In a quiet coastal town in Portugal lives a Russian businessman whose name is almost unknown to the general public. However, his name appeared again and again in Norwegian property registers, corporate documents and infrastructure contracts.

Meet Konstantin Chudinov, a man whose activities for more than twenty years revolved around facilities of strategic importance to Norway.

A journalistic OSINT investigation by the Norwegian television channel TV2 revealed that the “Russian businessman” systemically attempted to gain access to water resources, ports, and real estate located near critical infrastructure.

Let us broaden the context of the TV2 investigation with additional OSINT data on Chudinov’s European network, from Portugal to the UK. The TV2 report did not delve on these connections in detail, but they came to the attention of InformNapalm community volunteers.

Investments or strategic data collection?

When Chudinov first arrived in Norway in the early 2000s, he positioned himself as an ambitious investor. He spoke fluent Norwegian, built personal contacts with locals, attended business meetings and signed contracts.

To many, he looked like just another foreign entrepreneur in the thriving Nordic economy. But over time, his behavior looked less and less like typical investing and more like systematic data collection:

• he took acquisition interest in sources of drinking water;
• he attempted to gain control of or access to water supply systems;
• he acquired or attempted to acquire ports and maritime facilities – key logistics hubs;
• he invested in real estate near military and infrastructure facilities.

On paper, none of these actions were illegal, but taken together they paint a picture of a network of interests in areas critical to Norway’s national security. One of the most alarming discoveries made by TV 2 journalists is the length of time these events have been unfolding unchecked.

For many years, Norwegian law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received signals and warnings about his activities – from private individuals and through audits of corporate documents. However, his pattern of actions has neither been fully investigated or made public. Chudinov continued to quietly expand his influence over Norway’s infrastructure. Journalists have found family ties between Chudinov and people close to the Russian political elite.

This is no direct evidence that he acted in the interests of the state, but the pattern is important for assessing his activities from a security perspective: a foreigner with connections in political circles, for years gaining access to strategic resources and facilities.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been increasing talk in Europe about hybrid operations—a combination of intelligence collection, access to sensitive facilities, and influence operations under the guise of legitimate business.

The Chudinov case should be seen as an example of the mechanism enabling Russian influence networks to operate in Europe for years. This involves the gradual accumulation of information about critical infrastructure, acquisition of real estate, and formation of corporate ties paired with a lack of response from regulators or state security services.

To better understand the scale of this network, it is worth turning to public corporate registries and business profiles. Data analysis reveals additional connections between Konstantin Chudinov and companies in the UK and Portugal. Below are screenshots from open sources demonstrating the structure of his corporate connections and the geography of his business activities.

Additional OSINT data from InformNapalm on Chudinov’s network in the UK and Portugal

An analysis of public corporate registries and business profiles shows a broader context of Konstantin Chudinov’s activities in Europe.

Chudinov’s corporate network

One of the screenshots shows a connections diagram between companies associated with Chudinov. At the center of the network is Konstantin Chudinov himself, who is associated with several legal entities, in particular:

• Wells RE Ltd (UK)
• Hot Coll Ltd (UK)
• Trigina Lda (Portugal)
• Cristalina Lagoon SA
• Investure Lda (Portugal)

The diagram also shows a connection with the company Antihotel AS, which may indicate previous or indirect business contacts.

Such network graphs reveal not only individual companies, but also an entire structure of interconnected business assets that can be used for operations across multiple jurisdictions and can make it difficult to trace the true beneficiaries.

Business activity in the UK

The following screenshot shows that Konstantin Chudinov appears as a director in several UK-registered companies:

• Wells RE Limited – Director since March 2019
• Hot Coll Ltd – director since July 2023
• Antihotel Ltd – director since August 2023

These data indicate his direct involvement in British corporate structures, which expands the geography of his business activities beyond Norway and Portugal.

Investure Lda in Portugal

This screenshot shows information about Investure, Lda, a company registered in Lagos, Portugal.

According to corporate data:

• the company’s connection with Konstantin Chudinov: he is its director
• core activity – real estate and development
• the company’s authorized capital is €5,000

The company’s registered address is also in Lagos, which matches Chudinov’s residence in Portugal.

UK Business Contact: Lee James Measures

Another screenshot shows information about a British citizen, Lee James Measures, who is a co-director of Wells RE Limited.

He is known to be a chartered surveyor and has experience of participating in several companies in the UK.

His appointment as a director of a company linked to Chudinov may indicate the inclusion of British partners in the corporate structure, which could further complicate tracing the full ownership network.

What does this data show?

Taken together, these screenshots show several important points:

1. the geography of Chudinov’s activity is not limited to Norway.
   Portugal and the United Kingdom also feature in the network.
2. He is using several companies in different jurisdictions.
   This is a typical mechanism for creating international business structures.
3. The network includes foreign partners.
   For example, British directors in companies.

Why this data might be of interest to state security services

Given the available information about Konstantin Chudinov’s activities in various European countries, his possible contacts and activities in the UK and Portugal deserve special attention.

Any professional, business or personal connections of this individual in these countries should be be of interest to national security services.

Further investigation into these links could help to more accurately map the geography and true scope of the international network linked to Chudinov, as well as to understand the potential nature of his activities in other European countries.

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By Andriy Luchkov specifically for InformNapalm international intelligence community website. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0). Subscribe to InformNapalm social media pages.

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