Editor’s note: we publish this translation almost 7 years after its source text was published by Russkiy Journal — one of the oldest Russian e-Zines, that used to have almost iconic status among Russian digital intelligentsia of the 90-ies. An article indeed predicts some of the 2014 events in somewhat playful manner. It is a cynical story, written by a person from modern pro-Kremlin intellectual circles of Russia, so “People’s Movement of Ukraine” is referred to as ‘notorious’, Ukrainian patriots are derogatory called ‘the Orange’, Ukrainian land is called ‘territory’ and its people — ‘a population’ or ‘demographic resources’, etc. Still, the OSINT value and historical significance of this article is doubtless as it allows deep scan of the mind of an ordinary pro-Kremlin intellectual.

Major flaw of this article is that it fails to recognize existence of Ukrainian patriots, who speak Russian, are loyal to Ukraine and feel themselves integral parts of both: the Ukrainian and the Russian cultures. And this cohort of people is becoming growingly numerous in reverse progression to money and propaganda efforts Kremlin spends on brainwashing. To cut it short: this translated text goes best with a mild additions of pepper, salt and humor [we will add editorial comments in brackets to assist You on that, dear reader].

Ironically, Russkiy Journal was founded by Gleb Pavlovsky and Marat Guelman, who used to be spin-doctors of Mr. Putin in his earlier years of reign and who are now in his monarchical disgrace in favor of more hardcore spin-scientists and architects of ‘the Russian World’ like Alexander Dugin. Russkiy Journal itself now lost competition over smart and curious Russian minds to libertarian Colta.ru and other Russian online media of the post-Facebook age. The translation was not authorized for sure, so be quick to read and save it ) So:

The well-known Latin expression “If you want peace, prepare for the war!” is well out of date and no longer corresponds with the depth of human experience and our understanding of the situation. Because if the state of ‘peace’ can only be ‘understood’ as the absence of war. Mirroring the peace without war is not possible. Therefore, you can leave out the first part of this expression and keep the second — ‘prepare for the war’ adding ‘peace as well!’ Society must be ready for anything and bravely meet the war as well as the peace. Some might consider this too brave and too philosophical for a plain vanilla Internet article. However, nowadays in Russian society the political journalism has taken the social position that philosophy had in the ancient Greece.

The turmoil and tumult, triggered by a series of revelations and explanations by Russia’s leaders, regarding the fate of Ukraine being dragged further into NATO, show that Kremlin is on the right track. Remember that one of the responses to it was statement of the former foreign minister and the leader of the notorious People’s Movement of Ukraine Borys Tarasiuk [People’s Movement of Ukraine or the Rukh was an opposition movement and then an anti-communist political party which was created in the 1980-ies and played key role in Ukraine’s declaring its independence from the USSR], who offered to state territorial claim over the Russian territory. What a stroke of luck, now Russia does not even need to invent the ‘casus belli’!

Of course, it is already impossible to fool the Russians with delayed references to the ‘international law’ and that “Ukraine can decide freely as a sovereign state which alliances it enters”. The validity of these sayings belongs to the past, to the world before Kosovo, before Iraq. The Russophobe forces (after taking control over the country) will inevitably conduct the next steps against the Russian silent majority in the country after receiving the ‘NATO umbrella’.

If Ukraine joins NATO, the potential price of the Russian intervention will be significantly higher. Accordingly, the calculated probability of the interference by Moscow in support of the Russian speaking population of Ukraine will decrease and the confidence of the ‘Orange’ [author hints on Orange Revolution of 2004—2005 which brought pro-Western president Victor Yuschenko to power] in their impunity will increase. Ethnic cleansing of Russians in Ukraine will be inexorable from the moment ‘the Orange’ realize that the West is bound by the corresponding article in the Atlantic Charter, requiring the NATO to fight on behalf of its member state in case of a military intervention against this state. The Ukrainian society has been prepared for such purges for a long time. Therefore, it may be that in the resulting situation a preventive intervention will not only be much more effective, but also much cheaper.

