{"id":19293,"date":"2026-10-19T06:50:34","date_gmt":"2026-10-19T06:50:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19293"},"modified":"2026-10-19T06:50:34","modified_gmt":"2026-10-19T06:50:34","slug":"alexander-babakov-geoffroy-doly-sanctions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/alexander-babakov-geoffroy-doly-sanctions\/","title":{"rendered":"The Shadow-Shifter: Alexander Babakov, His French Prot\u00e9g\u00e9, and the Resilience of Russian Proxy Networks"},"content":{"rendered":"
This CYBINT investigation was prepared by Louis Martin exclusively for InformNapalm, the international intelligence community, based on materials from the #BabakovLeaks leaks provided exclusively by the hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division.<\/pre>\n
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Elections come and go in Moscow\u2019s tightly managed parliamentary theatre, but the people behind the Kremlin\u2019s foreign influence operations tend to stay in place. After securing another term in the September 2026 State Duma elections, Alexander Babakov, the Duma\u2019s Deputy Chairman, remains a key figure in Russia\u2019s efforts to influence politics across Europe.<\/strong><\/p>\n
\"\u041e\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0440<\/a>Western capitals remember Babakov best as the broker behind the 2014 operation<\/a> that channelled a \u20ac9.4 million loan to Marine Le Pen\u2019s Front National<\/i> via a collapsing Prague-registered bank \u2013 an early preview of how deeply Moscow aimed to entangle French politics.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Russian Influence Operations and the Limits of Sanctions<\/h2>\n
For years, EU governments treated Russian hybrid information attacks as background noise that was easier to ignore. That illusion was shattered by Ukrainian drone strikes on Yandex data centres \u2014 Yandex being Russia\u2019s equivalent of Google and a central pillar of its sovereign cloud infrastructure. As soon as those servers went offline, people on social media began joking that the internet could finally breathe a little easier, as posts from fake accounts posing as European citizens became noticeably less frequent.<\/p>\n
Yet while troll farms take time to rebuild, the human architects directing these grey-zone operations remain securely in place. When the United States Treasury, the European Union, and their allies placed Babakov and his son, Mikhail, under primary sanctions, regulators assumed blacklisting would cripple their foreign network. It did not. Babakov had no need to set foot in Paris to maintain his reach; the family had already taken deep roots in France, including close relatives anchored directly in the capital. Instead, his apparatus bypassed travel and financial restrictions through a quiet human bridge of non-sanctioned Western proxies.<\/p>\n
\"Portr\u00e4t<\/a>
\n\"Russische<\/a>
\n\"Dokumente<\/a>
\n\"Personal-<\/a><\/p>\n
Biographical personnel records and curricula vitae detailing the Babakov family\u2019s extensive, pre-existing real estate and familial roots in France.<\/i><\/p>\n
A prime case study in this sanctions workaround is Geoffroy Marie Gonzague Doly, a French national embedded inside the Babakov orbit for over a decade.<\/p>\n
\"Portr\u00e4t<\/a>
\n\"Geoffroy<\/a><\/em>Excerpt from the passport of Geoffroy Marie Gonzague Doly, featured in the investigation materials. Certain personal details have been partially obscured by the editorial team. The original document is preserved in the editorial archive.<\/em><\/p>\n
From Academic Fronts to State Diplomacy<\/b><\/h2>\n
\"Visumantrag<\/a>
\nApril 2015 visa petition filed by the Moscow-based Institute for Research on International Integration Issues with the Russian Embassy in Vienna, underwriting Doly\u2019s residency.<\/i><\/p>\n
Doly\u2019s entry into this ecosystem began through a classic Moscow front. As exposed by #BabakovLeaks<\/a>, the network has long relied on opaque non-governmental organisations masquerading as independent research bodies. In April 2015, the Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation Institute for Research on International Integration Issues \u2013 a Moscow-based entity \u2013 petitioned the Russian embassy in Vienna for a multi-entry visa on behalf of the then 20-year-old French national. He was publicly framed as a research intern, ostensibly tied to a Viennese firm. The Institute provided Doly with an official paper trail of “scientific collaboration”.<\/p>\n
\"Diplomatisches<\/a>
\nFebruary 2023 diplomatic correspondence signed by Russian Ambassador Dmitry Kurakov in Dakar, requesting entry visas for Mikhail Babakov and Geoffroy Doly for an official State Duma mission.<\/i><\/p>\n
