{"id":5239,"date":"2015-09-03T12:02:38","date_gmt":"2015-09-03T12:02:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/?p=5239"},"modified":"2015-12-24T14:22:46","modified_gmt":"2015-12-24T14:22:46","slug":"orlan-drones-the-sea-eagles-of-st-petersburg","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/informnapalm.org\/en\/orlan-drones-the-sea-eagles-of-st-petersburg\/","title":{"rendered":"‘Orlan’ Drones – The Sea Eagles of St. Petersburg"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ivan, you should only worry about the \u2018strengthening\u2019 part \u2013 I can \u2018direct\u2019 fine by myself! <\/em><\/p>\n

Marshal Nedelin \u2013 in imaginary answer<\/a> to Academician Sakharkov<\/p>\n

after the successful testing of the hydrogen bomb<\/p>\n

The Pie<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dennis Fetudinov, an employee of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (Moscow) and the editor of the web portal uav.ru stated, in a 2011 interview with Bernard Slacki<\/a>,<\/u>\u00a0that in Russia \u201cthe realization of the need to develop new drones came after the hostilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgian Hermes-450 drones (IAI) demonstrated good results during reconnaissance flights\u201d, even though some were shot down by the Russian military when flying on missions over Abkhazia.<\/p>\n

Based on the results of the war with Georgia, the Russian military compared and tested different models. Based on these tests, three main drone-building enterprises were selected: \u2018Eniks\u2019, STC and Zala. These would provide the military with drone systems (‘Eleron’ [Aileron], \u2018Orlan\u2019 [sea eagle], \u2018Lastochka\u2019 [swallow]) for testing.<\/p>\n

\u00abIt is critical that we provide the Airborne Troops with these drones as soon as possible. The operation of forcing Georgia into peace showed that we need more effective \u2018battlefield\u2019 drones, ones that are capable of not only looking over the nearest hill, but also of seeing dozens of kilometers ahead, giving exact coordinates of targets and allowing them to be targeted not only by the means at our direct disposal, but also by artillery systems that are located 70-100 kilometers away. I recall that we drew attention to this problem even before the Five-Day War, which was four years ago, and we still have not made any progress. Enough talk! Give the most militarily active forces what they need in order to fight!\u201d \u2013 said the commander of the Airborne Troops, Colonel General Shamanov<\/a> (2012).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\n

Three Russian-made drone models were presented for government testing in 2012, but only the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 passed the tests<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n

According to the Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu (February 2014), almost 320 billion rubles<\/strong> has been allocated to the program of providing the army with drones. The program is intended to be completed by 2020. This is almost 5.925 billion dollars<\/strong> (with an exchange rate of 54 rubles to the dollar). Thus, the yearly spending from 2014 to 2020 on this program will be roughly 987.5 million USD per year.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We predicted that the cost of the 179 drones provided to the Russian Military in 2014 was somewhere between 300 million and 1 billion USD. The upper limit turned out to be closer to the value declared by Shoygu in his 2014-2020 drone plan statement.<\/p>\n

By our estimates, the number of drones in the Russian military at the start of 2015 was 700-1000. According to Shoygu\u2019s data, the military had about 500 drones in February of 2014. The number of additional drones provided in 2014 was between 350 and 540 units. Thus, by the start of 2015, we are talking about 800 to 1040 drones.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, the Russian military\u2019s drone program has a budget of about 1 billion USD per year, and provides about 170 units per year. The cost of one unit is roughly 5.6 million USD.<\/p>\n

The members of ‘the banquet’ that have been invited to divide up a 1-billion-USD-per-year pie can count on a hefty profit, and play an active role in instructing the drone operators on how to properly use the equipment.<\/p>\n

One of the drones most actively used by the Russian military in its war against Ukraine is the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone. There are constant reports that drones of this model have been shot down by the Ukrainian Military. In addition to this, we were able to identify members of the 19th\u00a0motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Military with their \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone. This brigade is presently located in Ukraine, in the Amvrosiivky raion of Donetsk Oblast.<\/a><\/p>\n

Combat features of the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone<\/strong><\/b><\/p>\n

