The analysis of ATO area reports published by InformNapalm since the last days of April leads to the conclusion that the enemy is getting ready to continue armed confrontation. Since the signing of the second Minsk agreement the militant leaders have analyzed the mistakes made during the winter campaign and started the process of building a full fledged military force.
This was done in several stages. The uncontrollable armed groups (Don Cossacks, small militant bands, etc.) were disarmed or included in the ranks of LNR/DNR military with systematic exercises in combat cohesion under the supervision of instructors from Russia.
In our previous summaries we analyzed the possible directions of the militant offensive. Looking at the recent reports, we see that they haven’t changed. The combined Russian-separatist forces (CRSF) continue escalating their presence in the areas near the Sea of Azov. Two strike groups have been formed in the Mariupol direction – this is also supported by the reports from insiders in the occupied territories. As for the main directions of the strikes – the capture of Mariupol would bring no benefits to CRSF, for political and economic reasons. Some manufacturing continues in the occupied territories. Also one of the metallurgical plants in Donetsk is being restarted. The product of these plants can only be exported from the ports under Ukrainian control. Mariupol is one such port.
Regarding the preparations for the offensive along the sea shore, the importance of Shyrokine should not be overestimated. We hope that the Ukrainian Army commanders will not repeat the mistakes of the last year’s summer campaign and will not move the troops toward Novoazovsk, stretching the supply lines. The Russian Army commanders likely understand that the advance of the ATO forces toward Novoazovsk is out of the question, so pushing the Ukrainian Army back from Shyrokine will not be one of the goals of the summer campaign. Most likely Shyrokine will play the role of a distraction. The analysis of the social and political situation in the area confirms that the “liberators” will not be welcomed with open arms on the other side of the Donetsk – Mariupol highway, because this is a mostly agricultural area (similar to the northern part of Luhansk Oblast in 2014). Therefore, it is too early to talk about the possibility of an attack westward. The only thing the militants may have planned is the approach to the northern outskirts of Mariupol with the strikes from Dokuchayevsk and Komsomolske. This could include a diversion in the direction of Hranitne to tie down the 72nd Brigade (this is supported by the frequent shelling of that area.)
The creation of a militant strike group continues in the Donetsk area. In particular, the deployment of troops and weapons to the western outskirts of Donetsk has been observed. Strike groups are also being organized in Yasynuvata and Yelenivka. Therefore, CRSF will attempt to push the ATO forces away from the city with the strikes in a westerly direction, reaching the Bohoyavlenka – Kurakhovo – Karlivka line. This will put the forces in the airport area in a difficult position, cutting off their supply lines in the west. The Yasynuvata group, on the other hand, will try to cut off the supply lines from the north by controlling the Donetsk – Kostyantynivka highway together with the militants based in Horlivka. The events of April 28-29 in Dzerzhinsk [1] are directly related to this plan: that was an attempt to test the ATO defenses in the direction of Horlivka – Kostyantynivka.
The militants’ harassing activities near Mayorsk are likely a diversion to cover the creation of the strike force that will attack Zaytseve – Holmovsky – Artemivsk. Combined with a successful attack on Kostyantynivka, the militants will gain complete control over the Kostyantynivka – Artemivsk highway. The planned attack toward Artemivsk is also confirmed by the concentration of militants in the area of Alchevsk, Stakhanov, and Bryanka.
It is worth noting the relative calm near the front lines in that direction. The analysis of the quantities of armor in the militants’ possession and the available fuel (in the 1:5 ratio) suggests that CRSF plans a deep operation. In that case the north remains the most attractive direction for the offensive. Especially if we consider the “independence” of the Prizrak brigade of Alexey Mozgovoy and the loss of Lysychansk last year, where the brigade commander has his own business interests.
While the militants could achieve some tactical gains in all other directions, a Blitzkrieg-type operation suggested by the fuel reserves, that is, a tank breakthrough in the northern direction, would allow the militants to quickly reach Slavyansk and Krasnyi Liman, while the Ukrainian Army command would still be busy organizing the deployment of reserves from Kramatorsk. It is possible we will also see more sabotage team activity in that area.
As for the approach to Artemivsk from the east, this will be done with two strikes. The first one will be toward Kalinove – Troyitske to pull the ATO forces south to Mironovske water reservoir, the second one – to the north of Popasna. With the success of the latter and an attack from the opposite direction out of Horlivka the militants will have the chance to reach the goal very quickly. Along with the attempt to gain control over Artemivsk, Mosgovoy’s brigade will attempt to break through toward Lysychansk.
Regarding Sector A, only artillery engagements are likely here, along with sabotage team activity in the area of Schastya. Attention should be paid to Millerovo, where controllers from the Russian Army General Staff have been frequently visiting in the recent days.
Therefore, in the nearest future we should expect the escalation of fighting, especially if we take into account the arrival of the next “humanitarian convoy” from Russia and the planned arrival of other one on May 14. The analysis of the militant activities during the winter campaign shows that the next convoy arrives during the active phase, 5-10 days after the start of action. Which mean that we should expect the summer campaign to start between May 4 – 10.
(с) This material was prepared exclusively for InformNapalm [2], a reference to the source is required when using the information.
Prepared by Artyom Vasilenko, exclusively for InformNapalm [3].
Translated by Max Alginin.