However, in such an important issue as the shaping of history, some skepticism doesn’t hurt. Does Russia own the necessary tools to interfere Ukraine’s accession to NATO, or at least to prevent the part of the historical Rus, populated by the Russian-speaking majority, still faithful to Russian culture and history, from falling under the NATO bayonets?

Questions come primarily about the potential of the Russian armed forces and at their commanders to plan a needed operation and to bring it to life. How could a special operation of liberating Ukraine actually look like and what are the chances of its success?

There can be various scenarios. Depending on the development of the political framework, the scenario of a military intervention can work in three basic ways. In a likely limited variation, the Russian Army could occupy only the Crimean peninsula. Such a scenario is likely to happen, if the Ukrainian leadership continues to disregard the part of the Treaty of Friendship that regulates the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet [in Sevastopol]. In this case, Russia will conduct a landing operation by its naval forces, with the declaration of the need to increase security of its infrastructure. Then these assault forces will capture key elements of the infrastructure of Crimea — airports, ports and road junctions. The Ukrainian units in Crimea are not subject to direct attack, as long as they do not resist. Due to the reluctance of the Kyivan leadership a serious resistance in this scenario is excluded. The only land force, whose resistance is expected, is the separate Ukrainian elite battalion of the coast guards, stationed in Feodosiya. By the way, all the marine special corps of this country are limited to this unit. Likewise, individual clashes in the sea and rare attacks of Russian military planes are possible.

Kyiv is not likely to use its military for the „liberation“ of the peninsula, exposing itself in other directions. The Kyiv government has never enjoyed substantial support and was a bare administrative power in Crimea. To Ukraine Crimea is more of a headache, which ‘the Orange’ would rather get rid of, if they could only do this without losing face and parallelly strengthening control over the rest of Ukraine. In this case, the conflict will be rapidly moving from the military stage to the stage of international political struggle.

Thus, a positive reaction from the Russian majority to the Crimean autonomy is absolutely predictable. Predictable as well is a rapid reorientation of the local elite, which ‘the Orange’ government in Kyiv couldn’t match in any way. If Russia does not recall its troops and decides to take this step out of pure political logic, a referendum on the independence of the Republic of Crimea and later, probably in a few years, the formation of an alliance between Crimea and Russia or even the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation is quite possible.

The White and Blue Rus

In the case of a wider operation, the entire southeast of Ukraine, including the Crimea, the areas next to the Black Sea (Novorossija), the Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk become subject of intervention. These are the so-called ‘white-blue’ Russian-speaking areas whose population votes vehemently against Russophobe parties [white and blue were the colors of former Ukraine’s president Viktor Yanukovych campaign back in 2004, when he lost elections to pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Mr. Yushchehnko, in turn, lost presidential elections to Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, who then was overthrown by Maidan and fled the country in February 2014]. The ethnic self-identification is not defined here for part of local population, but they are definitely friendly towards Russia. This is also the place, where the major part of Ukrainian heavy industry is concentrated and it is closely linked to the Russian industry, particularly in the area of the arms production. All of Ukrainian missile production plants, factories making turbines for nuclear power plants, most of the shipbuilding industry and aviation factories are here.

The unification of these territories with Russia as an allied state structures or even their direct accession to the Russian Federation could have a number of advantages. Firstly, as already mentioned, these territories have friendly, culturally and genetically Russian population. With this population problems of cultural or religious incompatibility are unlikely to exist. To the contrary, one could imagine the example of an accession by Abkhazia. This Ukrainian population has no deep national identity, except the Russian, and in the case of reunification with Russia, it will completely burgeon in it.

Secondly, take into account an impressive level of education of population in the Southeast Ukraine, its ability and desire to integrate into the new Russian economy. The workers of the Southeast Ukraine traditionally carry a high degree of flexibility, as they themselves are migrants from the various regions of Russia.

