Kazakhstan is a new Pandora’s box for the Russian Federation.

This analytical review was specially prepared by Sofia Hriniova for the readers of the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community website. 

Russian propagandists are trying to convince the domestic audience that the special operation in Kazakhstan was successful and, allegedly, will significantly increase the Russian influence in this region, leading to the integration of Kazakhstan (In what form? The question remains unanswered.) But can these actions be deemed a success? Probably, we deal here with a reckless, panicky “project” of the Kremlin, which may have catastrophic consequences for Russia itself.

Let’s take a closer look at what happened in Kazakhstan in the past week (editor’s note: in the beginning of January,2022).

Events timeline

• The long-planned LPG price rise from January 3 sparked protests in Aktau and Zhanaozen. At that time, no-one foresaw or predicted that it would become a classic black swan event leading to large-scale consequences. The leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan paid no mind to the protests [1] until, within the next few days, they spread to other regions and became massive.

• Protesters began to put forward political demands for the resignation of the Nursultan Nazarbayev clan [2] that kept a firm hold on the power in Kazakhstan, despite Nazarbayev’s formal resignation as President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and his replacement by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a dependent lightweight lacking the political heft (the so-called transition of power.) It is this corrupt regime that is justifiably accused of deteriorating living standards of the majority of Kazakhs, especially in recent years [3] (in 2021, inflation reached 10.9%, the debt burden of the population increased by 12.3%, official unemployment increased by 12%, exclusive of domestic and external migrants.)

• On the morning of January 5, the puppet president Tokayev made substantial concessions, settling for dismissal of the government, and return to state regulation of gas prices. In some regions, a state of emergency was declared[4].
• Despite the concessions and the imposition of a state of emergency, the protest movement radicalizes, and the protesters seize a number of government buildings. Russian propagandists call it a “new Maidan”, and compare the akimat (mayor’s office) burned in Almaty [5] with the Trade Unions House in Odesa [6]. Photo 1: Trade Unions House fire, Odesa, May 2, 2014.
  Photo 2: Fire in Almaty city council, January 5, 2022. It becomes obvious that law enforcers in Kazakhstan cannot control the protests. Almaty Airport is seized [7] amid rumors of the redeployment of troops from Russia, Almaty Commandant reports discovery of headless corpses of law enforcement officers [8] (most likely, in order to anger the law enforcers against the civilians.) In parallel with the protests, rioters and looters come on the scene. The aggressive nature of the confrontations, as well as the pogroms, are explained by a significant numbers of unemployed young men (the average age of the population in Kazakhstan is 31 years [9]), which together makes the nature of the protest more similar to the Arab Spring events than the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries.
• On the evening of January 5, President Tokayev arbitrarily takes over as head of the Security Council of Kazakhstan (the position claimed for life by N. Nazarbayev) [10], and announces the start of a counter-terrorism operation against “terrorists trained outside the country and orchestrated by a single center“. For this operation, he requests the intervention of forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members – the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. There are two important points to note here. Firstly, Tokayev, apparently pulled off a classic “silent coup” with the support of foreign invaders. Secondly, the military intervention was unplanned and urgent for Russia, as evidenced by a number of indirect factors: an abrupt change in Tokayev’s rhetoric, from concessions to the military operation, within one day; the nature of the Russian airlift effort involving 70 transport aircraft (almost all the existing military transport aviation fleet); sending an official notice to the UN (required by the CSTO Charter for “peacekeeping operations”) only on January 7 [11], i. e. 2 days after the start of the operation. It is notable that just on January 7, usurper Tokayev wrote in English on his Twitter page about “20,000 terrorists, some speaking foreign languages, who had attacked Almaty” [12], but later deleted the post.
• The CSTO “peacekeepers”, whose number is insufficient for such intervention (up to 6,000 in total), are officially engaged in securing the critical infrastructure [13], and are not involved in the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) announced by Tokayev. In fact, this contingent is trying to legitimize the coup committed by Tokayev, and would act as a human shield in the event of a revolt of the Kazakh law enforcers or military.
• From January 6 to 10, the “CTO” in Kazakhstan continues, the pockets of resistance are gradually crushed, and usurper Tokayev gives an order to shoot to kill the protesters without warning. At the same time, the official version as to the performer of the “terrorist attacks” on Kazakhstan turned on a dime from the search for foreign influence (think about the absurd detention of a Kyrgyz musician [14], which led to a formal protest lodged by the Kyrgyz government [15], and the deletion of Tokaev’s English tweets about “terrorists”, which he perceived as official statements for the West [16]) to the statement about a “coup d’etat attempt”, with the detention of the chairman of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB), Karim Massimov [17], and the dismissal of several security officials from among Nazarbayev’s relatives. Nazarbayev himself is still out of sight, and there is no official statement from him. Despite rumors of Nazarbayev’s escape abroad, death, or being critically ill, on January 7, Alexander Lukashenko says he had a phone conversation with Nazarbayev, adding another surreal dimension to the situation [18].
• It is the coup d’état attempt that becomes an official version both in Kazakhstan and for the CSTO members [19][20] – the leaders of the CSTO member countries confirm this at their joint online summit on January 10 [21]. Moreover, in order to mask the undoubted fact that the CSTO intervened in the internal conflict, they constantly talk of some “external forces that wanted to take advantage of the situation [22]”, while nobody names their countries of origin and the nature of the intervention. According to Putin, the greatest sin was “the use of Maidan technologies [23]”, which of course required immediate military intervention.

Given all of the above, we can proceed to the conclusions about the “success” of Russia’s special operation in Kazakhstan and, most importantly, about its consequences, especially in the long term.

