On July 15, 2024, we began publishing a series called BaumankaLeaks, revealing the contents of hacked emails from high-ranking Russian officers. In the first part, we made public some interesting classified data concerning air and missile defense systems, lists and documents from the Military Training Center (MTC), which makes part of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University (BMSTU). We also published the names of officers responsible for Moscow’s air defense. The information was retrieved by Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group and provided for analysis and publication to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community. In the first part of BaumankaLeaks, we announced the forthcoming publication about the so-called “contract of the century” between Russia and India for the supply of S-400 missile systems.

Coincidentally, on the same day BaumankaLeaks was released, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs summoned the Ukrainian ambassador after President Volodymyr Zelensky criticized Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin following a missile strike on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv.

These actions by Indian diplomats compelled us to release nearly the entire dossier on this Russian-Indian arms deal. Today we are publishing a comprehensive list of equipment included in the S-400 contract with India. Initially, we intended to provide only a summary, omitting sensitive details. However, we will withhold for now the information related to the personal data of a select group of Indian military specialists, which was also found in the hacked mail of Russian officers from the MTC.

BMSTU and NPO Almaz

NPO Almaz is the key partner of the Military Training Center (MTC) department at BMSTU, where Russian Lieutenant Colonels Zakrutny and Potapov, the targets of the Cyber Resistance hack, work. NPO Almaz is the leading research and production association in the Russian defense industry and one of the two core enterprises of Almaz-Antey Corporation. NPO Almaz supplies BMSTU with simulators for training future air defense specialists.

The code ‘16Ю6 Т’ (16Yu6 T) denotes a simulator used for training on the S-400 systems developed by Almaz.

The MTC instructors, in turn, train foreign specialists who will operate exported Russian weapons.

Below are links to two presentations for training foreign specialists on the maintenance of S-300 system equipment.

• 2 (Theme5)
• 3 (Theme6)

Here is the cover page of one of the manuals for training “foreign technical specialists”.

BMSTU instructors are officially employed by NPO Almaz. Below is a list of documents required for employment at NPO Almaz.

Despite a decline in the arms exports from 2019 to 2023 (according to SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Russia remains the world’s third-largest arms exporter, with an 11% share. India is the largest buyer of Russian weapons, purchasing a third (34%) of Russia’s total arms exports.

Among the hacked emails of Lieutenant Colonels Zakrutny and Potapov, the most sensitive information relates to the training of Indian specialists.

Indian Contract Details

For many years, India has supported Russia in public relations efforts to bolster Moscow’s international standing. We recently witnessed another such event on July 8-9, as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Moscow. Despite the backdrop of an air strike on the Kyiv children’s hospital Okhmatdyt, Modi rode a golf cart with Putin and visited the Kremlin leader’s stables in Novo-Ogaryovo. This visit was intended to show that Putin was not isolated on the international stage.

In the fall of 2018, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to India, the countries signed a significant contract for the supply of Russian S-400 Triumph air defense systems. This deal was widely seen as a landmark deal for Russia’s defense industry, which significantly boosted the Kremlin’s political standing. The Russian media labeled it “the contract of the century”.

Such contracts are normally not just about the supply of specific weapon systems but also about reinforcing the political bonds between the supplier and the purchaser. These deals bind the purchasing country to the supplier, making it dependent on the supplier’s technology and support. In other words, the announced deal amount of over $5 billion is not final. India will continue investing in spare parts and maintenance to keep its systems operational. Additionally, as technology evolves, India will likely invest in future Russian developments to keep its air defense capabilities up-to-date. How do we know? Because the contract also includes long-term training for specialists to operate Russian systems.

Despite the initial excitement and acclaim, the contract to supply Russian S-400s to India became quickly viewed as “problematic” behind the scenes. Moscow has repeatedly postponed the delivery deadlines. While the reasons for the contractual delays have not been officially declared, unofficially it has been attributed to “domestic needs” and the war against Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the Russians remain confident that they will eventually fulfill their contractual obligations, thereby ensuring that India remains closely tied to them for the foreseeable future.

A crucial part of the contract involves training Indian military personnel to operate Russian systems. The training responsibility was assigned to NPO Almaz. To fulfill this responsibility, NPO Almaz recruited instructors from the MTC at BMSTU. This is where the tale of the Russian-Indian “contract of the century” intersects with the hacking of Zakrutny and Potapov.

