{"id":19116,"date":"2026-04-30T04:54:01","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T04:54:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19116"},"modified":"2026-05-01T07:29:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-01T07:29:01","slug":"cybint_against_gonets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/","title":{"rendered":"CYBINT operation against the Gonets satellite system, dubbed &#8220;Russia&#8217;s equivalent of Starlink&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Cyber specialists from the <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/256CyberAssault\/status\/2021900627916267946\"><b>256th Cyber Assault Division<\/b><\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/ukrainian_militant\/37152\"><b>Ukrainian Militant<\/b><\/a> analytical group, in cooperation with <a href=\"https:\/\/linktr.ee\/informnapalm\"><b>InformNapalm<\/b><\/a> volunteer intelligence community conducted another joint CYBINT operation against Russian companies associated with the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n<p>The large-scale operation, which lasted several years, yielded classified documents from organizations working in the interests of the Russian army. Hacktivists gained access to private correspondence and documents of the deputy general director <b>of JSC Satellite System Gonets<\/b> and his subordinates. Over many months from 2023 to 2025, information was systematically transmitted to the Ukrainian Defense Forces.<br \/>\nAfter completing all reconnaissance phases and securing the sources of information, the operation&#8217;s participants took a long pause to ensure the operations security (OPSEC) of associated ops.<\/p>\n<p>Today we are publishing a small portion of the retrieved data confirming the hacking of the SS Gonets internal documentation. On the one hand, it may be of interest to the public, and on the other have an additional impact on the targets of this operation.<\/p>\n<p>Archived video from the presentation of the SS Gonets to Dmitry Medvedev: the Gonets satellite is being positioned in Russia as &#8220;its own Starlink&#8221;, and it is announced that Russian specialists plan to install terminals on UAVs in the future.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/aw5xrKxTQv0?si=lz1Kv60G1rLEdMIP\" width=\"640\" height=\"340\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\">\ufeff<\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>However, its technical specifications and capabilities differ significantly from the American system.\u00a0The Gonets is a protracted Russian attempt to create its own low-orbit communications system, so far very much inferior to the American Starlink.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/BbKWIncl4Pc?si=982uq_QNA69Scmda\" width=\"642\" height=\"340\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\">\ufeff<\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Its development has been marred with delays not only due to the pressures of the Russian sanctions, but also due to successful, multi-year cyber operations organized by Ukrainian IT specialists.<\/p>\n<p>In this context, let us recall that in February 2026, a number of Ukrainian publications, including the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense&#8217;+s online media outlet <a href=\"https:\/\/armyinform.com.ua\/2026\/02\/12\/rosiyany-profinansuvaly-blokuvannya-ponad-2400-vlasnyh-starlinkiv\/\">ArmyInform<\/a>, the Ukrainian news portal <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ua\/ukr\/news\/tilki-pochatok-minoboroni-zayavili-vdalu-1770924502.html\">RBC-Ukraine<\/a>, and other media, reported on the details of another unique CYBINT operation. Ukrainian cyber specialists created a honeypot to collect data on the precise locations of Starlink terminals that were <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/53657-kak-rossiya-masshtabiruet-ispolzovanie-starlink-na-dronah\/\">smuggled into Russia<\/a> through third countries and used by the Russian military. The operation also helped identify individuals trying to provide whitelisting services to the enemy to circumvent restrictions imposed by SpaceX.<\/p>\n<h2>Vulnerabilities and entry points of the SS Gonets systems<\/h2>\n<p>Several top managers and IT specialists, including Deputy General Director <b>Alexey Labzin<\/b> (Rus: \u041b\u0430\u0431\u0437\u0438\u043d \u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0435\u0439 \u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0447) became conduits for one of the numerous leaks from the SS Gonets.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/5-\u2013-\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0456\u044f.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32776\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/5-\u2013-\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0456\u044f.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1060\" height=\"727\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In his CV, Labzin noted that he was directly managing 3 departments and 14 people. Among his responsibilities, he listed maintenance of IT infrastructure in the central office (110 PCs, 18 servers, network equipment), as well as support for 8 remote branches \u2013 all in all more than 300 employees (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/labzin_res_2023.pdf\">PDF curriculum vitae 2023<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Here is what Labzin indicates in the long list of his main functions at the SS Gonets:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>technical maintenance, functionality restoration of personal computers, printing devices, other office equipment, servers, local area network equipment, data storage systems;<\/li>\n<li>development and implementation of plans for the introduction of new computer equipment and technologies;<\/li>\n<li>ensuring information security\u2026<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In ensuring information security, he was assisted by another experienced military specialist \u2013 the Chief Cryptographic Information Protection Service Specialist of the SS Gonets <b>Vladimir Katayev<\/b>, who was also hacked by Ukrainian cyber specialists.