Over a decade, the young operative transitioned from a nominal research intern into a fixture within Alexander Babakov\u2019s inner circle. Administrative records and delegation manifests designate Doly as a “consultant” working alongside Mikhail Babakov. In February 2023, diplomatic correspondence signed by Russian Ambassador Dmitry Kurakov in Dakar formally requested entry visas for Mikhail Babakov and Doly to join an official State Duma mission to The Gambia led by parliamentary coordinator Nikolai Novichkov.<\/p>\n
\"Schreiben<\/a>
\nOfficial intervention letter signed by Alexander Babakov to Russian Ambassador to France Alexey Meshkov in Paris, leveraging parliamentary clout to secure a three-year multi-entry visa for Doly.<\/i><\/p>\n
The institutional sponsorship reached the highest levels of the Russian state: Alexander Babakov personally intervened with Russian Ambassador to France Alexey Meshkov in Paris, leveraging his parliamentary clout to secure a three-year multi-entry visa for Doly via the Institute for Research on International Integration Issues.<\/p>\n
This high-level access was managed directly from the top. Babakov\u2019s official Duma secretariat (pr401@mail.ru) and associated front organizations handled Doly\u2019s bureaucratic paperwork.<\/p>\n
\"E-Mail<\/a>
\nMarch 2023 email correspondence from Geoffroy Doly to Alexander Babakov\u2019s official State Duma secretariat (pr401@mail.ru), submitting conference registration paperwork.<\/i><\/p>\n
\"Offizielle<\/a>
\n\"Offizielle<\/a>
\n\"Offizielle<\/a>
\nOfficial parliamentary delegation and conference manifests designating Doly as a “Consultant” alongside senior state officials<\/i>.<\/p>\n
Business and logistics Intermediary<\/h2>\n
Beyond his role in various parliamentary delegations, Doly acts as a business and logistics intermediary across several countries. Company records and leaked travel logs point to a network spanning Moscow, the Western Balkans and Asia. Russian border logs from 2023 show Doly and Mikhail Babakov moving in lockstep across geopolitical hubs \u2013 sharing flights, checkpoints, and itineraries from Moscow to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Istanbul, Delhi, and Shanghai. Their travel was booked through a unified Moscow ticketing cluster (agency code 92150225) alongside perennial Babakov aides like Pavel Polikarpov and Evgenii Zobnin<\/strong><\/a>.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\"Registrierungsformular<\/a>
\nConference accreditation form for Geoffroy Doly, listing the corporate coordinates of AO “Strategy 350”.<\/i><\/p>\n
Entities like the Moscow-based AO “Strategy 350” (s350.ru), directed by Mikhail Babakov, anchor the domestic network, while traditional European real estate assets \u2013 such as the French property firm SCI du Chateau de St Leger<\/i> \u2013 maintain the Babakov family’s western footprint.<\/p>\n
\"Arbeitsvertrag<\/a>
\nDecember 2022 employment contract signed in Belgrade between Geoffroy Doly and BLK-SKY d.o.o., a corporate vehicle directed by Babakov associate Pavel Polikarpov.<\/i><\/p>\n
Following his acquisition of Serbian residency around 2021, Doly signed formal employment contracts in Belgrade with BLK-SKY d.o.o.<\/i>, a consulting firm directed by Babakov associate Pavel Polikarpov.<\/p>\n
Russian corporate registries tie Doly to equity holdings in entities such as LLC ALTACAP<\/i>, where he partners with long-standing Babakov associates like Sergey Mozhaev, alongside parallel corporate footprints stretching into Asia, including managerial and shareholder roles in Chengdu, China (Chengdu Hongqiang Mali Mianbao Co., Ltd.<\/i>).<\/p>\n
The compliance blind spot<\/h2>\n
The ease with which a young French national has woven his career into the circle of a sanctioned Kremlin power broker exposes a dangerous blind spot in Western enforcement.<\/p>\n
Doly is neither an ideologue nor a public political figure. Instead, he fills a vital logistical niche. When financial blacklists block direct travel and banking access for Russian principals, networks like Babakov’s require unflagged conduits. Armed with an EU passport and absolute discretion, Doly provides the quiet bridge needed to manage cross-border corporate vehicles, diplomatic access, and paperwork far below the radar of Western regulators.<\/p>\n
Operatives like Doly present a far more insidious challenge than noisy online trolls or extremist agitators. They leave no digital footprint of hostile rhetoric. Instead, they provide the silent, frictionless administrative scaffolding that allows Russian covert influence, asset management, and sanction-bypassing trade to endure undisturbed across Europe.<\/p>\n
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<\/b>This CYBINT investigation was prepared by Louis Martin exclusively for InformNapalm, the international intelligence community, based on materials from the #BabakovLeaks leaks provided exclusively by the hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to InformNapalm social media pages<\/a>.<\/p>\n
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