{"id":19076,"date":"2026-01-10T07:10:38","date_gmt":"2026-01-10T07:10:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19076"},"modified":"2026-01-11T16:17:23","modified_gmt":"2026-01-11T16:17:23","slug":"we-can-smuggle-even-nukes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/we-can-smuggle-even-nukes\/","title":{"rendered":"“We can smuggle even nukes”: Russian officers from the 291st Regiment and Vostok-Akhmat establish weapons smuggling channel through Crimea"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division,<\/b><\/a> in cooperation with InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community<\/b><\/a> conducted another CYBINT operation obtaining important intelligence for the Ukrainian Defense Forces.<\/p>\n

The public portion of this study focuses on exposing the supply chains of contraband weapons from the war zone to temporarily occupied Crimea. The peninsula, in turn, functions as a logistics hub for the further transfer of weapons to black markets in regions of the Russian Federation, as well as to countries in Europe, Western Asia, and Africa. These transfers reportedly involve Russia\u2019s so-called shadow fleet of tankers.<\/p>\n

During the operation, accounts belonging to several Russian officers were compromised, including that of Major Yevgeny Dmitriev, a platoon commander in a Storm V assault company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR), part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, currently operating on the Zaporizhzhia axis.<\/p>\n

The investigation uncovered direct cooperation between Russian army officers and representatives of Kadyrov\u2019s Vostok-Akhmat battalion in the illegal arms trade.<\/p>\n

Following the account breaches, Ukrainian hacktivists also carried out a successful social engineering operation. Posing as a Russian army major, they manipulated administrators of the pro-war Telegram channel Two Majors, persuading them to transfer funds collected for the 291st Regiment to the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (see video at the end of this report).<\/p>\n

Read more below.<\/p>\n

Background: weapons black market of the so-called “special military operation”<\/h2>\n

Weapons trafficking is a persistent feature of the Russian state system, which throughout its recent history has repeatedly waged localized wars of aggression. Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine significantly expanded both the scale of illicit arms circulation and the number of actors involved.<\/p>\n

Weapons trafficking is a typical phenomenon for Russia, which throughout its recent history, has constantly waged localized wars of aggression. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine significantly expanded both the scale of illicit arms circulation and the number of actors involved. The Global Organized Crime Index shows<\/a> that corrupt officials in Russian law enforcement agencies facilitate the movement of contraband weapons both domestically and to countries in Europe, Western Asia and Africa.<\/p>\n

Experts note that after nearly four years of full-scale war, occupied Crimea has emerged as the primary and relatively safe transit hub for weapons from the front lines.<\/p>\n

Following the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow on March 22, 2024, even the pro-war Telegram channel Grey Zone, associated with the Wagner PMC, indirectly acknowledged the role of Kadyrov\u2019s Akhmat units in organizing uncontrolled weapons flows from the front (archived posting<\/a>). The channel suggested that although Russia\u2019s FSB military counterintelligence is aware of the situation, it remains unable to intervene due to the political influence and protection afforded to Ramzan Kadyrov.<\/p>\n

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Illustrative photo.\u00a0Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Republic, Sharip Delimkhanov, commander of the Russian National Guard in Chechnya, and Viktor Zolotov, director of the Russian National Guard.<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Weapons trafficking routes intelligence findings<\/h2>\n

Data obtained through CYBINT operations indicate that Russian military personnel have established stable channels for smuggling weapons from frontline positions through the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts into occupied Crimea. The scheme relies on the duty schedules of specific Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) units at checkpoints along the R-280 highway on the Berdyansk\u2013Melitopol\u2013Chongar\u2013Simferopol route. Depending on prior arrangements, Rosgvardia personnel either allow suspicious cargo to pass without inspection (for regular and \u201ctrusted\u201d clients) or, for a fee, deliberately ignore discrepancies between transport documents and the actual cargo.<\/p>\n

Coordination of these schemes is attributed to officers of the 46th Operational Brigade, a formation reportedly composed almost entirely of natives of Chechnya and Dagestan. The main base of these Caucasus-origin units ine the occupied territory is located in Askania-Nova and nearby settlements in Kherson Oblast, while command personnel are also stationed in Ilyinka, Novotroitske, Chaplynka, and Kalanchak.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Why Akhmat destroyed Espanola<\/h2>\n

As background, it is important to note that Kadyrov-affiliated groups faced competition in the illicit arms market from the Russian formation known as Espanola, composed primarily of football ultras and far-right radicals.<\/p>\n

In December 2025, the group\u2019s founder and leader, Stanislav Orlov (call sign Spaniard), was shot dead at his dacha near Sevastopol. The killing was most likely linked to conflicts with rival criminal groups and law enforcement actors over control of weapons trafficking routes from the war zone through occupied Crimea.<\/p>\n