<\/p>\n<p>It is worth making a small historical digression here. Until 2019, Katayev served as a senior engineer in the secret military unit 46179 (the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, responsible for technical support of the nuclear forces and security of the Russian Federation). And in general, throughout his military career, he served in units of the 12th Main Directoratein positions related to the protection of military secrets.<\/p>\n<p>Read more:\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/polus-24_and_mu_33949\/\">Polus-24 and Military Unit 33949: documents obtained by cyber specialists lead to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/1.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32777\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1383\" height=\"1418\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/2.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32778\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"992\" height=\"364\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/4.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32779\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/4.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1304\" height=\"890\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Now that we&#8217;ve introduced leading information security and data protection specialists of SS Gonets, we can move on to information about their internal IT infrastructure.<\/p>\n<h2>IT infrastructure of the SS Gonets<\/h2>\n<p>In open sources, the SS Gonets is described as a low-orbit satellite communication system. Its stated purpose is to provide communication outside GSM coverage areas, transmit geospatial data, telemetry, and exchange messages between subscribers and infrastructure facilities. The SS Gonets is part of the Russian Federation&#8217;s space industry infrastructure and operates in cooperation with the Roscosmos. The company also participates in the operation of the Luch space relay system, which ensures data transmissions from launch vehicles and spacecraft.<\/p>\n<p>The ground-based part of the system consists of several regional stations located in Moscow, Zheleznogorsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Murmansk, Rostov-on-Don, Norilsk and Anadyr. Particularly indicative is the site near the Orbita station in Anadyr, which is listed not with an address in the documentation, but rather at the following coordinates:\u00a0<b>64\u00b043&#8217;55.8\u2033N 177\u00b028&#8217;39.3\u2033E<\/b><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/cor.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32780\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/cor.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1261\" height=\"726\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Internal documents extracted within the CYBINT operation indicate that at the company&#8217;s legal address at 53\/2 Baumanskaya st., Moscow, is also the physical location of the company&#8217;s the main IT infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>Security system&#8217;s technical specifications list this address as the deployment location for of the central access control system (ACS) software. This is a main control center for the entire infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>A revealing fragment of the leak was the internal network table and documentation of the 1C system. They explicitly show that the system was being fine-tuned to generate reports on the performance of government contracts within the framework of state defense procurement of the Russian Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n<p>Internal documents also reveal the impact of international sanctions, which made the company run its equipment on outdated software.<\/p>\n<p>Some documents from the data cache as an example:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Technical specifications (TS) for the security system development for the offices of the SS Gonets (converted to <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/tzGonec-v8.pdf\">PDF format for viewing<\/a>)<\/li>\n<li>\u00a0Digitalization concept of the SS Gonets (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/concepcia.pdf\">PDF<\/a>)<\/li>\n<li>TS for the Improvement of the of the SS Gonets financial system (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/fin1c.pdf\">PDF<\/a>)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>53\/2 Baumanskaya St., Moscow<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>head office, management seat;<\/li>\n<li>central server infrastructure location;<\/li>\n<li>IP telephony and video conferencing modernization unit;<\/li>\n<li>central server of the access control system<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The office infrastructure includes:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>about 60 workstations;<\/li>\n<li>server room;<\/li>\n<li>routers and switches;<\/li>\n<li>Altell Neo 120 and Cisco ASA 5505 firewalls;<\/li>\n<li>DELL, Supermicro and Aquarius servers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The servers use different legacy operating systems:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Windows Server 2016<\/li>\n<li>Windows Server 2012 R2<\/li>\n<li>Ubuntu<\/li>\n<li>CentOS<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Key services include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Active Directory<\/li>\n<li>Microsoft Exchange<\/li>\n<li>Hyper-V<\/li>\n<li>DHCP, DNS<\/li>\n<li>FTP<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In fact, this platform acts as the control center for the entire corporate network.<\/p>\n<p>The internal network used the subnet:\u00a0192\/168\/20.