{"id":19111,"date":"2026-04-08T08:08:32","date_gmt":"2026-04-08T08:08:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19111"},"modified":"2026-04-08T08:08:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-08T08:08:32","slug":"rus-sof-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/rus-sof-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"Reconnaissance and strike complex doctrine of the Russian Special Operations Forces increasing effectiveness of Iran&#8217;s attacks"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Having analyzed open sources data, analytical reports, and doctrinal materials from the Russian Armed Forces, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community identified patterns that offer an explanation to the nine-fold increase in the effectiveness of Iranian strikes against the allies.<\/p>\n<p>This significant change does not look like an organic evolution of the combat capability. It demonstrates a clear logic and coincide in time with the information about Russia sharing intelligence with Iran. Taken together, the facts point to a deeper process. Iran is gaining access to the Russian warfare model and experience, which centers on the Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a core element enabling the entire operational complex.<\/p>\n<h2>Doctrine explaining practice<\/h2>\n<p>Over the past decades, Russian military theory has developed a concept bringing reconnaissance and firepower together into a unified process within reconnaissance-strike complex (RSC) and reconnaissance-fire complex (RFC).<\/p>\n<p>Their logic is simple, and at the same time, it fundamentally changes the nature of war. Target identification, transmission of coordinates, decision-making and the fires are looped into one continuous cycle. The time between these stages is reduced to a minimum.<\/p>\n<p>Satellites or drones alone are not enough for such a complex to operate. It requires a component that can update, verify, and adapt the information to a specific attack. In the Russian doctrine, this function is performed by the SOF interfacing the reconnaissance and fire assets. The SOF update the target coordinates, transmit them to the battle management system, adjust the strikes and evaluate the effect.<\/p>\n<p>This is why the SOF are at the core of the RSC and RFC.<\/p>\n<h2>RFC and RSC as instruments of modern warfare<\/h2>\n<p>The reconnaissance and strike complex (RSC) was developed for the use of high-precision long-range weapon systems that receive data in near-real time. This complex combines satellite and drone reconnaissance, SIGINT and command centers, ensuring the engagement of targets at operational and strategic depth.<\/p>\n<p>The reconnaissance and fire complex (RFC) is traditionally described as a tactical-level network integrating the reconnaissance with artillery or close aviation support to quickly engage targets. At the same time, in modern Russian doctrine these complexes do not operate in isolation. They function as a single multi-level system, where tactical, operational and strategic assets are combined into a unified fires complex.<\/p>\n<p>Both complexes require constant interaction between their different components. In this system, the SOF play the role of an element that ensures accuracy and synchronization at all levels. They make it possible to connect different command and control levels ensuring the process continuity from reconnaissance to fires.<\/p>\n<p>Without this link, even the best intelligence data will not produce the desired result.<\/p>\n<h2>Intel sharing and its true meaning<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07\/\">Reuters<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/03\/06\/politics\/russia-aiding-iran-targeting\">CNN<\/a> report that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery and data on targets, including US military installations.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/iran-news\/article-892256\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Jerusalem Post<\/a> also recently reported that Russia handed over to Iran a hit list of 55 critical Israeli energy facilities.<\/p>\n<p>In this context, it is worth mentioning the reports about Russia&#8217;s proposal to the US that it would stop the intelligence data transfer to Iran in exchange for the US limiting its intelligence support for Ukraine. A proposal of this kind is only possible if the data transfer really takes place.<\/p>\n<p>However, the mere fact of intelligence sharing does not answer the main question of how exactly could Iran increase the effectiveness of its strikes so sharply.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\">\n<p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">Iranian missile hit rates against Israel have increased significantly, rising from 3% during the initial two weeks of the war to 27%.<\/p>\n<p>Source: JP Morgan <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/45erqvnl6X\">pic.twitter.com\/45erqvnl6X<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014 Clash Report (@clashreport) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/clashreport\/status\/2041247100860555599?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">April 6, 2026<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><script src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\"><\/script><\/p>\n<p>According to a report by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, the effectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles increased nine-fold from about 3 percent in the first weeks to about 27 percent in mid-March.<\/p>\n<p>This growth occurs in parallel with a shift in the structure of attacks. Data from the Institute for the Study of War and J.P. Morgan Asset Management <a href=\"https:\/\/am.jpmorgan.com\/content\/dam\/jpm-am-aem\/global\/en\/insights\/eye-on-the-market\/salems-lot-amv.pdf\">show a growing proportion<\/a> of missile strikes at precisely the moment when their effectiveness increases.<\/p>\n<p>In military terms, this means that the attacker has received a more reliable targeting mechanism.