{"id":19318,"date":"2026-11-13T13:24:52","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T13:24:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=19318"},"modified":"2026-11-13T13:24:52","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T13:24:52","slug":"russia-seeking-to-radicalize-protests-in-france","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russia-seeking-to-radicalize-protests-in-france\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia seeking to radicalize protests in France: intercepted emails linked to a GRU officer"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community, in cooperation with hacktivists from 256 Cyber Assault Division and the Ukrainian Militant analytical group, exclusively publishes the findings of a new CYBINT investigation into Russian intelligence efforts to influence protest movements in France.<\/p>\n<p>Email correspondence obtained by the investigators and linked to Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer Stanislav Nemich reveals a campaign of covert interference \u2014 from amplifying protest demands and drawing new participants into demonstrations to obstructing compromise between protesters and the authorities.<\/p>\n<p>The investigation shows how Russian intelligence services seek to exploit genuine social divisions to increase tensions and destabilize France.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/LbP2tNH7t80?si=hXFGlQx8KZzfu5Z0\" width=\"642\" height=\"360\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><span style=\"display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;\" data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" class=\"mce_SELRES_start\">\ufeff<\/span><\/iframe><\/p>\n<h1><b>Radicalization and France\u2019s street protest infrastructure<\/b><\/h1>\n<p>French society has lived with persistent social tensions. Images of mass protests in the education sector, clashes with police, damaged buildings, burned vehicles and looted shops have become a recurring feature of news coverage.<\/p>\n<p>Left-wing and far-left groups have often been among the main driving forces behind these and earlier protests, including the R\u00e9volution Permanente movement and La France insoumise (LFI), together with its media platform L\u2019insoumission. Trade unions, university students and secondary-school students also mobilize around these movements.<\/p>\n<p>Recent street protests, however, show signs of a more troubling trend. Demonstrations are becoming more radical, while demands centered on social rights or better educational conditions quickly give way to hardline anti-government slogans. The actions of some groups during clashes with police also appear highly organized and coordinated.<\/p>\n<p>According to French Interior Minister Laurent Nu\u00f1ez and reports by the Police Prefecture, peaceful marches involving school and university students and trade unions were deliberately infiltrated by coordinated groups of masked provocateurs \u2014 casseurs \u2014 and black-clad radicals prepared for violent confrontation with police.<\/p>\n<p>During just two nationwide days of action, on October 17 and 24, law-enforcement agencies detained around 3,400 people. On one of those days alone, more than 100 people were arrested carrying bladed weapons or objects prepared in advance for use in attacks.<\/p>\n<p>Well-prepared groups of provocateurs followed a clear pattern. They deliberately smashed shop windows and vehicles, looted and set fire to civilian property, and provoked police into forceful responses involving crowd-control measures such as stun grenades and water cannons.<\/p>\n<p>On October 17 alone, around 1,000 police officers and gendarmes were injured. To contain the unrest, the government deployed more than 70,000 security personnel, along with armored vehicles, helicopters and drones.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, Russian disinformation networks rapidly amplified the resulting chaos. Staged or decontextualized footage of clashes was circulated through thousands of bot accounts. The aim was to create a distorted impression among European audiences that France was entering a \u201ccivil war,\u201d while pushing the protesters\u2019 original social demands out of the information space.<\/p>\n<p>These developments raise questions about the extent to which external actors interested in destabilization may be influencing the level of violence and the evolution of protest movements.<\/p>\n<p>Russia has long sought to exploit such tensions. Understanding its disruptive methodsboth on the ground and online is therefore relevant not only to France but to other Western democracies as well.<\/p>\n<p>The Kremlin uses several most straightforward and tested tools to exploit social tensions and cause political unrest.<\/p>\n<h2>Street-level operations<\/h2>\n<p>These methods can include hiring opportunistic individuals or criminal elements for relatively small sums to stage false-flag provocations; carrying out deliberately radical acts such as provocative disobedience, flag burnings, vandalism of landmarks or politically significant symbols; and using graffiti or similar acts to inflame religious or ethnic tensions.<\/p>\n<p>Another method is to plant agents or intermediaries inside radical street groups in order to influence organizers or individual participants from within \u2014 including by provoking police into a forceful response and helping turn peaceful demonstrations into riots.<\/p>\n<h2>Information operations<\/h2>\n<p>Russian influence methods can include creating anonymous protest groups on popular messaging platforms or infiltrating closed groups while posing as like-minded activists.<\/p>\n<p>Other tactics include mass circulation of instructions on confronting or harming police, advice on countering tear gas, as well as campaigns aimed at discrediting senior officials or state institutions while disguising external direction as the \u201cspontaneous outrage\u201d of dissatisfied citizens.<\/p>\n<p>The objective is not necessarily to invent new problems, but to exacerbate existing domestic conflicts in France as much as possible and erode trust in state institutions.<\/p>\n<p>Radicalization and physical confrontation can then be framed as legitimate responses to supposedly unlawful or illegitimate actions by the authorities or law enforcement, while the instigators portray them as contrary to the interests of society.<\/p>\n<h2>Russian intelligence strategy: from media clones to information overload<\/h2>\n<p>According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), France has become the second most frequently targeted country in Europe for Russian disinformation operations, after Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>In 2025, France\u2019s agency for protection against foreign digital interference, VIGINUM, officially linked a series of large-scale operations targeting French media and state institutions to Russian military intelligence (GRU) activity in its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sgdsn.gouv.fr\/files\/files\/Publications\/20240214_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_PART2_ENG_VF.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">report<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The objective was to deepen social divisions, discredit elections \u2014 particularly centrist candidates \u2014 and foster chaos and public disillusionment.