In particular, Espanola exploited the designation of humanitarian and volunteer convoys to avoid thorough inspections at checkpoints.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Major Dmitriev as a source of intelligence<\/h2>\n

The scheme can be illustrated using the case of Major Yevgeny Nikolaevich Dmitriev, one of many Russian officers actively involved in arms smuggling in cooperation with Kadyrov\u2019s forces. Dmitriev served as a platoon commander in a Storm V assault company of the 291st MRR, which took part in combat operations on the Zaporizhzhia axis.<\/p>\n

Dmitriev was born on December 26, 1983 in the village of Krasnogvardeyskoye, Stavropol Krai, Russia. The last time he visited his parents was in June 2025 during his leave. His own residence is registered in Stavropol at the address: 77 Dovatortsev Street, Bldg. 1, Apt. 29. His personal military service number is \u0425-648025. He uses the following phone numbers: +7(962)4347515, +7(961)4957515 and +7(949)9866262. Email: dmitriev_ev83@bk.ru.<\/p>\n

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Photo: Major Dmitriev (center) after receiving the Assault Cross commemorative badge from the 58th Army command.<\/i><\/p>\n

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Location of Dmitriev’s Stavropol apartment and application to get his military service pay through Promsvyazbank.<\/em><\/p>\n

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Dmitriev’s passport and driver’s license.<\/i><\/p>\n

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Major Dmitriev during treatment in a hospital.<\/i><\/p>\n

Dmitriev got to the war zone after serving part of his term in a maximum security penal colony. He was sentenced in August 2023 by a Vladikavkaz court for large-scale narcotic drugs trafficking.<\/p>\n

The major not only sold but also took psychostimulants himself. Court-appointed expert assessments diagnosed him with mental and behavioral disorders resulting from substance abuse. According to case materials, he received 1,000 rubles per drug stash placed. This criminal background provides a clear prelude to his later involvement in arms smuggling after signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n

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Dmitriev’s criminal case materials<\/i><\/p>\n

To avoid further imprisonment, Dmitriev volunteered for military service and signed a two-year contract with the Russian army from May 31, 2024 to May 30, 2026, receiving a position as platoon commander in a penal Storm V assault unit.<\/p>\n

Initial draft office records mistakenly listed his rank as senior lieutenant, but this error was later corrected upon discovery of promotion orders dating back to 2017, confirming his rank of major.<\/p>\n

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Information about the first contract and an extract from the promotion order confirming Dmitriev’s military rank of major.<\/i><\/p>\n

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Dmitriev’s officer ID card.<\/i><\/p>\n

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Examples of debt notices and one of Dmitriev’s latest debt collection writs.<\/i><\/p>\n

Dmitriev is not officially married but provides financial support for two children. His participation in the war of aggression against Ukraine secured preferential college admission for his son Zakhar (born 2010), as a dependent of a deployed serviceman.<\/p>\n

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Information on family status from Dmitriev’s questionnaire, line 7 says “not married, supports 2 children”.<\/i><\/p>\n

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Certificate from the Ministry of Defense confirming college enrollment benefits for Zakhar, as son of a war-zone deployed serviceman.<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

291st Regiment realities of war and a video from Major Dmitriev’s phone<\/h2>\n

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CYBINT intercepts indicate that the 291st MRR, including Dmitriev\u2019s assault company, has been operating primarily on the Zaporizhzhia axis near Orikhiv, Tokmak, and Robotyne, as part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Army, within Russia\u2019s Dnepr group of forces.<\/p>\n

In 2023\u20132024, the regiment was among the main Russian units engaged in fighting around Robotyne. Prolonged frontal assaults, with positions repeatedly changing hands, effectively destroyed the regiment\u2019s personnel several times over. As of 2025, the unit continues operations near Orikhiv, mostly limited to holding positions and conducting localized assaults characterized by heavy KIA and WIA losses without meaningful territorial gains.<\/p>\n

The regiment\u2019s permanent base (military unit 43057) is located in Vladikavkaz, Republic of North Ossetia\u2013Alania. Its temporary deployment base is in the occupied village of Dunayivka, Pryazovske district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast.<\/p>\n

Intercepted communications contain numerous complaints about the regiment\u2019s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anton Godin (born 1987), described by subordinates as corrupt and a “cynical butcher” indifferent to personnel losses. Despite chronic manpower shortages, Godin reportedly ordered repeated localized assaults with no tactical justification and predictably high casualties.<\/p>\n

In correspondence with acquaintances, Dmitriev characterized Godin as a self-serving careerist whose sole concern was pleasing his superiors, shifting blame downward, and producing shiny reports at any cost.<\/p>\n