<\/p>\n<p>The choice of cluster munitions mentioned in the report could increase the kill area. However, this does not explain the selection of targets, the synchronization of strikes, or the penetration of air defenses, i.e. all the factors leading to the nine-fold effectiveness increase. All this requires a control system.<\/p>\n<h2>The role of the Russian SOF in explaining this effect<\/h2>\n<p>The answer to these questions must be sought in the doctrine of Russian Special Operations Forces.\u00a0The SOF operate at depths where technical reconnaissance has limited accuracy. They update the information, confirm targets and ensure the transmission of precise coordinates. They also evaluate the effect and inform decisions about repeat strikes.<\/p>\n<p>In this logic, even satellite data becomes just one element of the system. The ability to integrate all this data into a single process becomes a decisive factor.\u00a0The increase in the accuracy of Iranian strikes fits this model.<\/p>\n<h2>Transfer of experience<\/h2>\n<p>Russia has already used a similar approach in Syria. There, the SOF provided guidance for aircraft and missiles in complex environment.<\/p>\n<p>Today we see the same logic, albeit in a different configuration. Iran is the executor of the strikes, while Russia is providing the information and operational base.\u00a0This allows Moscow to influence the conflict without direct involvement.<\/p>\n<h2>Energy infrastructure as a strategic target<\/h2>\n<p>The targets featured in the leaks reported by The Jerusalem Post are not random. Energy infrastructure allows for systemic effects.<\/p>\n<p>Russia has already used this approach in its war against Ukraine. A failure of the power grid leads to cascading consequences and affects the functioning of the state as a whole.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, strikes on air defense systems are being reported. They reduce the protection capability and increase the effectiveness of subsequent attacks.<\/p>\n<h2>Why is this beneficial for Russia?<\/h2>\n<p>Russia is interested in prolonging the conflict in the Middle East. This distracts the US from Ukraine and forces it to redistribute resources.<\/p>\n<p>The energy factor plays a separate role. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz are impacting global oil and gas supplies. This keeps prices high and gives Russia additional revenue.\u00a0Thus, military cooperation with Iran also has a clear economic rationale.<\/p>\n<p>Back in 2023, InformNapalm published the <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/bagdasarovleaks-hacking-semyon-bagdasarov\/\">BagdasarovLeaks<\/a> CYBINT investigation, which addressed issues of cooperation between Russia and Iran, including the energy sector.\u00a0In hindsight, these materials appear to be part of a long-term strategy that has been put into practice.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>The increasing effectiveness of Iranian strikes, their precise synchronization with intelligence transfer, and their alignment with Russian military doctrine form a coherent picture. Apparently, we are witnessing Iran&#8217;s integration into Russia&#8217;s RSC, where the SOF play a key role in ensuring accuracy, coordination, and speed of decision-making.<\/p>\n<p>This means that the experience of the war against Ukraine is already extending beyond one theater of military operations and is being transferred to other regions. A conflict model is emerging in which intelligence, technology, and proxy forces are combined into a single system capable of acting and scaling up quickly.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, we are witnessing mutual integration of the combat capabilities of authoritarian regimes in real time. Russia is helping Iran to wage war against Israel and the United States on a deeper level than it may appear at first glance. This is not about exchanging specific data, but about transmitting a holistic warfare logic, where all elements work as a joint mechanism.<\/p>\n<p>Such processes have the ability to escalate quickly. Ignoring this trend carries the risk of exponentially worsening situation. The protracted war in the Middle East, its increasing intensity and the expansion of the circle of participants are becoming not a side effect, but an expected result.<\/p>\n<p>The longer this interaction goes unanswered, the more difficult it will be to contain its consequences.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Read more:<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/polus-24_and_mu_33949\/\">Polus-24 and Military Unit 33949: documents obtained by cyber specialists lead to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/opshackrussiasday\/\">Budapest as a hub for the Russian defense industry: Hungary facilitating dodging of international sanctions against Russia<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/we-can-smuggle-even-nukes\/\">&#8220;We can smuggle even nukes&#8221;: Russian officers from the 291st Regiment and Vostok-Akhmat establish weapons smuggling channel through Crimea<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-drone-operators-use-belarus\/\">Ukrainian hackers uncover how Russian drone operators are using Belarus<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/rosiiskym-viiskovym-zaboroniaiut-telegram\/\">The Russian General Staff is banning Telegram for military personnel: information leaks or risk of field communications collapse<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<p><b><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/><\/b>Compiled specially for InformNapalm readership. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to\u00a0InformNapalm social media pages.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/>InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country\u2019s government or large donors. Only community volunteers and our readers help us to maintain the site. You can also become one of the community volunteers or support InformNapalm with your donations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Having analyzed open sources data, analytical reports, and doctrinal materials from the Russian Armed Forces, InformNapalm volunteer&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":117,"featured_media":19110,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[528,679],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-19111","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","category-top-investigations"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO 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InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community identified patterns that offer an explanation to the nine-fold increase in the effectiveness of Iranian strikes against the allies.