<\/p>\n<h2><b>Major Russian influence networks targeting France<\/b><\/h2>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th><b>Network \/ operation<\/b><\/th>\n<th><b>Actors and infrastructure<\/b><\/th>\n<th><b>How it works<\/b><\/th>\n<th><b>Objective and effect<\/b><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Portal Kombat (Pravda)<\/td>\n<td>Russian company TigerWeb, Inforos resources, RRN bots<\/td>\n<td>A network of 193 fake news websites, including pravda-fr.com; search-engine manipulation and social-media spam<\/td>\n<td>Flooding search results with false content and discrediting support for Ukraine<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Doppelg\u00e4nger<\/td>\n<td>Russia\u2019s Social Design Agency (SDA)<\/td>\n<td>Cloning the websites of reputable media outlets such as Le Monde, Le Parisien, Le Figaro and AFP, using lookalike domains<\/td>\n<td>Making fabricated stories appear to originate from respected French media<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Operation Overload \/ Matryoshka<\/td>\n<td>Coordination through hundreds of anonymous Gmail accounts<\/td>\n<td>Large-scale distribution of fabricated material to media outlets and fact-checkers<\/td>\n<td>Overloading journalists with verification requests and forcing repeated exposure to false claims<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Storm-1516<\/td>\n<td>Psychological-operations elements linked to Russian intelligence services<\/td>\n<td>Producing staged videos, fabricated \u201cinvestigations\u201d and fake graffiti<\/td>\n<td>Discrediting French government officials and politicians ahead of elections<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>According to analysts, Military Unit 54777 serves as a central hub for psychological operations and strategic disinformation within the GRU and is responsible, among other areas, for operations targeting France.<\/p>\n<p>In the information domain, the unit specializes in building covert propaganda networks abroad through front organizations, nominally independent analytical centers and media outlets.<\/p>\n<p>Investigations have linked Military Unit 54777 to oversight of structures including the Inforos media agency, the Foundation for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Abroad \u2014 commonly known as Pravfond \u2014 and the GOLOS information network, which was later reformatted as the Europe Speaks project.<\/p>\n<p>These projects are overseen through former and serving intelligence officers, including Alexander Starunsky.<\/p>\n<p>The network regularly distributes manipulative French-language material designed to deepen social divisions, discredit European institutions and attack France\u2019s foreign-policy course.<\/p>\n<h2>GRU operation analysis: Russian intelligence working to influence protests in France<\/h2>\n<p>Email correspondence obtained by Ukrainian hacktivists shows how Russian intelligence works to steer elements of the French protest movement. It involves a career officer of Russian military intelligence \u2014 <b>Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Nemich<\/b>, who uses the alias <i>Nikolai Nemov<\/i> in official documents and operational correspondence.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image1.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33499 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"725\" height=\"1000\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image3.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33501 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image3.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"714\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image2.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33500 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"712\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Nemich has spent his military career within Russia\u2019s Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) and associated structures, both inside Russia and abroad.<\/p>\n<p>Among other postings, he served at a Russian intelligence facility in Dushanbe (Military Unit 48216) and at the Russian Embassy in Nicaragua.<\/p>\n<p>Since Soviet times, Russian intelligence activity in Nicaragua, and across Latin America more broadly,, has relied heavily on interaction with left-wing political movements.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image5.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33503 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image5.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"948\" height=\"386\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image4.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33502 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image4.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"840\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Although Nemich is based in Novosibirsk, far from the Moscow headquarters of Military Unit 54777, his case illustrates the distributed nature of Russia\u2019s propaganda and influence apparatus targeting Western countries. This structure allows remote \u201cinformation hubs\u201d to operate while reducing the risk of exposure.<\/p>\n<p>His career also reflects an evolution characteristic of modern Russian intelligence services: from conventional intelligence collection to hybrid operations in the European information environment.<\/p>\n<p>The correspondence indicates that Nemich works through purpose-created mailboxes hosted on domains controlled by Russian intelligence services and uses a network of front accounts, anonymous moderators and individuals infiltrated into protest movements.<\/p>\n<p>As part of this CYBINT investigation, InformNapalm volunteers gained access to part of Nemich\u2019s correspondence with one agent. The exchanges offer a rare inside view of how this system operates in the context of the current protests in France.<\/p>\n<p>The emails reveal a recurring workflow: Nemich receives tasks from higher command, prepares ready-made talking points and instructions for agents operating in both on the ground and online, and tracks how selected narratives spread through French protest communities and media.<\/p>\n<p>Set against later events, the instructions suggest that the agent\u2019s account served a channel for radicalization, redirecting genuine public anger toward increasingly confrontational positions.<\/p>\n<h2>From handler to protest communities: ready-made instructions and narrative<\/h2>\n<p>The handler sends the agent short, ready-made recommendations intended to be introduced discreetly into French protest communities.<\/p>\n<p>The agent\u2019s replies merely acknowledge receipt without discussing either the substance of the instructions or how the tasks will be carried out.<\/p>\n<p>Nemich\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9 contains no indication that he speaks French, suggesting that he likely relied on translation assistance.<\/p>\n<h2>Example 1<\/h2>\n<p>A revealing example of how Russian coordinators sought to influence protesters\u2019 demands appears in an email dated October 11, 2026.<\/p>\n<p>In it, Lieutenant Colonel Nemich \u2014 using the name \u201cNemov\u201d \u2014 gives his agent a clear instruction: amplify among young people the demand to abolish <i>Parcoursup<\/i>, France\u2019s national higher-education admissions platform, and seek to have the demand publicly endorsed by left-wing leaders, including Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon.<\/p>\n<p><i>\u201cIn your demands, focus first and foremost on abolishing Parcoursup. We expect Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon to officially support this point in his speech. This is very important. You can count on all possible support.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image7.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33504 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image7.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"291\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Analysis of the timeline and monitoring of French media show that on the same day the email was sent \u2014 October 11, 2026 \u2014 Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon did indeed make the abolition of <i>Parcoursup<\/i> one of the central themes of a public speech to young voters in Clermont-Ferrand. That daytime speech preceded the evening email, so this is more a coincidence between the handler\u2019s demand and a position the politician had already stated publicly.<\/p>\n<p>Also that day, the demand became the main programme item on the <i>L\u2019insoumission<\/i> movement\u2019s official platform. Over the following days, it was actively picked up by education media such as <i>Le Caf\u00e9 p\u00e9dagogique<\/i> and by protest-oriented social-media communities, turning abolition of Parcoursup into one of the main formal demands of the school strikes.