<\/p>\n<p>Among the recorded nodes:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>192.168.20.1 \u2013 MicroTik gateway<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.2 \u2013 domain controller<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.4 \u2013 Exchange mail server<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.7 \u2013 1C server<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.9 \u2013 Parsec access control system<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.12 \u2013 document management + SQL<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.16 \u2013 Kaspersky Security Center<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.17 \u2013 Activity Monitor<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.25 \u2013 web hosting<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.28 \u2013 SVN<\/li>\n<li>192.168.20.190 \u2013 repository for developers<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The network also contains IP addresses of CCTV cameras and gateways of other offices.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>This CYBINT operation demonstrates not only the hacking of an individual Russian company, but also systemic cybersecurity weakness of Russia&#8217;s critical infrastructure. The findings indicate that even structures integrated into the military-industrial complex and linked to the space industry remain vulnerable due to outdated software, centralized architecture, and human factors.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, the published materials are only a fragment of a much wider array of information. They provide a glimpse of the scale of penetration, but do not reveal its full depth, maintaining uncertainty for the adversary. This approach is part of a modern cyber strategy, where information is used not only as evidence, but also as a tool of influence.<\/p>\n<p>Ukrainian cyber specialists showed that they are capable of systematically taking on complex targets, combining technical capabilities with analytics and long-term planning. In modern warfare, this becomes a separate front, where success is determined not by the number of attacks, but by the depth of penetration, the quality and the application of of the obtained data.<\/p>\n<p>As an afterword, we can show an example of a document that all major Russian military-industrial complex enterprises periodically receive.<\/p>\n<p>It talks about the actions of Ukrainian hackers exploiting software vulnerabilities. Ironically, these recommendations are made by people like Katyaev, who have spent their entire lives working in the field of information security and state secrets.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/12345.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32781\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/12345.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1280\" height=\"641\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<h2>Read more:<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/we-can-smuggle-even-nukes\/\">&#8220;We can smuggle even nukes&#8221;: Russian officers from the 291st Regiment and Vostok-Akhmat establish weapons smuggling channel through Crimea<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-drone-operators-use-belarus\/\">Ukrainian hackers uncover how Russian drone operators are using Belarus<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/okbm-leaks-classified-documents\/\">OKBMLeaks: classified documents from a Russian\u00a0 components manufacturer for Su-57 fighter and PAK DA Poslannik next-gen bomber<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<p><b><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/><\/b>Compiled specially for InformNapalm readership. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to\u00a0InformNapalm social media pages.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/>InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country\u2019s government or large donors. Only community volunteers and our readers help us to maintain the site. You can also become one of the community volunteers or support InformNapalm with your donations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Cyber specialists from the 256th Cyber Assault Division and Ukrainian Militant analytical group, in cooperation with InformNapalm&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":117,"featured_media":19117,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8552,528,8525],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-19116","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cyber-resistance","category-news","category-russian-ukrainian-war"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site 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intelligence community conducted another joint CYBINT operation against Russian companies associated with the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.","og_url":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/","og_site_name":"InformNapalm.org (English)","article_published_time":"2026-04-30T04:54:01+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-05-01T07:29:01+00:00","og_image":[{"width":642,"height":336,"url":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2026\/04\/1-1.