Let\u2019s look at the combat features of the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone (taken from the 2013 drone exhibition) as part of the \u2018Leer-3\u2019 <\/strong>complex: the automated workstations of the drone operator\u00a0and\u00a0the payload operator, the antenna-feeder system of the command-telemetric communications, two \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones, and the starting apparatus (catapult).<\/p>\n

The main combat features of the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone as part of the \u2018Leer-3\u2019 complex are as follows:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • Ceiling\u00a0– 5000\u00a0m,<\/li>\n
  • Speed \u2013 70-130 km\/h,<\/li>\n
  • Maximum flight duration \u2013 10 h,<\/li>\n
  • Distance of operation \u2013 120 km,<\/li>\n
  • Payload type \u2013 EW (electronic warfare)<\/li>\n
  • Maximum payload mass \u2013 2.5 kg<\/li>\n
  • Takeoff weight \u2013 15 kg<\/li>\n
  • Operating temperatures – -30 to +40 degrees Celcius<\/li>\n
  • Deployment time \u2013 under 30 minutes,<\/li>\n
  • Number of blocked GSM communication operators \u2013 up to 3<\/li>\n
  • Radius of blocking zone of subscriber terminals:\n
      \n
    • With type 1 transceiver modules \u2013 up to 5 km<\/li>\n
    • With type 2 and 3 transceiver modules \u2013 up to 3.5 km<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n
    • Engine type \u2013 ICE (internal combustion engine)<\/li>\n
    • Launch method \u2013 catapult<\/li>\n
    • Landing method \u2013 automatic, with parachute<\/li>\n
    • Crew\u00a0– 4<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
      \"Information<\/a><\/p>\n

      Information stand with the characteristics of the \u2018Leer-3\u2019 complex (which includes the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone) on a drone exhibition in 2013 (photo courtesy of I. Korotchenko)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \"The<\/a><\/p>\n

      The \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone at that same exhibition<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      The \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone is classified as an SR (Short Range \u2013 up to 300 km) drone. Its advantages over similar drones are its flight duration and distance of operation. In addition, it does not require a runway to take off or land, as it takes off with the help of a catapult and uses a pneumatic inflatable buffer when landing.<\/p>\n

      Attention is also drawn to the fact that the \u2018Leer-3\u2019 complex is intended for the \u201cmonitoring of GSM communication networks, the determination of system identifiers of mobile stations and their locations, and the transmission of obtained data\u201d. The drone carries an EW (electronic warfare) payload.<\/p>\n

      Traditional EW methods for the monitoring of GSM networks and the blocking of subscriber terminals are typically ground-based, either stationary or mobile. The use of EW methods of a comparatively low radius on board a drone allows one to significantly improve the accuracy and selectivity of the jamming process. Meanwhile, the 120 km distance of operations keeps the operators hidden and safe.<\/p>\n

      The drone payload changes in accordance with the task at hand. The drone can house video surveillance, directional and other equipment. But the EW tools are specialized, used by the government to perform radio-electronic reconnaissance and to jam the enemy\u2019s electronic systems. These tools were developed by specialized research institutions and other organizations, ones that have both the special government licenses needed to produce these tools and the engineers and developers with backgrounds in radio technology, radio physics, programming and related fields. The use of the EW tools also requires special education, training, and access. By the looks of it, the enterprise that developed the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone – the \u201cSpecial Technological Center\u201d (STC) – meets all these criteria.<\/p>\n

      What is the STC<\/strong>?<\/b><\/p>\n

      Information regarding the STC appeared in the press rather often, usually in relation to them providing the Russian military with \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones. For instance:\u00a0The Special Technological Center (STC) increases shipments of the\u00a0\u2018Orlan\u2019 drone complexes to the Russian Ministry of Defense:<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