<\/p>\n<p>Monitoring sources and materials from October 12 include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/actu.fr\/auvergne-rhone-alpes\/clermont-ferrand_63113\/a-clermont-ferrand-jean-luc-melenchon-fait-salle-comble-et-reitere-ses-promesses-pour-2027_64910229.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon\u2019s speech in Clermont-Ferrand, reported by actu.fr<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/linsoumission.fr\/2026\/10\/12\/melenchon-clermont-ferrand-jeunesse\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Official L\u2019insoumission publication on the youth program and the speech<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cafepedagogique.net\/2026\/10\/14\/parcoursup-un-archaisme-des-annees-macron\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cParcoursup: un archa\u00efsme des ann\u00e9es Macron\u201d in Le Caf\u00e9 p\u00e9dagogique<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Ohmymag\/posts\/m%C3%A9lenchon-et-attal-saffrontent-sur-parcoursup-et-la-col%C3%A8re-lyc%C3%A9enne-chacun-accus\/1456248493307896\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Ohmymag Facebook discussion of the Parcoursup debate and anger among secondary-school students<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Example 2<\/h2>\n<p>Another episode in Lieutenant Colonel \u201cNemov\u2019s\u201d exposed correspondence concerns an instruction issued immediately after the first violent street clashes between protesters and law-enforcement officers.<\/p>\n<p>The Russian handler reacted quickly to reports of teenagers being injured and instructed the agent to add a new and more radical demand to the protest agenda: criminal accountability for law-enforcement officers.<\/p>\n<p><i>\u201cGiven the events of the clashes, a new core demand must be added. The justice system must punish police officers who used unjustified force against secondary-school students or inflicted serious bodily harm on these teenagers. Formulate a demand calling for the punishment of the police officers.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image6.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33504 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image6.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"313\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Following the directive, the infiltrated network began actively pushing claims of \u201csystemic police terror against children\u201d through protest-oriented media channels and social networks.<\/p>\n<p>In this case, the Russian intelligence handlers again applied a familiar technique: amplifying genuine public outrage.<\/p>\n<p>Images of crowd-control measures being used against young people naturally generate a strong emotional response. The Russian instruction sought to channel this spontaneous anger into a systematic demand for punishment of the police, with the aim of blocking compromise between the government and protesters, undermining confidence in law enforcement and increasing the likelihood of further confrontations.<\/p>\n<p>Monitoring sources showing the active spread of these narratives include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bfmtv.com\/societe\/manifestations\/direct-colere-des-lyceens-de-nouveaux-blocages-prevus-pour-l-acte-v-de-la-mobilisation-des-manifestations-organisees-partout-en-france_LN-202610130061.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">BFMTV live coverage of mobilization and school blockades<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/lereporterindependant\/posts\/-violences-polici%C3%A8res-contre-les-lyc%C3%A9ens-le-gouvernement-doit-rendre-des-comptes\/1129796152896227\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Le Reporter Ind\u00e9pendant post on violence against secondary-school students<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/mesinfos.fr\/13300-salon-de-provence\/mouvement-des-lyceens-apres-la-repression-le-temps-du-dialogue-ne-repond-pas-aux-attentes-340991.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Mesinfos analysis from Salon-de-Provence<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LaFranceInsoumiseBron\/videos\/-d%C3%A9cha%C3%AEnement-de-violence-de-la-police-contre-les-lyc%C3%A9ens-ce-matin-%C3%A0-bron-soutie\/2147499012819787\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">La France Insoumise Bron video concerning police actions<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/JournalFakir\/videos\/-lavenir-cest-nous-lyc%C3%A9es-de-rosny-sous-bois-%C3%A0-lens-m%C3%AAmes-col%C3%A8res-m%C3%AAme-combat-je\/1406976541136885\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Journal Fakir video on youth mobilization<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/brutofficiel\/videos\/une-%C3%A9norme-pancarte-bismillah-cest-les-t%C3%A9n%C3%A8bres-face-aux-policiers-une-pancarte-\/1092568130040846\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Brut Officiel report from the protests<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.dailymotion.com\/video\/xbglw5u\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Dailymotion footage of clashes<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/reel\/DecMsKbhZpD\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Instagram video from the secondary-school protests<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Example 3<\/h2>\n<p>Another important episode in the obtained correspondence shows the handler pushing to broaden the protest by bringing different social groups together \u2014 the so-called <i>convergence des luttes<\/i>, or \u201cconvergence of struggles.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The handler instructed the agent to move beyond purely student and school-based grievances and draw powerful trade unions and veterans of the Yellow Vest movement into the street mobilization.<\/p>\n<p><i>\u201cYou must expand the protest movement and bring in other forces to create a convergence of demands. For the next blockade actions, involve the trade unions more actively, particularly the CGT, as well as Yellow Vest activists.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Of particular interest is the agent\u2019s reply to this instruction. It contains the Spanish-language phrase <i>\u201c\u00a1Siempre m\u00e1s all\u00e1!\u201d<\/i> \u2014 \u201cAlways further!\u201d<\/p>\n<p>We were unable to confirm the phrase as the official motto of any specific organization. It is best known as the title of an academic work concerning the Sandinista movement, a far-left movement that historically maintained close ties with Soviet and later Russian intelligence networks in Latin America.<\/p>\n<p>The appearance of this particular phrase in the correspondence may indicate a possible connection between the infiltrated agent and pro-communist or anti-Western networks in Latin America, where the individual may have been recruited or drawn into cooperation.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image9.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33507 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image9.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"376\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Subsequent events show that the handler\u2019s instruction coincided with developments on the streets. Within days, leading French media outlets and trade-union organizations were discussing the convergence of different protest groups ahead of the nationwide day of action on October 17.<\/p>\n<p>This timing does not by itself establish that the Russian instruction caused that mobilization. It does, however, show that the handler was working to reinforce a trend already emerging within the protest environment.<\/p>\n<p>Monitoring sources include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/UniteCGT\/posts\/-supplement-unite-cgt-a-lheure-de-la-mobilisation-lyc%C3%A9enne-du-17octobre-et-de-la\/1171802911855470\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Unit\u00e9 CGT Facebook publication on the October 17 mobilization<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/mesinfos.fr\/13000-marseille\/gilets-jaunes-lyceens-cgt-a-quoi-s-attendre-a-marseille-ce-17-octobre-341018.