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"ninja","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"ninja","Est. reading time":"9 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/"},"author":{"name":"ninja","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/2673601928324f455208edb62fcf9d50"},"headline":"CYBINT operation against the Gonets satellite system, dubbed &#8220;Russia&#8217;s equivalent of Starlink&#8221;","datePublished":"2026-04-30T04:54:01+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-01T07:29:01+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/"},"wordCount":1457,"commentCount":0,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2026\/04\/1-1.jpg","articleSection":["Cyber Resistance","News","Russian-Ukrainian war"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/","url":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/","name":"CYBINT operation against the Gonets satellite system, dubbed \"Russia's equivalent of Starlink\"","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2026\/04\/1-1.jpg","datePublished":"2026-04-30T04:54:01+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-01T07:29:01+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/2673601928324f455208edb62fcf9d50"},"description":"Cyber specialists from the 256th Cyber Assault Division and Ukrainian Militant analytical group, in cooperation with InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community conducted another joint CYBINT operation against Russian companies associated with the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2026\/04\/1-1.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2026\/04\/1-1.jpg","width":642,"height":336},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/cybint_against_gonets\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"CYBINT operation against the Gonets satellite system, dubbed &#8220;Russia&#8217;s equivalent of Starlink&#8221;"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/","name":"InformNapalm.org (English)","description":"Latest News from 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Assault Division<\/b><\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/ukrainian_militant\/37152\"><b>Ukrainian Militant<\/b><\/a> analytical group, in cooperation with <a href=\"https:\/\/linktr.ee\/informnapalm\"><b>InformNapalm<\/b><\/a> volunteer intelligence community conducted another joint CYBINT operation against Russian companies associated with the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.\r\n\r\nThe large-scale operation, which lasted several years, yielded classified documents from organizations working in the interests of the Russian army. Hacktivists gained access to private correspondence and documents of the deputy general director <b>of JSC Satellite System Gonets<\/b> and his subordinates. Over many months from 2023 to 2025, information was systematically transmitted to the Ukrainian Defense Forces.\r\nAfter completing all reconnaissance phases and securing the sources of information, the operation's participants took a long pause to ensure the operations security (OPSEC) of associated ops.\r\n\r\nToday we are publishing a small portion of the retrieved data confirming the hacking of the SS Gonets internal documentation. On the one hand, it may be of interest to the public, and on the other have an additional impact on the targets of this operation.\r\n\r\nArchived video from the presentation of the SS Gonets to Dmitry Medvedev: the Gonets satellite is being positioned in Russia as \"its own Starlink\", and it is announced that Russian specialists plan to install terminals on UAVs in the future.\r\n\r\n<iframe src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/aw5xrKxTQv0?si=lz1Kv60G1rLEdMIP\" width=\"640\" height=\"340\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\">\ufeff<\/iframe>\r\n\r\nHowever, its technical specifications and capabilities differ significantly from the American system.\u00a0The Gonets is a protracted Russian attempt to create its own low-orbit communications system, so far very much inferior to the American Starlink.\r\n\r\n<iframe src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/BbKWIncl4Pc?si=982uq_QNA69Scmda\" width=\"642\" height=\"340\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\">\ufeff<\/iframe>\r\n\r\nIts development has been marred with delays not only due to the pressures of the Russian sanctions, but also due to successful, multi-year cyber operations organized by Ukrainian IT specialists.\r\n\r\nIn this context, let us recall that in February 2026, a number of Ukrainian publications, including the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense'+s online media outlet <a href=\"https:\/\/armyinform.com.ua\/2026\/02\/12\/rosiyany-profinansuvaly-blokuvannya-ponad-2400-vlasnyh-starlinkiv\/\">ArmyInform<\/a>, the Ukrainian news portal <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ua\/ukr\/news\/tilki-pochatok-minoboroni-zayavili-vdalu-1770924502.html\">RBC-Ukraine<\/a>, and other media, reported on the details of another unique CYBINT operation. Ukrainian cyber specialists created a honeypot to collect data on the precise locations of Starlink terminals that were <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/53657-kak-rossiya-masshtabiruet-ispolzovanie-starlink-na-dronah\/\">smuggled into Russia<\/a> through third countries and used by the Russian military. The operation also helped identify individuals trying to provide whitelisting services to the enemy to circumvent restrictions imposed by SpaceX.\r\n<h2>Vulnerabilities and entry points of the SS Gonets systems<\/h2>\r\nSeveral top managers and IT specialists, including Deputy General Director <b>Alexey Labzin<\/b> (Rus: \u041b\u0430\u0431\u0437\u0438\u043d \u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0435\u0439 \u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0447) became conduits for one of the numerous leaks from the SS Gonets.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/5-\u2013-\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0456\u044f.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32776\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/5-\u2013-\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0456\u044f.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1060\" height=\"727\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nIn his CV, Labzin noted that he was directly managing 3 departments and 14 people. Among his responsibilities, he listed maintenance of IT infrastructure in the central office (110 PCs, 18 servers, network equipment), as well as support for 8 remote branches \u2013 all in all more than 300 employees (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/labzin_res_2023.pdf\">PDF curriculum vitae 2023<\/a>).