      \u201cLast year the STC produced, as part of a defense order, around 200 drones. This year, we will up that number to almost 300\u201d \u2013 stated a representative of the agency. He noted that most (roughly 90%) of that number are \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones. Only a few \u2018Orlan-1\u2019 and \u2018Orlan-2\u2019 apparatuses are ordered. The representative also stated that the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 complex is provided to the army on a Kamaz chassis. The last few years saw the production of over 200 complexes of this type. STC is expanding production and hiring new staff to keep up with the increased demand, said the representative. According to him, not a single drone complex was sold to civilians \u2013 all of the complexes are sold either to the Ministry of Defence or to law enforcement agencies<\/strong>. The complexes are currently not exported, said the source. The change of the ruble exchange rate has had practically no effect on the cost of the complexes, as they have few components that need to be imported\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

      Therefore, the main focus of production at the STC are the drone complexes with the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones, and all of the complexes go either to the Ministry of Defence or to law enforcement agencies.\u00a0The point about insignificance of the imported components is the matter\u00a0of dispute, since the high-tech parts and components are assembled from imported materials.<\/p>\n

      We know of a civilian application of the the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones (M): aerial photography and cartography. In 2015, \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones, outfitted with aerial photography systems, were presented at the conference \u201cApplication of unmanned aerial vehicles in the remote probing of the earth for the purposes of cartography and object monitoring\u201d<\/a>, which took place on June 2-4, 2015 at the Alferyevo Airfield outside of Moscow. But the number of \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones used for these purposes is, evidently, insignificant.<\/p>\n

      STC showcased some of its wares \u2013 the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone and the \u2018Crab\u2019 hexacopter \u2013 at the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 exhibition.
      \n      \"\u041a\u0440\u0430\u0431<\/a><\/p>\n

      \"The<\/a><\/p>\n

      The \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 and the \u2018Crab\u2019 hexacopter (\u2018Orlan-K6\u2019) at the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 exhibition<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      The \u2018Crab\u2019 hexacopter (\u2018Orlan-K6\u2019) has a video camera with thermal imaging capabilities mounted onto a gyro-stabilized platform. This increases its accuracy, improving its effectiveness on reconnaissance and targeting missions.<\/p>\n

      The STC website<\/a> has the following information: \u201cThe enterprise has had a presence at Russian and international measuring equipment markets for about 10 years. In this time, it has become a leading producer of radio-control equipment\u201d. The address of the enterprise is St. Petersburg, 21 Gzhatskaya St., building 2.<\/em><\/p>\n

      \"The<\/a><\/p>\n

      The official website of the \u2018Special Technological Center\u2019<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      The website of the enterprise indicates that it produces \u2018Bars\u2019 radars, intended for direction finding and control over radio sources. They are produced in the stationary, mobile and portable varieties. The specifications of the models differ. For instance, here are the characteristics of the mobile complex:<\/p>\n

        \n
      • Search and direction finding of sources over given frequency ranges<\/li>\n
      • Control of a list of frequency channels<\/li>\n
      • Creation of a broadcast schedule on controlled frequencies<\/li>\n
      • Analysis of the spectrum of one of several frequency ranges<\/li>\n
      • Display of the instantaneous, average, and accumulated spectra<\/li>\n
      • Retention of the accumulated spectrum for later use<\/li>\n
      • Measurement of the signal parameters<\/li>\n
      • Control over parameters and service data in modern digital mobile communication and data transfer networks (in the GSM\/DCS, IMT-MC-450,UMTS,TERRA and LTE standards), as well as over television broadcasts (DVP-T\/T2\/H)<\/li>\n
      • Determination of the likely location of a radiation source, and the visualization of the location on a digital map of the surrounding area.<\/li>\n
      • Automatic execution of measurements according to schedule<\/li>\n
      • Generation of reports based on the measurement results.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        These functional capabilities correspond to network control tools intended for wireless transfer of data and other radio-technical systems. But here is the interesting part \u2013 the STC website has no mention whatsoever about the production of \u2018Leer-3\u2019 complexes, or even of \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones. Meanwhile, the catalog of the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 exhibition clearly states the address of the \u2018Special Technological Center\u2019 (St. Petersburg, 21 Gzhatskaya St., Letter \u2018B\u2019, Office 53<\/em>).<\/p>\n