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Mesinfos report on Yellow Vests, secondary-school students and the CGT in Marseille<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rtl.fr\/actu\/debats-societe\/convergence-des-luttes-ou-union-des-coleres-les-lyceens-appellent-a-rejoindre-les-gilets-jaunes-le-17-octobre-7900685081\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">RTL analysis of convergence des luttes and calls to unite<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/contre-attaque.net\/2026\/10\/13\/les-figures-des-gilets-jaunes-appellent-a-rejoindre-le-17-octobre\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Yellow Vest leaders\u2019 appeal published by Contre-Attaque<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.tf1info.fr\/societe\/gilets-jaunes-lyceens-la-cgt-se-joindra-aux-manifestations-du-17-octobre-pour-faire-barrage-a-l-extreme-droite-2469761.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">TF1 Info report on CGT participation in the October 17 protests<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Example 4<\/h2>\n<p>Another revealing episode is an instruction dated October 15, 2026, found in the Russian handler\u2019s correspondence.<\/p>\n<p>As the French government moved to defuse tensions by proposing a a videoconference with protest leaders to discuss concessions, the Russian intelligence officer issued a clear directive to block any compromise.<\/p>\n<p><i>\u201cThe minister has scheduled a videoconference with you and the secondary-school student associations in order to weaken the movement by announcing minor concessions. Do not let yourselves be deceived. The movement\u2019s leaders must remain firm: all demands must be met, without any concessions or additional conditions.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image8.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33506 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image8.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"324\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Monitoring of French media shows that representatives of the school protest movements subsequently took a hard line. , They rejected the government\u2019s compromise offers, even \u00a0after consultations with government representatives, and insisted on immediate and full implementation of their demands with no room for negotiation.<\/p>\n<p>The timing alone does not establish that the Russian directive caused this position. What the correspondence does show is that the handler explicitly sought to prevent compromise and sustain maximalist demands.<\/p>\n<p>The logic behind \u00a0the directive is that a successful compromise or partial satisfaction of the protesters\u2019 social demands would risk weakening the protest wave. The network was therefore told to promote an uncompromising position \u2014 effectively, \u201cno concessions\u201d \u2014 designed to prolong the conflict and increase the risk of renewed unrest and clashes.<\/p>\n<p>The presence of these and similar directives in the correspondence of a Russian intelligence officer does <b>not<\/b> mean that M\u00e9lenchon himself or members of his immediate circle are directly receiving instructions from Russia.<\/p>\n<p>A more plausible scenario is indirect manipulation: working through people in the politician\u2019s wider political orbit, potentially including individuals sympathetic to Russia, and using them, knowingly or unknowingly, to amplify selected messages.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image11.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33509 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image11.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"702\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image10.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-33508 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image10.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"628\" height=\"1000\" \/><\/a><br \/>\n<i>Sophia Chikirou at an \u201cImmortal Regiment\u201d march. Source: <\/i><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/fb9kUVs1eIQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><i>YouTube<\/i><\/a><i>.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>One relevant example is Sophia Chikirou, an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.assemblee-nationale.fr\/dyn\/deputes\/PA791812\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LFI member of parliament<\/a>, party vice-president and close M\u00e9lenchon ally who is involved in public communications and may influence protest messaging.<\/p>\n<p>According to the French newspaper <i>Le Canard encha\u00een\u00e9<\/i>, Chikirou <a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/fb9kUVs1eIQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">participated<\/a> in an \u201cImmortal Regiment\u201d march in Paris in May 2025.<\/p>\n<p>Chikirou publicly denied this, saying that she had attended a separate event organized by the <i>Mouvement de la Paix<\/i>. However, the video linked above appears to contradict her denial.<\/p>\n<p>She has also been associated with public positions opposing Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO and the European Union \u2014 positions critics characterize as pro-Russian.<\/p>\n<h2>Challenges ahead<\/h2>\n<p>Hostile intelligence services are adept at exploiting society\u2019s deepest fault lines. Genuine efforts by citizens to defend social rights or improve educational conditions can be manipulated and turned into tools of destabilization.<\/p>\n<p>The danger increases when domestic political ambitions or blind spots overlap with the interests of a hostile foreign power.<\/p>\n<p>In such circumstances, an ordinary protester or active online commentator can become part of a covert GRU -run network without necessarily understanding the role they are playing. The boundary between domestic protest and external interference can then become extremely difficult to distinguish.<\/p>\n<p>Calls for critical thinking alone are no longer sufficient to counter such threats.<\/p>\n<p>Modern democracies need to shift toward systematically exposing foreign influence networks before they can act. Such a strategy requires:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>stronger counterintelligence capabilities to identify and disrupt covert influence operations at the planning stage;<\/li>\n<li>close cooperation with leading analytical centers and independent investigators to rapidly analyze and verify disinformation networks;<\/li>\n<li>international cooperation with partners that have unique practical experience in this field \u2014 particularly Ukraine.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Read also: <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-sabotage-europe-russia-2026\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sabotage warfare: Russia exports chaos to Europe, but its own home front is becoming increasingly vulnerable<\/a><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><b><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"ls-is-cached lazyloaded alignnone\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/> <\/b><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"ls-is-cached lazyloaded alignnone\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This article was prepared by <\/span><b>Louis Martin<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> specifically for readers of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community website.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sharing and republication with an active link to the source are welcome. (Creative Commons \u2014 Attribution 4.0 International \u2014 CC BY 4.0).