\r\n\r\nHere is what Labzin indicates in the long list of his main functions at the SS Gonets:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>technical maintenance, functionality restoration of personal computers, printing devices, other office equipment, servers, local area network equipment, data storage systems;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>development and implementation of plans for the introduction of new computer equipment and technologies;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>ensuring information security\u2026<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nIn ensuring information security, he was assisted by another experienced military specialist \u2013 the Chief Cryptographic Information Protection Service Specialist of the SS Gonets <b>Vladimir Katayev<\/b>, who was also hacked by Ukrainian cyber specialists.\r\n\r\nIt is worth making a small historical digression here. Until 2019, Katayev served as a senior engineer in the secret military unit 46179 (the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, responsible for technical support of the nuclear forces and security of the Russian Federation). And in general, throughout his military career, he served in units of the 12th Main Directoratein positions related to the protection of military secrets.\r\n\r\nRead more:\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/polus-24_and_mu_33949\/\">Polus-24 and Military Unit 33949: documents obtained by cyber specialists lead to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/1.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32777\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1383\" height=\"1418\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/2.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32778\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"992\" height=\"364\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/4.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32779\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/4.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1304\" height=\"890\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nNow that we've introduced leading information security and data protection specialists of SS Gonets, we can move on to information about their internal IT infrastructure.\r\n<h2>IT infrastructure of the SS Gonets<\/h2>\r\nIn open sources, the SS Gonets is described as a low-orbit satellite communication system. Its stated purpose is to provide communication outside GSM coverage areas, transmit geospatial data, telemetry, and exchange messages between subscribers and infrastructure facilities. The SS Gonets is part of the Russian Federation's space industry infrastructure and operates in cooperation with the Roscosmos. The company also participates in the operation of the Luch space relay system, which ensures data transmissions from launch vehicles and spacecraft.\r\n\r\nThe ground-based part of the system consists of several regional stations located in Moscow, Zheleznogorsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Murmansk, Rostov-on-Don, Norilsk and Anadyr. Particularly indicative is the site near the Orbita station in Anadyr, which is listed not with an address in the documentation, but rather at the following coordinates:\u00a0<b>64\u00b043'55.8\u2033N 177\u00b028'39.3\u2033E<\/b>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/cor.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32780\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/cor.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1261\" height=\"726\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nInternal documents extracted within the CYBINT operation indicate that at the company's legal address at 53\/2 Baumanskaya st., Moscow, is also the physical location of the company's the main IT infrastructure.\r\n\r\nSecurity system's technical specifications list this address as the deployment location for of the central access control system (ACS) software. This is a main control center for the entire infrastructure.\r\n\r\nA revealing fragment of the leak was the internal network table and documentation of the 1C system. They explicitly show that the system was being fine-tuned to generate reports on the performance of government contracts within the framework of state defense procurement of the Russian Ministry of Defense.\r\n\r\nInternal documents also reveal the impact of international sanctions, which made the company run its equipment on outdated software.\r\n\r\nSome documents from the data cache as an example:\r\n<ol>\r\n \t<li>Technical specifications (TS) for the security system development for the offices of the SS Gonets (converted to <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/tzGonec-v8.pdf\">PDF format for viewing<\/a>)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>\u00a0Digitalization concept of the SS Gonets (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/concepcia.pdf\">PDF<\/a>)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>TS for the Improvement of the of the SS Gonets financial system (<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/fin1c.pdf\">PDF<\/a>)<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<b>53\/2 Baumanskaya St., Moscow<\/b>\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>head office, management seat;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>central server infrastructure location;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>IP telephony and video conferencing modernization unit;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>central server of the access control system<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nThe office infrastructure includes:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>about 60 workstations;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>server room;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>routers and switches;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Altell Neo 120 and Cisco ASA 5505 firewalls;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>DELL, Supermicro and Aquarius servers.