The inclusion of additional 15—20 million ethnic Russians to the Russian civilizational project in one or another way will allow to strengthen the core of the Russian civilization. This would strengthen the demands of the ‘Russian World’ for its selfhood in general, since one of the main counter-arguments here is the lack of demographic resources. The merging of these resources, if not in a state, then at least in a fraternal alliance, would considerably strengthen Russia’s status. Taking a look at the Anglo-Saxons, one can easily imagine how the situation would become more difficult for the United States worldwide, if this country would not enjoy the virtually guaranteed cooperation with countries such as the UK, Canada and Australia.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the a rather limited ‘Crimean’ scenario, the resistance of the Ukrainian Russophobes will intesify as well. Because according to this scenario ‘the Orange’ Ukraine will lose about half of its territory and population, two-thirds of their industry and access to the sea. Should the Kyivan elites today weigh themselves in the illusion of Ukraine’s becoming one of the major European players in the future, these ambitions won’t have any basis then, not even an imaginary.

There is a considerable number of the Ukrainian army units stationed in this region. The overall strength of Ukraine’s ground troops comprises up to 80 thousand men. Russian units and formations of Russian militia could face three armored brigades in this case, one which is stationed in Kharkiv and the others could be pulled from the regions of Chernihiv and Krivyi Rih. Considering the fear of the advance on Kyiv, the Ukrainian army will most likely not be able to oppose the Russian attack with more than five mechanized brigades.

Ukrainian air assault units will suffer the same fate: instead of participating in the hostilities, they will be recalled to the capital. We are talking about the 25th Airborne Assault Brigade of Dnipropetrovsk, 95th Air Assault Brigade of Zhytomyr and the 80th Separate Air Assault Regiment of Lviv. The 79th Separate Air Assault Brigade of Mykolaiv will not make it to retreat in time and will be surrounded in its stationing point. Three regiments of the Ukrainian Air Force will not be able to give serious resistance to the 16th Air Fleet of the Russian Air Force  of Kubinka being reinforced by the Air Assault Groups of 5th Ural and 6th Severomorsk air squadrons of the Russian Air Force and Air Defence.

The operation could begin with the destruction of the Ukrainian Navy through air strikes and antiship cruise missiles and the occupation of its harbors by the 810th Separate Regiment, the 882 Separate Airborne Assault Battalion and the 382nd separate Marine Infantry Battalion of the Black Sea Fleet, with the air support of the four regiments of the Pacific fleet, the 55th Marine Infantry Division of Vladivostok in Odessa, Ochakiv, Chernomorsk, Novoozerne, Mykolaiv, Yevpatoriya and Feodosiya. It will be reasonable for the success of the airborne units to move the separate tank battalion of Marines of the Black Sea Fleet of Novorossiysk into Odessa’s deployment zone.

However, it is impossible to limit such an operation to air and marine landing units. Russia could bring the forces of the airborne troops and naval infantry to the operation. But should the Ukrainian motorized infantry and armored units resist for any reason, the operation could last unnecessarily longer. Therefore, it would be more logical if the actions of landing troops on the first stage are supported by the strike of heavy units of the ground forces and armored divisions in coastal direction with the access to the Dnipro estuary and, after striking the river, by assault of a part of the forces available on the Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade in order separate it from the other formations of the Ukrainian Army in the area of Kryviy Rih and Bila Tserkva. The ultimate goal of the motorized infantry units and armored units is the invasion all the way to the border with Transnistria in Pervomaysk.

The rapid progress and moderate losses can be achieved by extensive use of field intelligence. This goal is easy to achieve, taking into account the friendly character of the local population. An effective relocation of the Ukrainian units to the South, if it comes to existence, will put the forced crossing of the Dnipro in danger. To prevent this, an air attack on the runways of airports of Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa and is highly recommended. Then the tactical air force units of the Black Sea Fleet should be used for the weakening of the Ukrainian air defense with their anti-radar missiles.

Further North, near Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, the advance of the landing force should be supported by the units of the Moscow Military District. The main objective here is a swift capture of the cities and the encirclement of the battered units of the Ukrainian army. Because they consist mainly of Russian speakers, they will, if they lose the land connection to the center, most probably provide no serious resistance. In general, the biggest battles with ‘the Orange’ units that have remained loyal to Kyiv are expected in the fields of Odesa and Mykolaiv, as the access to the Black Sea is the most valuable achievement for the Ukrainian Euroatlanticists and their Western masters.