        \"Screenshot<\/a><\/p>\n

        Screenshot of the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 catalog, showing the address of the STC<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

        The Russian and English descriptions of the enterprise\u2019s activities, found in the catalog of the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 exhibition, differ, but the English version clearly states that the enterprise develops and manufactures drones (Unmanned Aerial Systems). <\/em>This information is not present in the Russian version<\/a>. It is also strange that the online-catalog of the \u2018Army-2015\u2019 exhibition, the STC is named, but no contact information is given<\/a>.<\/p>\n

        A brochure for the \u2018Special Technological Center\u2019<\/a>, published a few years ago, clearly states that the enterprise manufactures \u2018Bars\u2019 radars and \u2018Orlan\u2019 drones.<\/p>\n

         <\/p>\n

        \"STC-Booklet\"<\/a><\/p>\n

        Therefore, the address of the \u2018Special Technological Center\u2019, which develops special radio-technical complexes and \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones is St. Petersburg, 21 Gzhatskaya St., Letter \u2018B\u2019, Office 53. <\/em>This same address is listed on the conformity certificate, given on March 2,\u00a02015 to the LLC ‘Special Technological Center’ by the Institute for Testing and Certification of Weapons and Military Equipment. It is also listed in the certificate of registration of the entity with the INN code 7802170553 and the KPP code 780401001. The address corresponds to the Vedeneyev Hydraulic Engineering Research Institute.<\/p>\n

        Why does the STC not publish information about the drones it manufactures on its website? Evidently, the reason for this is the fact that, as mentioned before, \u201call of the complexes are sold either to the Ministry of Defense or to law enforcement agencies\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

        The enterprise publishes information regarding three patents:<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. \u201cMethod and device intended for the determination of the coordinates of a radiation source\u201d<\/a>, patent \u21162283505, priority date January 31,\u00a02005.<\/li>\n
        2. \u201cMethod and device intended for radio signal direction-finding\u201d<\/a>, patent \u21162263327, priority date\u00a0January 15,\u00a02004.<\/li>\n
        3. \u201cMethod intended for the determination of the coordinates of a radiation source\u201d<\/a>, patent \u21162296341, priority date November\u00a024,\u00a02005.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          The patent holders are Terentyev Aleksey Vasilievich, Solomatin Aleksandr\u00a0Ivanovich, Smirnov Pavel Lenidovich, Tsarik Oleg Vladimirovich, Tsarik Igor Vladimirovich, Shepilov Aleksandr\u00a0Mihailovich and Shishkov Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich.<\/p>\n

          The STC is also proud of its diplomas. What surprised us, however, was how proud they are of diplomas given to them by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the international salon \u2018Noviy Chas\u2019 [New Time], granted to them in 2007 in Sevastopol<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n

          \"Patenty-Diplomy\"<\/a><\/p>\n

          \"Dyplomy<\/a><\/p>\n

          It is deeply ironic that these people are so proud of diplomas given to them by a country they are at war with; diplomas given to them in a city that was captured by their armed forces. Perhaps no one told them that there\u2019s a war going on with Ukraine, and that Sevastopol (along with all of Crimea) is occupied by Russia?<\/p>\n

          Who are these shy people at the STC<\/strong>?<\/b><\/p>\n

          According to https:\/\/sbis.ru<\/a>, the director of the LLC ‘Special Technological Institute’ (INN code 7802170553) is Mityagin Aleksandr Gennadievich<\/strong>, while the owners of the enterprise are Solomatima Nataliya Petrovna, Shishkov Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, Andropova Irina Yurievna and 5 other private individuals.<\/p>\n

          \"Statistical<\/a><\/p>\n

          According to\u00a0data from 2012<\/a>, the shareholders of the STC were the following: the \u2018Specialized Business Center for Information Security and Special Technical Means\u2019 ( 10% of the shares), Terentyeva Larisa Danilovna (26% of the shares), Romanenkova Tamara Vladislavovna (13% of the shares), Solomatina Nataliya Petrovna (13% of the shares), Shishkov Aleksandr Yakovlevich (13% of the shares) and Andropova Irina Yurievna (25% of the shares).<\/p>\n