One of the emails found in both mailboxes was written on behalf of Vladimir Chervakov, the head of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems Department at BMSTU. It seems that this message was circulated among all the faculty members of the department. At first glance, it’s difficult to understand what it is about – it mentions some “supply package”, “list of specialists”…

The contents of the email become clearer upon opening the attached file named “1 1 перечень имущества” (1 1 material list).

This file contains the complete inventory of five battalion kits of S-400 Triumf that Russia promises to deliver to India. This includes every component with its code, and even all necessary spare parts.

Importantly, the document also specifies the exact number of munitions that Russia will provide to New Delhi.

Full document: file.

There are several more reasons why we believe that this specific set of S-400 systems will be sent to India. To understand this, simply open the second file in the same email titled “Осн документ 18 21” (Main document 18 21). This file contains two articles from the contract between Russia and India, specifically concerning the training of Indian specialists in Russia (Article 18) and the confidentiality of information (Article 21). The full document is available under the link below.

Full document: file

It should be noted that InformNapalm got from Cyber Resistance hacktivists personal data of the Indian military specialists who came to Russia for training. We have chosen not to make it public for now, hoping that India will ultimately realize that Russia is not a reliable supplier of arms and partner. Moreover, Russian military personnel are unable to protect either their own or others’ sensitive information.

This leak of a part of the Indian contract data demonstrates Russia’s sheer disregard for confidentiality, posing risks to its partners’ national security. This information was found in the personal emails of mid- and lower-level employees, including teachers in military training departments at Russian universities.

Partnering with Russia means accepting the risk of having no confidentiality guarantees. The same also applies to private commercial entities risking their reputations by supplying dual-use goods to Russian businesses. Those trying to make quick buck by circumventing sanctions will inevitably face intense scrutiny, as open-source and cyber intelligence research actively hunt their data and methods. Indeed, how can Russia be trusted to protect sensitive information of its partners when it cannot even keep the critical details of the “contract of the century” secure?

Read more publications based InformNapalm on the data from Cyber Resistance hacktivists

• European sanctions disrupt state contract of Russian MOD to supply Granat-4 UAV system
• Hacking the Infocomms Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Katyusha and the secrets of General Konashenkov
• Hacking a Russian war criminal, deputy commander of the OMON of the Krasnoyarsk Krai
• Hacking a Russian war criminal, commander of 960th Assault Aviation Regiment
• BagdasarovLeaks: hacking ex-member of the Russian State Duma Semyon Bagdasarov. Iranian gambit
• Hacked: Russian GRU officer wanted by the FBI, leader of the hacker group APT 28
• Hacking “James Bond”: medical service commander of 960th Assault Aviation Regiment doxed key personnel of his own unit
• Hacking Andrey Lugovoy, member of the Russian State Duma, First Deputy Head of the Security Committee
• Ukrainian hacktivists acquired first-ever photo of the GRU hacker unit commander wanted by the FBI for meddling in the U.S. election
• New evidence of collaboration of former Slovak Justice Minister Štefan Harabin with the Russian Federation
• Hacking Colonel Leonid Rusin, ex-commander of Russian AWACS unit
• Ukrainian hackers posted lists and documents of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (TOP-10 files)
• Economic summit Russia–Africa 2023 databases hacked by Ukrainian hacktivists
• Hacking Lieutenant Colonel Kasatkin, Russian war criminal, head of Combat Training of A-50 early warning aircraft, military unit 41520
• BabakovLeaks: hacking Alexander Babakov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma
• Cuban mercenaries continue to join the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence of new recruitments of Cuban citizens
• Hacked: Russian pilot reveals schemes for weapons supply from Iran, South Africa and Mali to Russia
• CYBINT investigation: how the Orlan-10 manufacturer imports parts bypassing sanctions
• Hacking assistant to vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma: agents of influence in Serbia and media campaigns in the EU
• Hacktivists uncovered new classified documents from STC, Russian manufacturer of Orlan-10 drones
• CYBINT. Hacking Russian UAV manufacturer. Part 1: who assembles Geran-2?
• AlabugaLeaks. Part 2: Kaspersky Lab and neural networks for Russian military drones
• AlabugaLeaks. Part 3: Albatross, war, NVIDIA, Sony and Saito
• MedvedevLeaks: Blackmail by Dmitry ‘Nuclear Teddy’ Medvedev, Aggressive Russian Actions in the Arctic, and Rosatom
• Russian MOD officer conducting PSYOPS via Facebook in France

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