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Follow the official channels of <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/linktr.ee\/informnapalm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">InformNapalm<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community, in cooperation with hacktivists from 256 Cyber Assault Division and the Ukrainian Militant&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":117,"featured_media":19320,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8552,528,8607,2,679],"tags":[511,8666,8667,166],"class_list":["post-19318","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cyber-resistance","category-news","category-osint","category-summaries","category-top-investigations","tag-france","tag-gru-officer","tag-protests-in-france","tag-russia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Russia seeking to radicalize protests in France: intercepted emails linked to a GRU officer<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, 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cooperation with hacktivists from 256 Cyber Assault Division and the Ukrainian Militant analytical group, exclusively publishes the findings of a new CYBINT investigation into Russian intelligence efforts to influence protest movements in France.\r\n\r\nEmail correspondence obtained by the investigators and linked to Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer Stanislav Nemich reveals a campaign of covert interference \u2014 from amplifying protest demands and drawing new participants into demonstrations to obstructing compromise between protesters and the authorities.\r\n\r\nThe investigation shows how Russian intelligence services seek to exploit genuine social divisions to increase tensions and destabilize France.\r\n\r\n<iframe title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/LbP2tNH7t80?si=hXFGlQx8KZzfu5Z0\" width=\"642\" height=\"360\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><span style=\"display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;\" data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" class=\"mce_SELRES_start\">\ufeff<\/span><\/iframe>\r\n<h1><b>Radicalization and France\u2019s street protest infrastructure<\/b><\/h1>\r\nFrench society has lived with persistent social tensions. Images of mass protests in the education sector, clashes with police, damaged buildings, burned vehicles and looted shops have become a recurring feature of news coverage.\r\n\r\nLeft-wing and far-left groups have often been among the main driving forces behind these and earlier protests, including the R\u00e9volution Permanente movement and La France insoumise (LFI), together with its media platform L\u2019insoumission. Trade unions, university students and secondary-school students also mobilize around these movements.\r\n\r\nRecent street protests, however, show signs of a more troubling trend. Demonstrations are becoming more radical, while demands centered on social rights or better educational conditions quickly give way to hardline anti-government slogans. The actions of some groups during clashes with police also appear highly organized and coordinated.\r\n\r\nAccording to French Interior Minister Laurent Nu\u00f1ez and reports by the Police Prefecture, peaceful marches involving school and university students and trade unions were deliberately infiltrated by coordinated groups of masked provocateurs \u2014 casseurs \u2014 and black-clad radicals prepared for violent confrontation with police.\r\n\r\nDuring just two nationwide days of action, on October 17 and 24, law-enforcement agencies detained around 3,400 people. On one of those days alone, more than 100 people were arrested carrying bladed weapons or objects prepared in advance for use in attacks.\r\n\r\nWell-prepared groups of provocateurs followed a clear pattern. They deliberately smashed shop windows and vehicles, looted and set fire to civilian property, and provoked police into forceful responses involving crowd-control measures such as stun grenades and water cannons.\r\n\r\nOn October 17 alone, around 1,000 police officers and gendarmes were injured. To contain the unrest, the government deployed more than 70,000 security personnel, along with armored vehicles, helicopters and drones.\r\n\r\nAt the same time, Russian disinformation networks rapidly amplified the resulting chaos. Staged or decontextualized footage of clashes was circulated through thousands of bot accounts. The aim was to create a distorted impression among European audiences that France was entering a \u201ccivil war,\u201d while pushing the protesters\u2019 original social demands out of the information space.\r\n\r\nThese developments raise questions about the extent to which external actors interested in destabilization may be influencing the level of violence and the evolution of protest movements.\r\n\r\nRussia has long sought to exploit such tensions. Understanding its disruptive methodsboth on the ground and online is therefore relevant not only to France but to other Western democracies as well.\r\n\r\nThe Kremlin uses several most straightforward and tested tools to exploit social tensions and cause political unrest.\r\n<h2>Street-level operations<\/h2>\r\nThese methods can include hiring opportunistic individuals or criminal elements for relatively small sums to stage false-flag provocations; carrying out deliberately radical acts such as provocative disobedience, flag burnings, vandalism of landmarks or politically significant symbols; and using graffiti or similar acts to inflame religious or ethnic tensions.\r\n\r\nAnother method is to plant agents or intermediaries inside radical street groups in order to influence organizers or individual participants from within \u2014 including by provoking police into a forceful response and helping turn peaceful demonstrations into riots.\r\n<h2>Information operations<\/h2>\r\nRussian influence methods can include creating anonymous protest groups on popular messaging platforms or infiltrating closed groups while posing as like-minded activists.\r\n\r\nOther tactics include mass circulation of instructions on confronting or harming police, advice on countering tear gas, as well as campaigns aimed at discrediting senior officials or state institutions while disguising external direction as the \u201cspontaneous outrage\u201d of dissatisfied citizens.\r\n\r\nThe objective is not necessarily to invent new problems, but to exacerbate existing domestic conflicts in France as much as possible and erode trust in state institutions.\r\n\r\nRadicalization and physical confrontation can then be framed as legitimate responses to supposedly unlawful or illegitimate actions by the authorities or law enforcement, while the instigators portray them as contrary to the interests of society.\r\n<h2>Russian intelligence strategy: from media clones to information overload<\/h2>\r\nAccording to the European External Action Service (EEAS), France has become the second most frequently targeted country in Europe for Russian disinformation operations, after Ukraine.\r\n\r\nIn 2025, France\u2019s agency for protection against foreign digital interference, VIGINUM, officially linked a series of large-scale operations targeting French media and state institutions to Russian military intelligence (GRU) activity in its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sgdsn.gouv.fr\/files\/files\/Publications\/20240214_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_PART2_ENG_VF.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">report<\/a>.\r\n\r\nThe objective was to deepen social divisions, discredit elections \u2014 particularly centrist candidates \u2014 and foster chaos and public disillusionment.