          The LLC \u2018Specialized Business Center for Information Security and Special Technical Means\u2019 develops \u2018Poisk\u2019 [Search] technology<\/a> for ballistics tests and the identification of weapons and ammunition. The shareholders are<\/a> Ilyasov Yuriy Vladimirovich (44%), the \u2018Omega\u2019 special agency (25%) , Zhavoronkov Valerij Arkadievich (13%), one private individual and one unnamed shareholder.<\/p>\n

          In addition to this, open sources also note the former director Shishkov Aleksandr Yakovlevich, the head of the drone division and chief designer Ivanov Roman Vyacheslavovich, as well as the military representative Aleksey Psarev.<\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n

          \"Shishkov<\/a><\/p>\n

          Shishkov Aleksandr Yakovlevich, the former director of the STC (before Mityagin A.G)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          \"Ivanov<\/a><\/p>\n

          Ivanov Roman Vyacheslavovoch Head of the drone division at STC<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          \"Aleksey<\/a><\/p>\n

          Aleksey Psarev Military representative at STC<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          The STC drone division is responsible for the development of the \u2018Orlan\u201d drone family: \u2018Orlan-1\u2019, \u2018Orlan-2\u2019, \u2018Orlan-3\u2019, \u2018Orlan-10\u2019, \u2018Orlan-30\u2019, \u2018Orlan-50\u2019. They are also responsible for the development of the \u2018Crab\u2019 hexacopter (\u2018Orlan-K6\u2019)<\/p>\n

          The STC works in the field of radio-control, producing radio-control complexes and their carriers<\/a>. They have been active on Russian and international markets since 2001. The core team of drone specialists came from the Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation. The enterprise produces over 100 drones yearly, with varying payload types. The total flight time of \u2018Orlan\u2019 drones in 2014 was over 10 000 hours. The drones\u2019 high reliability has been confirmed by certified tests performed at the State Flight Test Center, and the \u2018Orlan’ drones have been accepted into service by the Russian military.<\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n

          From St. Petersburg \u2018with love\u2019 \u2013 the trails of the \u2018Orlan\u2019 drones in Ukraine<\/strong>\u0435<\/b><\/p>\n

          The assembly production of the \u2018Orlan-1\u2019, \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 and \u2018Orlan-30\u2019 drones and the \u2018Crab\u2019 (\u2018Orlan-K6\u2019) hexacopter, was shown in a feature about the STC on the \u2018Zvezda\u2019 [Star] channel<\/u>.<\/a> As can be seen during the feature, the manufacturing process is controlled by military representatives of the Russian Armed Forces. One of them, Aleksey Psarev, enthusiastically talked about the quality control of the production process.<\/p>\n

          \"Drone<\/a><\/p>\n

          Drone assembly room at the STC<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          \"An<\/a><\/p>\n

          An ‘Orlan’ drone, along with catapults, at the STC warehouse<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          \"An<\/a><\/p>\n

          An ‘Orlan-10’ drone preparing to launch<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

          After assembly, the STC transfers the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones to the Russian military, who in turn transfer them into the hands of the \u201cbrave soldiers of the Russian world\u201d, such as Aleks Dzhumagaliev, Ruslan Galimov and Nikolai Belokopytenko, who are active participants in the Russian invasion of Donbas (as evidenced by photos from their social network accounts<\/a>)<\/p>\n

          \"\"<\/p>\n

          Here, for example, is a photo of a serviceman of the drone company of the 19th\u00a0<\/span>motorized rifle brigade\u00a0(military unit No. 20634, Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia-Alaniya, Russia), senior \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drone operator, graduate of the Training center for specialists of drone aircraft complexes (in Kolomna), Nikolai Belokopytenko. He is standing, armed, in front of the \u201cDonbas Arena\u201d stadium in Donetsk, Ukraine.<\/p>\n

          \"\"<\/p>\n

          \"\"<\/p>\n

          It is quite easy to identify the characteristic containers and parts of the \u2018Orlan-10\u2019 drones on the photos of the servicemen.<\/p>\n