\r\n\r\nThis significant change does not look like an organic evolution of the combat capability. It demonstrates a clear logic and coincide in time with the information about Russia sharing intelligence with Iran. Taken together, the facts point to a deeper process. Iran is gaining access to the Russian warfare model and experience, which centers on the Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a core element enabling the entire operational complex.\r\n<h2>Doctrine explaining practice<\/h2>\r\nOver the past decades, Russian military theory has developed a concept bringing reconnaissance and firepower together into a unified process within reconnaissance-strike complex (RSC) and reconnaissance-fire complex (RFC).\r\n\r\nTheir logic is simple, and at the same time, it fundamentally changes the nature of war. Target identification, transmission of coordinates, decision-making and the fires are looped into one continuous cycle. The time between these stages is reduced to a minimum.\r\n\r\nSatellites or drones alone are not enough for such a complex to operate. It requires a component that can update, verify, and adapt the information to a specific attack. In the Russian doctrine, this function is performed by the SOF interfacing the reconnaissance and fire assets. The SOF update the target coordinates, transmit them to the battle management system, adjust the strikes and evaluate the effect.\r\n\r\nThis is why the SOF are at the core of the RSC and RFC.\r\n<h2>RFC and RSC as instruments of modern warfare<\/h2>\r\nThe reconnaissance and strike complex (RSC) was developed for the use of high-precision long-range weapon systems that receive data in near-real time. This complex combines satellite and drone reconnaissance, SIGINT and command centers, ensuring the engagement of targets at operational and strategic depth.\r\n\r\nThe reconnaissance and fire complex (RFC) is traditionally described as a tactical-level network integrating the reconnaissance with artillery or close aviation support to quickly engage targets. At the same time, in modern Russian doctrine these complexes do not operate in isolation. They function as a single multi-level system, where tactical, operational and strategic assets are combined into a unified fires complex.\r\n\r\nBoth complexes require constant interaction between their different components. In this system, the SOF play the role of an element that ensures accuracy and synchronization at all levels. They make it possible to connect different command and control levels ensuring the process continuity from reconnaissance to fires.\r\n\r\nWithout this link, even the best intelligence data will not produce the desired result.\r\n<h2>Intel sharing and its true meaning<\/h2>\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07\/\">Reuters<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/03\/06\/politics\/russia-aiding-iran-targeting\">CNN<\/a> report that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery and data on targets, including US military installations.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/iran-news\/article-892256\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Jerusalem Post<\/a> also recently reported that Russia handed over to Iran a hit list of 55 critical Israeli energy facilities.\r\n\r\nIn this context, it is worth mentioning the reports about Russia's proposal to the US that it would stop the intelligence data transfer to Iran in exchange for the US limiting its intelligence support for Ukraine. A proposal of this kind is only possible if the data transfer really takes place.\r\n\r\nHowever, the mere fact of intelligence sharing does not answer the main question of how exactly could Iran increase the effectiveness of its strikes so sharply.\r\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\">\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">Iranian missile hit rates against Israel have increased significantly, rising from 3% during the initial two weeks of the war to 27%.<\/p>\r\nSource: JP Morgan <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/45erqvnl6X\">pic.twitter.com\/45erqvnl6X<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u2014 Clash Report (@clashreport) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/clashreport\/status\/2041247100860555599?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">April 6, 2026<\/a><\/blockquote>\r\n<script src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\"><\/script>\r\n\r\nAccording to a report by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, the effectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles increased nine-fold from about 3 percent in the first weeks to about 27 percent in mid-March.\r\n\r\nThis growth occurs in parallel with a shift in the structure of attacks. Data from the Institute for the Study of War and J.P. Morgan Asset Management <a href=\"https:\/\/am.jpmorgan.com\/content\/dam\/jpm-am-aem\/global\/en\/insights\/eye-on-the-market\/salems-lot-amv.pdf\">show a growing proportion<\/a> of missile strikes at precisely the moment when their effectiveness increases.\r\n\r\nIn military terms, this means that the attacker has received a more reliable targeting mechanism.\r\n\r\nThe choice of cluster munitions mentioned in the report could increase the kill area. However, this does not explain the selection of targets, the synchronization of strikes, or the penetration of air defenses, i.e. all the factors leading to the nine-fold effectiveness increase. All this requires a control system.\r\n<h2>The role of the Russian SOF in explaining this effect<\/h2>\r\nThe answer to these questions must be sought in the doctrine of Russian Special Operations Forces.