{"id":19016,"date":"2025-08-02T05:23:28","date_gmt":"2025-08-02T05:23:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19016"},"modified":"2025-08-02T05:23:28","modified_gmt":"2025-08-02T05:23:28","slug":"opshackrussiasday","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/opshackrussiasday\/","title":{"rendered":"Budapest as a hub for the Russian defense industry: Hungary facilitating dodging of international sanctions against Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"

OpsHackRussia\u2019sDay
\nInformNapalm<\/a> volunteer intelligence community, in cooperation with the specialists of Militant Intelligence (INTMIL<\/a>), continues to release materials obtained as part of the multi-level cyber operation OpsHackRussia\u2019sDay (#OHRD). During this operation, hacktivists infiltrated an entire network of Russian companies connected to the Russian military-industrial complex, and obtained access to their corporate communications. Some of this correspondence features foreign contractors and reveals gray schemes for bypassing international sanctions \u2014 including those involving companies from NATO member states. We believe such activity by European defense companies is unacceptable, as it not only provides Russia with profit and access to components but also sabotages the EU’s sanction strategy and undermines the security architecture of NATO countries.<\/h2>\n

Budapest as a global lobbying platform for Russia<\/h2>\n

Following the publication of our previous investigation into the activities of the Hungarian company Milspace Kft<\/a> \u2014 which assisted Russian arms manufacturers in bypassing EU sanctions \u2014 we received dozens of inquiries from journalists requesting broader context and access to more documents. In the OpsHackRussia\u2019sDay archives, we discovered a number of additional documents concerning Hungary and the military-technical cooperation between Budapest and Moscow after 2014. These materials not only corroborate our earlier findings but also allow for broader conclusions. Under the leadership of Viktor Orb\u00e1n, Hungary \u2014 despite being a NATO and EU member \u2014 has effectively become a hub for Russian defense companies, diplomats, and intelligence agencies to promote Russian interests in Europe.<\/p>\n

This article provides an analysis \u2014 based on official documents, including letters, contracts, and internal memos \u2014 of how Russia continued technical cooperation with the Hungarian Ministry of Defense despite sanctions, involving Israel Aerospace Industries and Russian companies from the Rostec orbit, such as Russian Helicopters and Oboronprom.<\/p>\n

Documentary evidence<\/h2>\n

We present key documents below, accompanied by brief descriptions. Full original copies in PDF or DOCX format without watermarks are available upon request.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udcc4 Letter from the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (March 9, 2016)<\/i><\/p>\n

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The Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) officially confirms the authority of Russian Helicopters to bid in the tender of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense for the overhaul of 4\u20135 Mi-17 helicopters. It emphasizes that the Moscow Mil Helicopter Plant, the original developer, must be involved. This confirms direct involvement of Russian defense contractors in the modernization of NATO-member armaments after Russia\u2019s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udcc4 Memo from “Russian Helicopters” on Cooperation with Hungary (2016)<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n

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This document provides a detailed inventory of Hungary\u2019s fleet of Soviet\/Russian-made helicopters \u2014 55 units, including Mi-8\/17, Mi-24, and Ka-26. The document also notes that under a 2013 contract, the Russian company Oboronprom was awarded over $16.9 million for maintenance and repairs, with $4.6 million in work completed by February 2016. In 2015, Russia was initially excluded from a tender but was later readmitted through lobbying by intermediaries such as Armitech Ltd.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udcc4 Certificate of Conformity for Oboronprom Products (2014)<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n

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This document confirms the supply of Mi-17\/Mi-8 helicopter components by Oboronprom to the Hungarian Air Force. These shipments were made through the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, circumventing EU sanctions imposed after Russia\u2019s occupation of Crimea. The Hungarian side thus blatantly disregarded EU Council Regulation No. 833\/2014.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udcc4 Letter from Israel Aerospace Industries to Russian Helicopters (2018)<\/i>
\n<\/i>\"\"<\/a>\u00a0<\/i>In the letter addressed to Andrey Boginsky, the CEO of Russian Helicopters, Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) expresses its readiness to modernize Hungary\u2019s Mi-35 helicopters and collaborate with Russia on the Ka-226 project in India. This correspondence illustrates the commercial interest of an Israeli company in cooperating with Russia despite its international isolation.<\/p>\n

Analysis: Budapest is NATO\u2019s weak link and Russia\u2019s gateway<\/h2>\n

These documents highlight a disturbing trend: Russia has been systematically using Hungary as a gateway for its military-industrial complex to access EU and NATO markets. Despite sanctions, Hungarian officials and companies have enabled Russian enterprises to continue profiting and to retain control over the maintenance of critical defense systems within NATO countries.<\/p>\n

This poses direct risks to NATO, including:<\/p>\n