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Anton Godin<\/i><\/p>\n

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Training evaluation report declaring the assault company \u201cNOT combat ready\u201d.<\/i><\/p>\n

Following training exercises, Dmitriev\u2019s company received an official assessment deeming it unfit for assault operations. Nevertheless, the regiment\u2019s command disregarded the evaluation and immediately deployed the unit into combat, once again demonstrating that for the Russian command, personnel are treated as expendable.<\/p>\n

As a platoon commander, Dmitriev himself showed little regard for losses and complied with orders. Even so, in private communications he occasionally expressed shock at the cruelty of his superiors.<\/p>\n

In a video message sent to an acquaintance from the Akhmat-Vostok battalion, Dmitriev described a situation so dire that one soldier was sent on an assault mission riding a motorcycle while wearing an Ilizarov apparatus \u2014 an external fixation device used to treat severe fractures when conventional immobilization is no longer possible.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/01\/VID-20241221-end-of-video-s-aparatom-elizarova-na-shturm.mp4<\/a><\/video><\/div>\n

In addition to numerous videos recorded by himself, Dmitriev also stored a collection of interrogation recordings of captured Russian servicemen in his cloud storage. Among them is a video featuring Mikhail Nikolaenko, apparently an acquaintance of his. In the recording, the prisoner of war calmly recounts how, during an advance toward a trench, only two out of twelve Russian soldiers survived in a forest belt. The others were killed not by Ukrainian fire, but by their own fellow servicemen\u2014shot in the back to prevent any attempt at retreat.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/01\/otbival-srok-sviditelstvo.mp4<\/a><\/video><\/div>\n

However, let us get back to the weapons smuggling scheme.<\/p>\n

Primary sourcing begins with Russian officers commanding assault units on the front line. It is common practice for them to deliberately inflate reported losses of small arms during assaults. At the same time, some soldiers are sent into attacks without standard-issue weapons, sometimes being told to \u201cwin their weapons in combat.\u201d Firearms left on positions are subsequently written off as lost and diverted into illicit circulation. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported<\/a> such Russian “bare-handed” attacks.<\/p>\n

Another frequent source involves weapons and ammunition found or seized in no-man\u2019s-land along the line of contact, which are deliberately not reported. Most often, these are weapons taken from the bodies of soldiers from neighboring units. Recent radio intercepts from the Russian 291st MRR further confirm that sending troops into assaults with minimal or no ammunition has long been standard practice there.<\/p>\n

There is little material documenting Major Dmitriev\u2019s personal combat experience as a platoon commander. Among hundreds of photographs stored on his phone, not a single one was taken from an active combat position. Instead, there are dozens of images from rear areas\u2014in dugouts, shelters, or even in a toilet\u2014where he poses in newly issued body armor.<\/p>\n

For Dmitriev, the war appears to be a backdrop for selfies rather than a risk shared with subordinates who are thoughtlessly \u201cerased\u201d in assaults. It should be noted, however, that he did sustain a minor wound and was hospitalized.<\/p>\n

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Major Dmitriev’s selfie session<\/i><\/p>\n

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Major Dmitriev’s wound report issued by a military medical commission and a photo of his injury<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Akhmat-Vostok and the road to Crimea<\/h2>\n

Intercepted correspondence does not reveal where exactly Dmitriev first established contact with his Kadyrovite accomplices\u2014whether in prison, at unit headquarters, during regular sauna visits with prostitutes, or while undergoing treatment at the 1472nd Naval Hospital in Sevastopol. What is known is that by the summer of 2024, Major Dmitriev had begun active cooperation with fighters from the Akhmat-Vostok battalion.<\/p>\n

Beyond financial motives, Dmitriev was attracted by the security guarantees such cooperation offered. Through corrupt connections, Kadyrov\u2019s men could provide advance warnings about snap inspections and \u201cshadow shopping\u201d raids conducted by military counterintelligence, the FSB, or the Investigative Committee\u2014agencies that routinely operate in the area searching for illicit arms dealers.<\/p>\n

Likewise, Kadyrov\u2019s men and their accomplices among Russian military officers do not fear enhanced inspections of military transport at the administrative border between the temporarily occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. As a rule, they enjoy prearranged \u201cgreen corridors.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Major Dmitriev and his friends from the North Caucasus<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Weapons trafficking scheme: “We can smuggle even nukes”<\/h2>\n

Dmitriev\u2019s correspondence reveals that his primary contact for weapons sales was Nazir Radzhabov, a member of the Vostok-Akhmat battalion.<\/p>\n