\r\n<h2><b>Major Russian influence networks targeting France<\/b><\/h2>\r\n<table>\r\n<thead>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th><b>Network \/ operation<\/b><\/th>\r\n<th><b>Actors and infrastructure<\/b><\/th>\r\n<th><b>How it works<\/b><\/th>\r\n<th><b>Objective and effect<\/b><\/th>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/thead>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Portal Kombat (Pravda)<\/td>\r\n<td>Russian company TigerWeb, Inforos resources, RRN bots<\/td>\r\n<td>A network of 193 fake news websites, including pravda-fr.com; search-engine manipulation and social-media spam<\/td>\r\n<td>Flooding search results with false content and discrediting support for Ukraine<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Doppelg\u00e4nger<\/td>\r\n<td>Russia\u2019s Social Design Agency (SDA)<\/td>\r\n<td>Cloning the websites of reputable media outlets such as Le Monde, Le Parisien, Le Figaro and AFP, using lookalike domains<\/td>\r\n<td>Making fabricated stories appear to originate from respected French media<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Operation Overload \/ Matryoshka<\/td>\r\n<td>Coordination through hundreds of anonymous Gmail accounts<\/td>\r\n<td>Large-scale distribution of fabricated material to media outlets and fact-checkers<\/td>\r\n<td>Overloading journalists with verification requests and forcing repeated exposure to false claims<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Storm-1516<\/td>\r\n<td>Psychological-operations elements linked to Russian intelligence services<\/td>\r\n<td>Producing staged videos, fabricated \u201cinvestigations\u201d and fake graffiti<\/td>\r\n<td>Discrediting French government officials and politicians ahead of elections<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\nAccording to analysts, Military Unit 54777 serves as a central hub for psychological operations and strategic disinformation within the GRU and is responsible, among other areas, for operations targeting France.\r\n\r\nIn the information domain, the unit specializes in building covert propaganda networks abroad through front organizations, nominally independent analytical centers and media outlets.\r\n\r\nInvestigations have linked Military Unit 54777 to oversight of structures including the Inforos media agency, the Foundation for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Abroad \u2014 commonly known as Pravfond \u2014 and the GOLOS information network, which was later reformatted as the Europe Speaks project.\r\n\r\nThese projects are overseen through former and serving intelligence officers, including Alexander Starunsky.\r\n\r\nThe network regularly distributes manipulative French-language material designed to deepen social divisions, discredit European institutions and attack France\u2019s foreign-policy course.\r\n<h2>GRU operation analysis: Russian intelligence working to influence protests in France<\/h2>\r\nEmail correspondence obtained by Ukrainian hacktivists shows how Russian intelligence works to steer elements of the French protest movement. It involves a career officer of Russian military intelligence \u2014 <b>Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Nemich<\/b>, who uses the alias <i>Nikolai Nemov<\/i> in official documents and operational correspondence.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image1.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33499 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"725\" height=\"1000\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image3.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33501 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image3.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"714\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image2.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33500 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"712\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nNemich has spent his military career within Russia\u2019s Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) and associated structures, both inside Russia and abroad.\r\n\r\nAmong other postings, he served at a Russian intelligence facility in Dushanbe (Military Unit 48216) and at the Russian Embassy in Nicaragua.\r\n\r\nSince Soviet times, Russian intelligence activity in Nicaragua, and across Latin America more broadly,, has relied heavily on interaction with left-wing political movements.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image5.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33503 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image5.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"948\" height=\"386\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image4.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33502 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image4.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"840\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nAlthough Nemich is based in Novosibirsk, far from the Moscow headquarters of Military Unit 54777, his case illustrates the distributed nature of Russia\u2019s propaganda and influence apparatus targeting Western countries. This structure allows remote \u201cinformation hubs\u201d to operate while reducing the risk of exposure.\r\n\r\nHis career also reflects an evolution characteristic of modern Russian intelligence services: from conventional intelligence collection to hybrid operations in the European information environment.\r\n\r\nThe correspondence indicates that Nemich works through purpose-created mailboxes hosted on domains controlled by Russian intelligence services and uses a network of front accounts, anonymous moderators and individuals infiltrated into protest movements.\r\n\r\nAs part of this CYBINT investigation, InformNapalm volunteers gained access to part of Nemich\u2019s correspondence with one agent. The exchanges offer a rare inside view of how this system operates in the context of the current protests in France.\r\n\r\nThe emails reveal a recurring workflow: Nemich receives tasks from higher command, prepares ready-made talking points and instructions for agents operating in both on the ground and online, and tracks how selected narratives spread through French protest communities and media.\r\n\r\nSet against later events, the instructions suggest that the agent\u2019s account served a channel for radicalization, redirecting genuine public anger toward increasingly confrontational positions.\r\n<h2>From handler to protest communities: ready-made instructions and narrative<\/h2>\r\nThe handler sends the agent short, ready-made recommendations intended to be introduced discreetly into French protest communities.\r\n\r\nThe agent\u2019s replies merely acknowledge receipt without discussing either the substance of the instructions or how the tasks will be carried out.\r\n\r\nNemich\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9 contains no indication that he speaks French, suggesting that he likely relied on translation assistance.\r\n<h2>Example 1<\/h2>\r\nA revealing example of how Russian coordinators sought to influence protesters\u2019 demands appears in an email dated October 11, 2026.\r\n\r\nIn it, Lieutenant Colonel Nemich \u2014 using the name \u201cNemov\u201d \u2014 gives his agent a clear instruction: amplify among young people the demand to abolish <i>Parcoursup<\/i>, France\u2019s national higher-education admissions platform, and seek to have the demand publicly endorsed by left-wing leaders, including Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon.\r\n\r\n<i>\u201cIn your demands, focus first and foremost on abolishing Parcoursup. We expect Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon to officially support this point in his speech. This is very important. You can count on all possible support.\u201d<\/i>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image7.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33504 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image7.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"291\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nAnalysis of the timeline and monitoring of French media show that on the same day the email was sent \u2014 October 11, 2026 \u2014 Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon did indeed make the abolition of <i>Parcoursup<\/i> one of the central themes of a public speech to young voters in Clermont-Ferrand. That daytime speech preceded the evening email, so this is more a coincidence between the handler\u2019s demand and a position the politician had already stated publicly.\r\n\r\nAlso that day, the demand became the main programme item on the <i>L\u2019insoumission<\/i> movement\u2019s official platform. Over the following days, it was actively picked up by education media such as <i>Le Caf\u00e9 p\u00e9dagogique<\/i> and by protest-oriented social-media communities, turning abolition of Parcoursup into one of the main formal demands of the school strikes.