At this point of the battle the appearance of the volunteers or even the regular army units of the NATO countries such as Poland and Romania can be expected. In this case, one could speak of an escalation of the conflict. By the way, Russia has something that it could respond to such an escalation without provoking these countries by direct attacks on their territories. Russia could launch an operation against vessels of these countries both in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and detain them until the situation is clarified. Such actions will be of no direct military value, but they would show Russia’s determination and would furthermore scare countries like Germany and France. Out of the fear of a direct confrontation with Russia they would require a stop of the intervention and in the best case, cause the political conflict among the NATO members. This would be even better win for Russia.

Moreover, Russia should not delay the solution of the conflict in view of the needs and opportunities of the Russian economy. In contrast to the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia is quite capable of being victorious in this case, without being drawn into a hard and exhausting struggle with a population that is ethnically alienated.

Return of the “Mother of All the Russian Cities”

The third scenario aims at the control of Kyiv and the central oblasts in addition to taking the Southeast. The implementation of such a scenario will of course require the highest price to be paid, yet it also has its advantages: Russia will regain control over the oldest center of Russian spirituality and statehood. Of course, this scenario is possible only if the ambition of the Russian elite increases. Yet it remains relatively low at the time, as opposed to the missile capacity.

At the moment when the opposing party realises that Kyiv is a target, all ‘the Orange’ government forces will surely be withdrawn to the capital and in such a case, all the major fighting will occur in the city outskirts. Then an extreme radicalization of the hostilities by the both sides is possible. The aim of the airborne troops and the Air Force will then be to cut off Kyiv from the communication channels that connect the city with the Western oblasts, for not allowing the flooding of the city with tank hunters, represented by the West Ukrainian militias and not prolong the fighting within the city. In Kyiv and to the North of it resistance is possible from the 8th Ukrainian Army Corps and especially the 1st Separate Tank Brigade, which has previously earned the attention of ‘the Orange’ leadership.

A demonstrative stratospheric nuclear strike to the South of the Pripyat River marshes during nighttime will help greatly in such a case. It would not cause a significant damage, apart from the destruction of power lines and malfunctioning of an electrical appliances within a radius of 100 kilometers of the explosion. And it will be quite visible in the Moskali-hating Lviv and even in Poland. A demonstration of such an extraordinary determination by the Kremlin will cool event the most heated minds.

Still, the political costs of such a demonstration might seem unbearable to some. Therefore, a rapid mobilization of volunteers among the youth of the Ukrainian Southeast could be an effective alternative to use of the nuclear weapons. When they will appear in the capital, these forces will be able to put things in order much faster than the Russian army, which will be left with the role of supporting the highly motivated Southeast infantry by using its high precision weapons.

As an additional measure one could recommend attacks on transport hubs and areas of the enemy forces concentration, West of Kyiv, using cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives and white phosphorus from the air. The Gunners should not be left without a job: from Kyiv’s suburbs, multiple rocket launchers are able to control a territory within a radius of 90 kilometers. Using reconnaissance data from drones, they will be able to stop the advance of the enemy reinforcements to the city.

An important part of the operation will be the taking of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Monastery and ensuring its protection until the arrival of the main forces. The special assault force conducting this operation will have to act in complete encirclement for quite a long time. In the course of cleaning up the capital from the remains of ‘the Orange’, Moscow will be able to focus itself on the diplomatic front, where the main battles are expected. They will be difficult, but in the end Moscow’s international influence will only be strengthened since many doubters will understand that one should rather be friends with Russia, then being at war with it.

In the capital cities, which remain particularly persistent in their hostilities, the state of a certain shock will occur… However, since the current temperature of the political relationships with these nations is close to absolute zero anyway, it cannot be lower anyway. Because of globalization the strongest countries in the World hang no less to Russia, than Russia hangs to them. In the short term perspective Russia is reliably protected against direct attack, by its strategic nuclear forces. As for the long-term perspective, they rather not depend on Russia’s behavior, but on the ability of its government to preserve the state of strategic stability. No ‘good’ behavior protects Russia against hostilities, as soon as Americans consider their missile shield complete. And until then, Russia has every reason to make its own law on the issues it considers important.

Original article by Igor Dzhadan, translated by Marc Köster, edited by Gennadiy Kornev.