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nThe servers use different legacy operating systems:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Windows Server 2016<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Windows Server 2012 R2<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Ubuntu<\/li>\r\n \t<li>CentOS<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nKey services include:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Active Directory<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Microsoft Exchange<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Hyper-V<\/li>\r\n \t<li>DHCP, DNS<\/li>\r\n \t<li>FTP<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nIn fact, this platform acts as the control center for the entire corporate network.\r\n\r\nThe internal network used the subnet:\u00a0192\/168\/20.\r\n\r\nAmong the recorded nodes:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.1 \u2013 MicroTik gateway<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.2 \u2013 domain controller<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.4 \u2013 Exchange mail server<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.7 \u2013 1C server<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.9 \u2013 Parsec access control system<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.12 \u2013 document management + SQL<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.16 \u2013 Kaspersky Security Center<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.17 \u2013 Activity Monitor<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.25 \u2013 web hosting<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.28 \u2013 SVN<\/li>\r\n \t<li>192.168.20.190 \u2013 repository for developers<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nThe network also contains IP addresses of CCTV cameras and gateways of other offices.\r\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\r\nThis CYBINT operation demonstrates not only the hacking of an individual Russian company, but also systemic cybersecurity weakness of Russia's critical infrastructure. The findings indicate that even structures integrated into the military-industrial complex and linked to the space industry remain vulnerable due to outdated software, centralized architecture, and human factors.\r\n\r\nAt the same time, the published materials are only a fragment of a much wider array of information. They provide a glimpse of the scale of penetration, but do not reveal its full depth, maintaining uncertainty for the adversary. This approach is part of a modern cyber strategy, where information is used not only as evidence, but also as a tool of influence.\r\n\r\nUkrainian cyber specialists showed that they are capable of systematically taking on complex targets, combining technical capabilities with analytics and long-term planning. In modern warfare, this becomes a separate front, where success is determined not by the number of attacks, but by the depth of penetration, the quality and the application of of the obtained data.\r\n\r\nAs an afterword, we can show an example of a document that all major Russian military-industrial complex enterprises periodically receive.\r\n\r\nIt talks about the actions of Ukrainian hackers exploiting software vulnerabilities. Ironically, these recommendations are made by people like Katyaev, who have spent their entire lives working in the field of information security and state secrets.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/12345.jpg\"><img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-32781\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/04\/12345.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1280\" height=\"641\" \/><\/a>\r\n<h2>Read more:<\/h2>\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/we-can-smuggle-even-nukes\/\">\"We can smuggle even nukes\": Russian officers from the 291st Regiment and Vostok-Akhmat establish weapons smuggling channel through Crimea<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-drone-operators-use-belarus\/\">Ukrainian hackers uncover how Russian drone operators are using Belarus<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/okbm-leaks-classified-documents\/\">OKBMLeaks: classified documents from a Russian\u00a0 components manufacturer for Su-57 fighter and PAK DA Poslannik next-gen bomber<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<b><img class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/><\/b>Compiled specially for InformNapalm readership. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to\u00a0InformNapalm social media pages.\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<img class=\"alignleft ls-is-cached lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/>InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country\u2019s government or large donors. Only community volunteers and our readers help us to maintain the site. You can also become one of the community volunteers or support InformNapalm with your donations.","amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19116","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/117"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19116"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19116\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":19120,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19116\/revisions\/19120"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19117"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19116"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19116"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19116"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}