\r\n\r\nMonitoring sources and materials from October 12 include:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/actu.fr\/auvergne-rhone-alpes\/clermont-ferrand_63113\/a-clermont-ferrand-jean-luc-melenchon-fait-salle-comble-et-reitere-ses-promesses-pour-2027_64910229.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon\u2019s speech in Clermont-Ferrand, reported by actu.fr<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/linsoumission.fr\/2026\/10\/12\/melenchon-clermont-ferrand-jeunesse\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Official L\u2019insoumission publication on the youth program and the speech<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cafepedagogique.net\/2026\/10\/14\/parcoursup-un-archaisme-des-annees-macron\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cParcoursup: un archa\u00efsme des ann\u00e9es Macron\u201d in Le Caf\u00e9 p\u00e9dagogique<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Ohmymag\/posts\/m%C3%A9lenchon-et-attal-saffrontent-sur-parcoursup-et-la-col%C3%A8re-lyc%C3%A9enne-chacun-accus\/1456248493307896\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Ohmymag Facebook discussion of the Parcoursup debate and anger among secondary-school students<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<h2>Example 2<\/h2>\r\nAnother episode in Lieutenant Colonel \u201cNemov\u2019s\u201d exposed correspondence concerns an instruction issued immediately after the first violent street clashes between protesters and law-enforcement officers.\r\n\r\nThe Russian handler reacted quickly to reports of teenagers being injured and instructed the agent to add a new and more radical demand to the protest agenda: criminal accountability for law-enforcement officers.\r\n\r\n<i>\u201cGiven the events of the clashes, a new core demand must be added. The justice system must punish police officers who used unjustified force against secondary-school students or inflicted serious bodily harm on these teenagers. Formulate a demand calling for the punishment of the police officers.\u201d<\/i>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image6.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33504 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image6.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"313\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nFollowing the directive, the infiltrated network began actively pushing claims of \u201csystemic police terror against children\u201d through protest-oriented media channels and social networks.\r\n\r\nIn this case, the Russian intelligence handlers again applied a familiar technique: amplifying genuine public outrage.\r\n\r\nImages of crowd-control measures being used against young people naturally generate a strong emotional response. The Russian instruction sought to channel this spontaneous anger into a systematic demand for punishment of the police, with the aim of blocking compromise between the government and protesters, undermining confidence in law enforcement and increasing the likelihood of further confrontations.\r\n\r\nMonitoring sources showing the active spread of these narratives include:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bfmtv.com\/societe\/manifestations\/direct-colere-des-lyceens-de-nouveaux-blocages-prevus-pour-l-acte-v-de-la-mobilisation-des-manifestations-organisees-partout-en-france_LN-202610130061.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">BFMTV live coverage of mobilization and school blockades<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/lereporterindependant\/posts\/-violences-polici%C3%A8res-contre-les-lyc%C3%A9ens-le-gouvernement-doit-rendre-des-comptes\/1129796152896227\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Le Reporter Ind\u00e9pendant post on violence against secondary-school students<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/mesinfos.fr\/13300-salon-de-provence\/mouvement-des-lyceens-apres-la-repression-le-temps-du-dialogue-ne-repond-pas-aux-attentes-340991.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Mesinfos analysis from Salon-de-Provence<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LaFranceInsoumiseBron\/videos\/-d%C3%A9cha%C3%AEnement-de-violence-de-la-police-contre-les-lyc%C3%A9ens-ce-matin-%C3%A0-bron-soutie\/2147499012819787\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">La France Insoumise Bron video concerning police actions<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/JournalFakir\/videos\/-lavenir-cest-nous-lyc%C3%A9es-de-rosny-sous-bois-%C3%A0-lens-m%C3%AAmes-col%C3%A8res-m%C3%AAme-combat-je\/1406976541136885\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Journal Fakir video on youth mobilization<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/brutofficiel\/videos\/une-%C3%A9norme-pancarte-bismillah-cest-les-t%C3%A9n%C3%A8bres-face-aux-policiers-une-pancarte-\/1092568130040846\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Brut Officiel report from the protests<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.dailymotion.com\/video\/xbglw5u\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Dailymotion footage of clashes<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/reel\/DecMsKbhZpD\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Instagram video from the secondary-school protests<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<h2>Example 3<\/h2>\r\nAnother important episode in the obtained correspondence shows the handler pushing to broaden the protest by bringing different social groups together \u2014 the so-called <i>convergence des luttes<\/i>, or \u201cconvergence of struggles.\u201d\r\n\r\nThe handler instructed the agent to move beyond purely student and school-based grievances and draw powerful trade unions and veterans of the Yellow Vest movement into the street mobilization.\r\n\r\n<i>\u201cYou must expand the protest movement and bring in other forces to create a convergence of demands. For the next blockade actions, involve the trade unions more actively, particularly the CGT, as well as Yellow Vest activists.\u201d<\/i>\r\n\r\nOf particular interest is the agent\u2019s reply to this instruction. It contains the Spanish-language phrase <i>\u201c\u00a1Siempre m\u00e1s all\u00e1!\u201d<\/i> \u2014 \u201cAlways further!\u201d\r\n\r\nWe were unable to confirm the phrase as the official motto of any specific organization. It is best known as the title of an academic work concerning the Sandinista movement, a far-left movement that historically maintained close ties with Soviet and later Russian intelligence networks in Latin America.\r\n\r\nThe appearance of this particular phrase in the correspondence may indicate a possible connection between the infiltrated agent and pro-communist or anti-Western networks in Latin America, where the individual may have been recruited or drawn into cooperation.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image9.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33507 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image9.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"376\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nSubsequent events show that the handler\u2019s instruction coincided with developments on the streets. Within days, leading French media outlets and trade-union organizations were discussing the convergence of different protest groups ahead of the nationwide day of action on October 17.\r\n\r\nThis timing does not by itself establish that the Russian instruction caused that mobilization. It does, however, show that the handler was working to reinforce a trend already emerging within the protest environment.\r\n\r\nMonitoring sources include:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/UniteCGT\/posts\/-supplement-unite-cgt-a-lheure-de-la-mobilisation-lyc%C3%A9enne-du-17octobre-et-de-la\/1171802911855470\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Unit\u00e9 CGT Facebook publication on the October 17 mobilization<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/mesinfos.fr\/13000-marseille\/gilets-jaunes-lyceens-cgt-a-quoi-s-attendre-a-marseille-ce-17-octobre-341018.