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Russian Propaganda Coordination Scheme Hacked: Tasks, Payments, Reports

This investigation is based on an analysis of private data and supplemented with open source intelligence (OSINT). It reveals a scheme of coordination of Russian information saboteurs who commit subversive actions against Ukraine and engage in information support of the operations of Russian hybrid terrorist forces. The publication covers the complete cycle from tasks assigned by supervisors to payment and reporting.

On June 28, Ukrainian patriots from the cyber-alliance FalconsFlame [1], Trinity [2]Ruh8 [3] и KiberHunta [4] successfully conducted the #opDay28 [5] operation, breaking into several information resources used by Russian propagandists. Consequently, seventeen “Information” resources received an injection of truth serum [6] from the knights of cyberspace.

Besides the websites, the mailboxes, social network accounts, and cloud storage of the persons involved in their maintenance were also hacked. They were editors, systems administrators, journalists, as well as supervisors and funding managers from the Russian Federation. All data obtained in the hacks was transferred to InformNapalm volunteers and intelligence analysts for screening, analysis, and subsequent public dissemination. Today we would like to turn our attention to the analysis of the hacked e-mail correspondence of one of the agents of Russian aggressive propaganda Alexander Vladimirovich Dmitrievsky.

The Customer

Taras Alekseev (archived profile [7], friends [8], archived profile 2 [9], friends [10]), a citizen of the Russian Federation. Born 26.05.1979. Lives in Moscow. E-mail address iesaul@rambler.ru, Mobile phone number +79067778761. In March 2014 he actively participated in the preparation of the illegal referendum in Crimea. He has access to secret documents of the Crimean branch of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) The photos of Alekseev from 2010 have been found in the photo album of Anna Gritsaevskaya (photo1 [11], photo2 [12]).  Selection_076 [13]Selection_074 [14]Scheme [15]

It is worth noting that three Facebook friends of Alekseev received their military education at the Military University of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This university is known to be training [16] military propaganda personnel at the department of Foreign Military Information. Listed below are the basic requirements and preferences presented by Alekseev as a customer that are 100% consistent with the duties of such professionals:

“We need something like what I do here. We need an operator in the center and a group of people who would work on facebook, social networks, tweeter, etc. These people must be familiar with such work and be reliable. Communication like in my case will be between each individual and the operator only. Targeted information injection, trolling of designated groups in vkontakte, promotion of the appropriate articles, support of the appropriate social network groups. At the moment we just need information support and for that a supervisor is needed on your side in Luh. [Luhansk – editor] … and if someone is available, in Khar. [Kharkiv – editor]. The main operator works on a salary, and he specifies objectives and evaluates performance based on our requests. This is the first stage, it does not require any office space and the risk of unwanted guests is minimal. The main objective is forming public opinion in the Ukrainian-speaking segment [of the internet]. When this work gets on track well we will think about the gym, ideology, etc. Can we do this kind of set up? We don’t need a lot of people, the most important is to start, the main thing is that the confidence within the group is 100%”

Propaganda [17]


Alexander Dmitrievsky (archived profile [18]), a citizen of the Russian Federation. Born 27.08.1974. Passport 2908 338551, registered at the village Vasyunino, Vladimir Oblast, house №3. VAT identification number 402902394100. He owns property in Ukraine, in the city of Makiivka, Ostrovs’koho Street 23, apt. 3. He uses the following mobile phone numbers: +380 713 020705, +380 506 065653, +7 903 6832300. E-mail address dmitryjewski@mail.ru. He is the administrator of the terrorist media site YIA (Youth Information Agency) “Novorossia”, the correspondent of the Donetsk Ridge newspaper, the editor of the Russian propaganda resource segodnia.ru, the financial mediator [19] between the assistant of a Russian State Duma deputy and members of YIA “Novorossia”, a member of the “Izborsk Club”. He actively prepared the ground for the occupation of Donbass by Russian hybrid troops.Selection_079 [20]

Selection_078 [21]

Orders and Progress Reports

Alekseev sent his orders for the creation of anti-Ukrainian propaganda articles, their publication, and dissemination on the internet to Dmitrievsky over e-mail. For example, here is one of his letters of 03.19.2014 that includes the following order:

there is a need to bring up these topics

1. Self-Defense Forces from Kiev are looting, robbing, and raping people in the south-east.

2. There are incidents of Ukrainian soldiers selling weapons to locals, rumors say one can buy anything, even an APC.

3. National treasures are being sold out of museums, many valuables are missing.

Three days later, Dmitrievsky sends his progress report in the form of a letter listing the articles in the online propaganda publication segodnia.ru:

Selection_080 [22]

Selection_081 [23]


Dmitrievsky (WMID: 294744496868, passport [24]) received his fee for the publication and dissemination of propaganda from Alekseev through an electronic payment system. As we can conclude from the correspondence, the amount of payment was one million Russian rubles. This amount was allocated to him for a year of work.Selection_082 [25]Selection_086 [26]Selection_087 [27]


In one of his letters Dmitrievsky shares the contact information of one Boris Anatolievich Prokofiev, his overseer at the Russian Foreign Ministry. He lists these phone numbers for Prokofiev: +7 499 2441727 and +7 916 8379018 and the email proban@yandex.ru. Notably, the first three digits of the landline number are 244, which matches the phone pool of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow.  Selection_088 [28]

This article was prepared for publication by the international community volunteer InformNapalm by Mikhail Kuznetsov [29] based on the analysis of data received from the hacker cyber-alliance FalconsFlame [1], Trinity [2]Ruh8 [3] and KiberHunta [4]

Translated by Volodymyr Bogdanov

Edited by Max Alginin


(CC BY) information has been prepared exclusively for InformNapalm.org [30] in case of reprint and use of the material active links of the author and our project are required.

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