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Radzhabov with Dmitriev; Radzhabov during his service in the Russian National Guard in Grozny prior to the full-scale invasion<\/i><\/p>\n

Notably, in 2024, Vostok-Akhmat commander Vakha \u201cAskhab\u201d Khambulatov\u2014formerly Ramzan Kadyrov\u2019s personal bodyguard\u2014was implicated in an incident<\/a> at the entrance to temporarily occupied Melitopol. Kadyrov\u2019s men openly assaulted military police officers at a checkpoint and threatened them with weapons. Such deliberately provocative behavior appears designed to intimidate military police and facilitate the unchecked passage of vehicles carrying illegal weapons.<\/p>\n

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Commander of the Vostok-Akhmat battalion Vakha Khambulatov and Ramzan Kadyrov<\/i><\/p>\n

Below is an excerpt from correspondence between Radzhabov and Dmitriev. Dmitriev handed over the weapons either to Radzhabov himself or to his trusted persons, for example, the commander of the Vostok-Akhmat reconnaissance platoon, Ali “Nokhcho” Osmayev.<\/p>\n

One particularly revealing message from Radzhabov reads:\u00a0“Bro, we can smuggle even nukes, if we have to”.<\/b><\/p>\n

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Screenshots of messaging between Radzhabov and Dmitriev<\/i><\/p>\n

These exchanges continued throughout the year. During this period, Dmitriev\u2019s financial situation visibly improved: he purchased expensive clothing and other high-value items. Throughout the entire \u201cpartnership\u201d with Radzhabov, weapons transfers were suspended only a few times\u2014specifically after insider warnings about intensified FSB inspections.<\/p>\n

Active combat operations greatly facilitated fraudulent write-offs. For example, on June 11, 2024, Dmitriev received ten AK-12 rifles with ammunition for his unit. By June 25, he formally returned only three AK-12s and one captured AK-74, leaving six new assault rifles \u201cwritten off\u201d and available for illicit sale.<\/p>\n

He also shared proceeds with accomplices: the acting head of the weapons and ordnance service, D. Timoshin, received $200 per rifle, while the warehouse chief, D. Rovensky, received $50 per weapon.<\/p>\n

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Internal weapons transfer documentation<\/i><\/p>\n

This stage of Major Dmitriev\u2019s \u201cservice\u201d ended in May 2025, when he was transferred from the assault company of the 291st MRR (military unit 43057) to military unit 41830 in the village of Terpinnia, Melitopol district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Shortly thereafter, he was reassigned as head of the 121st Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee in temporarily occupied Donetsk\u2014his current duty station.<\/p>\n

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Dmitriev’s proof of employment at the Investigative Committee of Russia in occupied Donetsk.<\/i><\/p>\n

The scale of the weapons trafficking in the Russian army is significant. Some smugglers even get caught. Thus, following tip-offs to the FSB from “concerned citizens,” a large-scale raid took place on December 12, 2025, when the FSB, police, and the Russian National Guard detained 169 individuals<\/a> from 53 regions of Russia involved in illegal arms trafficking. Among the items seized were machine guns, assault rifles, grenade launchers, marksman rifles, mines, approximately 220,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as large quantities of TNT and gunpowder.<\/p>\n

According to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the first half of 2025 saw a record surge in crime, with over 27,000 registered offenses, compared to 23,700 during the same period in 2024. Regions bordering territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russian forces lead this trend.<\/p>\n

Major Dmitriev and his accomplices from Vostok-Akhmat were not detained during that operation. Their reckoning still lies ahead. Nevertheless, Dmitriev has already completed another task that may seriously complicate his future service.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Epilogue: hijacking a fundraiser<\/h2>\n

Ukrainian hacktivists from the 256th Cyber Assault Division used Major Dmitriev as an unwilling tool to hijack a fundraiser run by Two Majors, a Russian pro-war Telegram channel with over one million subscribers.<\/p>\n

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Correspondence with Dmitriev before this publication<\/i><\/p>\n

Hacktivists took advantage of the fundraiser request function on Two Majors<\/a> on behalf of the Russian 291st MRR and contacted the admins posing as Major Dmitriev, who later “helped” to channel the funds to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.<\/p>\n

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Dmitriev’s correspondence with the administrators of the Two Majors channel<\/i><\/p>\n

According to the hacktivists, the funds were used to purchase drones for Ukrainian SOF units, accompanied by a video report from the soldiers. All that remains is to congratulate the Russcists who donated to Two Majors in support of the 291st MRR\u2014their money ultimately strengthened Ukraine\u2019s Defense Forces.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/01\/\u0443\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456-\u0432\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0456-\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0442.mp4<\/a><\/video><\/div>\n

Read more:<\/b><\/h2>\n