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Mesinfos report on Yellow Vests, secondary-school students and the CGT in Marseille<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rtl.fr\/actu\/debats-societe\/convergence-des-luttes-ou-union-des-coleres-les-lyceens-appellent-a-rejoindre-les-gilets-jaunes-le-17-octobre-7900685081\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">RTL analysis of convergence des luttes and calls to unite<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/contre-attaque.net\/2026\/10\/13\/les-figures-des-gilets-jaunes-appellent-a-rejoindre-le-17-octobre\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Yellow Vest leaders\u2019 appeal published by Contre-Attaque<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.tf1info.fr\/societe\/gilets-jaunes-lyceens-la-cgt-se-joindra-aux-manifestations-du-17-octobre-pour-faire-barrage-a-l-extreme-droite-2469761.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">TF1 Info report on CGT participation in the October 17 protests<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<h2>Example 4<\/h2>\r\nAnother revealing episode is an instruction dated October 15, 2026, found in the Russian handler\u2019s correspondence.\r\n\r\nAs the French government moved to defuse tensions by proposing a a videoconference with protest leaders to discuss concessions, the Russian intelligence officer issued a clear directive to block any compromise.\r\n\r\n<i>\u201cThe minister has scheduled a videoconference with you and the secondary-school student associations in order to weaken the movement by announcing minor concessions. Do not let yourselves be deceived. The movement\u2019s leaders must remain firm: all demands must be met, without any concessions or additional conditions.\u201d<\/i>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image8.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33506 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image8.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"324\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\nMonitoring of French media shows that representatives of the school protest movements subsequently took a hard line. , They rejected the government\u2019s compromise offers, even \u00a0after consultations with government representatives, and insisted on immediate and full implementation of their demands with no room for negotiation.\r\n\r\nThe timing alone does not establish that the Russian directive caused this position. What the correspondence does show is that the handler explicitly sought to prevent compromise and sustain maximalist demands.\r\n\r\nThe logic behind \u00a0the directive is that a successful compromise or partial satisfaction of the protesters\u2019 social demands would risk weakening the protest wave. The network was therefore told to promote an uncompromising position \u2014 effectively, \u201cno concessions\u201d \u2014 designed to prolong the conflict and increase the risk of renewed unrest and clashes.\r\n\r\nThe presence of these and similar directives in the correspondence of a Russian intelligence officer does <b>not<\/b> mean that M\u00e9lenchon himself or members of his immediate circle are directly receiving instructions from Russia.\r\n\r\nA more plausible scenario is indirect manipulation: working through people in the politician\u2019s wider political orbit, potentially including individuals sympathetic to Russia, and using them, knowingly or unknowingly, to amplify selected messages.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image11.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33509 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image11.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"702\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image10.jpg\"><img class=\"alignnone wp-image-33508 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2026\/11\/image10.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"628\" height=\"1000\" \/><\/a>\r\n<i>Sophia Chikirou at an \u201cImmortal Regiment\u201d march. Source: <\/i><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/fb9kUVs1eIQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><i>YouTube<\/i><\/a><i>.<\/i>\r\n\r\nOne relevant example is Sophia Chikirou, an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.assemblee-nationale.fr\/dyn\/deputes\/PA791812\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LFI member of parliament<\/a>, party vice-president and close M\u00e9lenchon ally who is involved in public communications and may influence protest messaging.\r\n\r\nAccording to the French newspaper <i>Le Canard encha\u00een\u00e9<\/i>, Chikirou <a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/fb9kUVs1eIQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">participated<\/a> in an \u201cImmortal Regiment\u201d march in Paris in May 2025.\r\n\r\nChikirou publicly denied this, saying that she had attended a separate event organized by the <i>Mouvement de la Paix<\/i>. However, the video linked above appears to contradict her denial.\r\n\r\nShe has also been associated with public positions opposing Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO and the European Union \u2014 positions critics characterize as pro-Russian.\r\n<h2>Challenges ahead<\/h2>\r\nHostile intelligence services are adept at exploiting society\u2019s deepest fault lines. Genuine efforts by citizens to defend social rights or improve educational conditions can be manipulated and turned into tools of destabilization.\r\n\r\nThe danger increases when domestic political ambitions or blind spots overlap with the interests of a hostile foreign power.\r\n\r\nIn such circumstances, an ordinary protester or active online commentator can become part of a covert GRU -run network without necessarily understanding the role they are playing. The boundary between domestic protest and external interference can then become extremely difficult to distinguish.\r\n\r\nCalls for critical thinking alone are no longer sufficient to counter such threats.\r\n\r\nModern democracies need to shift toward systematically exposing foreign influence networks before they can act. Such a strategy requires:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>stronger counterintelligence capabilities to identify and disrupt covert influence operations at the planning stage;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>close cooperation with leading analytical centers and independent investigators to rapidly analyze and verify disinformation networks;<\/li>\r\n \t<li>international cooperation with partners that have unique practical experience in this field \u2014 particularly Ukraine.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nRead also: <a href=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/russian-sabotage-europe-russia-2026\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sabotage warfare: Russia exports chaos to Europe, but its own home front is becoming increasingly vulnerable<\/a>\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\n<b><img class=\"ls-is-cached lazyloaded alignnone\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" width=\"100\" height=\"48\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2020\/10\/%D1%81%D1%81.jpg\" \/> <\/b><img class=\"ls-is-cached lazyloaded alignnone\" src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" width=\"100\" height=\"44\" data-src=\"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/2016\/01\/InformNapalm_logo_07.png\" \/>\r\n\r\n<span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This article was prepared by <\/span><b>Louis Martin<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> specifically for readers of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community website.<\/span>\r\n\r\n<span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sharing and republication with an active link to the source are welcome. 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