00edlena o\u00a0vojensk\u00e9 \u00fatvary z\u00a0Ji\u017en\u00edho vojensk\u00e9ho okruhu Ozbrojen\u00fdch sil RF (nap\u0159. n\u011bkolik brig\u00e1d ze stavu 49.\u00a0arm\u00e1dy). To je za druh\u00e9! Pr\u00e1v\u011b z\u00a0onoho \u201eza druh\u00e9\u201c m\u016f\u017eeme vyvodit z\u00e1v\u011br, \u017ee p\u0159ed zah\u00e1jen\u00edm ofenzivy od Krymu prob\u011bhne p\u0159esun dvou brig\u00e1d, proto\u017ee by musely b\u00fdt nasazeny do boje ke konci prvn\u00edho dne, tak\u017ee jejich nakl\u00e1dka za\u010dne na cca D-2(3), a je\u0161t\u011b p\u0159edt\u00edm za\u010dne masov\u00e9 soust\u0159ed\u011bn\u00ed transportn\u00edch letadel v\u00a0m\u00edstech nakl\u00e1dky 108.\u00a0pluku a spousta dal\u0161\u00edch opat\u0159en\u00ed, kter\u00e1 sv\u00fdm zp\u016fsobem poslou\u017e\u00ed jako markery, \u017ee to za\u010d\u00edn\u00e1. K\u00a0dne\u0161n\u00edmu dni \u017e\u00e1dn\u00e9 informace o\u00a0z\u0159izov\u00e1n\u00ed \u00fato\u010dn\u00fdch skupin z\u00a0ve\u0159ejn\u011b p\u0159\u00edstupn\u00fdch zdroj\u016f nepozorujeme.<\/p>\n

Nav\u00edc klasick\u00e1 ofenziva pozemn\u00ed slo\u017eky je s\u00a0ohledem na podm\u00ednky v\u00a0opera\u010dn\u00ed oblasti jen m\u00e1lo pravd\u011bpodobn\u00e1, tak\u017ee nep\u0159\u00edtel bude nejsp\u00ed\u0161 v\u00a0mal\u00fdch skupink\u00e1ch destabilizovat situaci v\u00a0oblasti a vytv\u00e1\u0159et odd\u00edly nez\u00e1konn\u00fdch ozbrojen\u00fdch formac\u00ed s\u00a0n\u00e1sledn\u00fdm p\u0159evzet\u00edm objekt\u016f, kter\u00e9 ho zaj\u00edmaj\u00ed.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pro dne\u0161ek kon\u010d\u00edm, na dal\u0161\u00ed pravd\u011bpodobn\u00e9 sm\u011bry se pod\u00edv\u00e1me pozd\u011bji, pokud tento p\u0159\u00edsp\u011bvek z\u00edsk\u00e1 v\u011bt\u0161\u00ed po\u010det lajk\u016f. A te\u010f v\u00e1\u017en\u011b: v\u00a0dal\u0161\u00edm \u010dl\u00e1nku se pokus\u00edm obdobn\u011b polopaticky rozepsat, co se pravd\u011bpodobn\u011b odehraje ve sm\u011bru Doku\u010dajevsk\u00a0\u2013 Melitopol<\/em>, na z\u00e1klad\u011b vyhodnocen\u00ed pouze ve\u0159ejn\u00fdch zdroj\u016f a instrukc\u00ed Ozbrojen\u00fdch sil RF, kter\u00e9 jsou p\u0159\u00edstupn\u00e9 ve\u0159ejn\u011b.<\/p>\n

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Toto shrnut\u00ed zpracoval vojensk\u00fd analytik Artem Vasylenko<\/a> speci\u00e1ln\u011b pro web InformNapalm.<\/em><\/p>\n

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\u010ct\u011bte a sd\u00edlejte dal\u0161\u00ed p\u0159\u00edsp\u011bvky od InformNapalmu<\/h2>\n