{"id":10990,"date":"2017-04-30T21:00:57","date_gmt":"2017-04-30T21:00:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=10990"},"modified":"2017-05-01T07:55:39","modified_gmt":"2017-05-01T07:55:39","slug":"surkov-needs-private-army-union-donbas-volunteers-reserve-russian-guard","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/surkov-needs-private-army-union-donbas-volunteers-reserve-russian-guard\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Surkov Needs Private Army: Union of Donbas Volunteers (UDV) as Reserve of National Guard of Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"

Following the news on the assumed closing of the Novorossiya project by the Russian puppeteers in May 2015, a press conference was held in Moscow on August 27, 2015, dedicated to creating the so-called “Union of Donbas Volunteers” Interregional Voluntary Organization (<\/span>UDV<\/span><\/i>). The Union was headed by the former DPR Prime Minister Aleksandr Boroday. In October, the first congress of the new organization was held, with its main official goals stated as uniting, employing and helping the “volunteers” who fought in the Donbas.<\/span><\/p>\n

UDV management and membership never concealed the fact that their employer (or, rather, slaveowner) is Russian presidential aide <\/span>Vladislav Surkov<\/span><\/a>, known as one of the Kremlin’s shadow operators. In this investigation, in which we use the archives of the correspondence of the UDV deputy head <\/span>A. Pinchuk<\/span><\/a>, we will try to understand why Surkov began to form and finance the UDV.<\/span><\/p>\n

After the failure of the Novorossiya project and the recall of the Russian spin doctors and burned military experts from the East of Ukraine, the rather broad powers of Surkov (who still was at that time the main curator of the Ukrainian issue) were significantly limited by the top Russian leadership. Only the issues directly related to politics in the occupied territories of the Donbas were left within Surkov’s purview (meetings within the scope of the <\/span>Minsk agreements<\/span><\/a>, creating a favorable media image for the PDDLO “leadership,” elections in the Donbas, spinning movements in the style of “Donetsk and Luhansk Republics”, etc.). All other fields of work were divided between the Russian special services (FSB and GRU), as well as the relevant Russian ministries (Ministry of Economic Development, etc.).<\/span><\/p>\n

All further attempts by Surkov to influence the Donbas issues beyond his purview were curtailed by his competitors. First deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) <\/span>Vladimir Grigoryevich Kulishov<\/span><\/a> succeeded the most. There are reasons to believe that after the assumed closure of the Novorossiya project, he has been managing all appointments in the occupied territories and controlling everything that “crosses the ribbon” to get there, and does not like anyone grazing in his garden.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such state of affairs was very insulting to the Kremlin’s gray cardinal and, as an experienced opportunist, he created a puppet jingoistic organization that is on trend in Russia, expecting this tool to help him renew and consolidate in the near future his influence not only in the Donbas, but also in other regions and areas related to the sphere of the national security of the Russian Federation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Surkov’s personal interest in the UDV’s activities is also confirmed by the fact that this organization is financed by his business partner Sergei Aleksandrovich Astanin (General Director of the Foundation for Support and Development of Education and Culture of the Nations of the World).<\/span><\/p>\n