\u00a0The SOF operate at depths where technical reconnaissance has limited accuracy. They update the information, confirm targets and ensure the transmission of precise coordinates. They also evaluate the effect and inform decisions about repeat strikes.\r\n\r\nIn this logic, even satellite data becomes just one element of the system. The ability to integrate all this data into a single process becomes a decisive factor.\u00a0The increase in the accuracy of Iranian strikes fits this model.\r\n<h2>Transfer of experience<\/h2>\r\nRussia has already used a similar approach in Syria. There, the SOF provided guidance for aircraft and missiles in complex environment.\r\n\r\nToday we see the same logic, albeit in a different configuration. Iran is the executor of the strikes, while Russia is providing the information and operational base.\u00a0This allows Moscow to influence the conflict without direct involvement.\r\n<h2>Energy infrastructure as a strategic target<\/h2>\r\nThe targets featured in the leaks reported by The Jerusalem Post are not random. Energy infrastructure allows for systemic effects.\r\n\r\nRussia has already used this approach in its war against Ukraine. A failure of the power grid leads to cascading consequences and affects the functioning of the state as a whole.\r\n\r\nAt the same time, strikes on air defense systems are being reported. They reduce the protection capability and increase the effectiveness of subsequent attacks.\r\n<h2>Why is this beneficial for Russia?<\/h2>\r\nRussia is interested in prolonging the conflict in the Middle East. This distracts the US from Ukraine and forces it to redistribute resources.\r\n\r\nThe energy factor plays a separate role. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz are impacting global oil and gas supplies. This keeps prices high and gives Russia additional revenue.\u00a0Thus, military cooperation with Iran also has a clear economic rationale.\r\n\r\nBack in 2023, InformNapalm published the <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/bagdasarovleaks-hacking-semyon-bagdasarov\/\">BagdasarovLeaks<\/a> CYBINT investigation, which addressed issues of cooperation between Russia and Iran, including the energy sector.\u00a0In hindsight, these materials appear to be part of a long-term strategy that has been put into practice.\r\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\r\nThe increasing effectiveness of Iranian strikes, their precise synchronization with intelligence transfer, and their alignment with Russian military doctrine form a coherent picture. Apparently, we are witnessing Iran's integration into Russia's RSC, where the SOF play a key role in ensuring accuracy, coordination, and speed of decision-making.\r\n\r\nThis means that the experience of the war against Ukraine is already extending beyond one theater of military operations and is being transferred to other regions. A conflict model is emerging in which intelligence, technology, and proxy forces are combined into a single system capable of acting and scaling up quickly.\r\n\r\nIn fact, we are witnessing mutual integration of the combat capabilities of authoritarian regimes in real time. Russia is helping Iran to wage war against Israel and the United States on a deeper level than it may appear at first glance. This is not about exchanging specific data, but about transmitting a holistic warfare logic, where all elements work as a joint mechanism.\r\n\r\nSuch processes have the ability to escalate quickly. Ignoring this trend carries the risk of exponentially worsening situation. The protracted war in the Middle East, its increasing intensity and the expansion of the circle of participants are becoming not a side effect, but an expected result.\r\n\r\nThe longer this interaction goes unanswered, the more difficult it will be to contain its consequences.\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<h2>Read more:<\/h2>\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/polus-24_and_mu_33949\/\">Polus-24 and Military Unit 33949: documents obtained by cyber specialists lead to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/opshackrussiasday\/\">Budapest as a hub for the Russian defense industry: Hungary facilitating dodging of international sanctions against Russia<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/we-can-smuggle-even-nukes\/\">\"We can smuggle even nukes\": Russian officers from the 291st Regiment and Vostok-Akhmat establish weapons smuggling channel through Crimea<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-drone-operators-use-belarus\/\">Ukrainian hackers uncover how Russian drone operators are using Belarus<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/rosiiskym-viiskovym-zaboroniaiut-telegram\/\">The Russian General Staff is banning Telegram for military personnel: information leaks or risk of field communications collapse<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<b><img class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/><\/b>Compiled specially for InformNapalm readership. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to\u00a0InformNapalm social media pages.\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<img class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/>InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country\u2019s government or large donors. Only community volunteers and our readers help us to maintain the site. You can also become one of the community volunteers or support InformNapalm with your donations.","amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19111","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/117"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19111"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19111\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":19113,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19111\/revisions\/19113"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19110"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19111"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19111"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19111"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}