Conclusions

What really happened in Kazakhstan? The massive scale and radical nature of the protest obviously came as a complete surprise to everyone in Kazakhstan and abroad. It is evidenced by both the absence of official comments until the evening of January 5, and the failure to take preventive action to deter or put down the protests. The most probable reasons could be the struggle for power between Nazarbayev’s heirs who could sabotage the orders of the puppet ruler Tokayev, and general confusion caused by the lack of reliable information about the protests, which resulted in a delay of a sweeping crackdown on the protest during the first days. However, the unexpected support of Tokayev from Russia can be explained only by Putin’s irrational and panicky fear of the “Maidan technologies“. This fear turned out to be so strong that Putin betrayed Nazarbayev and became an accomplice of the silent coup on the side of the official who was supposed to become the guarantor of Nazarbayev clan’s immunity.

For the sake of comparison, let’s imagine the Putin-Medvedev tandem (which, in its time, was similar to the Nazarbayev-Tokayev one), where Medvedev involves foreign troops to fight Putin and his loyal officials. Besides, in order to fight the “Maidan” and preserve the privileged status of his sacred position of the nation’s President, Putin will have to keep Tokayev in office and support the elimination of Nazarbayev’s loyalists from Kazakhstan’s state apparatus. It should also be remembered that the clan wars never benefit the economic development, which means that the preconditions for future protests remain in force. For Russia, it further implies either granting fresh credits to Kazakhstan or the need to expand its military presence in this country.

The long-term consequences of this dizzying “Drive to the East” (German: “Drang nach Osten”) don’t look good for the Russian Federation.

• The CSTO has become a de facto on-call service for the dictators of the post-Soviet countries, who now can put down popular protests by proxy, or use foreign troops in their own clan wars. In this regard, the organization may expand at the expense of corrupt gerontocracies that fear for their future (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, etc.), thus forming a dubious foundation for rebuilding the perverse new version of USSR 2.0, which is ardently desired by the Russian leadership. However, the integration will be extremely formal, since the dictators now have every reason to fear that their own retinue may push the “call button” earlier – one only needs to say the magic word “Maidan”.
• Both Putin and Lukashenko will kling to their presidencies until death. At the same time, the security apparatus, as the sole support of the regime in their countries, will get more and more power, intensely using strong-arm tactics to prevent any attempt to protest. That will significantly deepen their isolation from the West, even to the point of raising a new Iron Curtain.
• Such a striking example of illogical interference in other countries’ internal affairs makes it impossible to conduct successful negotiations with the United States on security guarantees and delimitation of spheres of influence. Similarly, the cost of Russian intervention in Ukraine will significantly increase. The Russian regime is turning into a toxic tyranny with a hysterical leader at the controls unable to cope with his own phobias.
• Russia has opened “Pandora’s box” not only for the CSTO member countries. This approach can now be used by odious regimes all over the world – they only need to set up an international collective security organization or engage the existing ones.
• Most importantly, a similar approach can now be used against Russia. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that on January 8, China offered assistance to Kazakhstan within the framework of the SCO’s (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) charter [24]. What will prevent China from “extending the hand of friendship” to Russia (also an SCO member), should any forces appear in Russia that want to take advantage of the old age, weakness or illness of its leader, and to make a similar coup?

[1] https://www.inform.kz/ru/ceny-na-szhizhennyy-neftyanoy-gaz-v-kazahstane-yavlyayutsya-samymi-nizkimi-v-regione-magzum-mirzagaliev_a3881181

[2] https://www.dialog.ua/world/243625_1641320413

[3] https://carnegie.ru/commentary/86147

[4] https://www.dw.com/ru/prezident-kazahstana-tokaev-prinjal-otstavku-pravitelstva/a-60333016

[5] https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31640303.html

[6] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/29709

[7] https://news.liga.net/ua/world/news/v-kazahstane-protestuyuschie-zahvatili-aeroport-almaty-smi

[8]https://www.vb.kg/doc/411990_pogromshiki_otrezali_golovy_kazahstanskomy_siloviky.html

[9] https://carnegie.ru/commentary/86147

[10] https://www.inform.kz/ru/hronologiya-besporyadkov-v-kazahstane-kak-deystvoval-prezident-tokaev_a3882990

[11] https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/generalnyy-sekretar-odkb-proinformiroval-oon-obse-i-shos-o-provedenii-mirotvorcheskoy-operatsii-v-ka/

[12] https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-prezident-kazahstana-udalil-tvit-20-tysyach-terroristov/31645182.html

[13] https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/kontingenty-kollektivnykh-mirotvorcheskikh-sil-odkb-napravleny-v-respubliku-kazakhstan/#loaded

[14] https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/61dbf01a9a794727c8128e33

[15] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/01/2022/61dab47c9a7947596bffdcf9

[16] https://www.inform.kz/ru/tvity-prezidenta-rk-o-situacii-v-strane-nashli-podderzhku-so-storony-mezhdunarodnyh-organizaciy_a3882980

[17] https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2022/01/08/kazakhstan-nazarbaev/

[18] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/07/01/2022/61d896609a7947e5e4ef9774

[19] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/01/2022/61dbe3519a79471ffb313e6c

[20] https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/61dbb4349a794711597cf0a6

[21] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/01/2022/61dbe3b09a79472081acc658

[22] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/01/2022/61dbebd89a7947251d67ed2e

[23] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/01/2022/61dbebd89a7947251d67ed2e

[24] http://russian.news.cn/2022-01/08/c_1310414757.htm

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 This publication was prepared by Sofia Hriniova especially for InformNapalm. Translated by Victria Batarchuk, edited by Artem Velichko. Dissemination and reprint with reference to the source is appreciated. (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram / Slate (Sl8).

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