
The following InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community investigation is based on the analysis the correspondence of the agent code-named Bagheera; it gives us some insights into the Russian intelligence agencies methods in the occupied territories of Ukraine and reveals some information about the hijacking of the military jamming station Kupol-M (a trial model, code-named Item No 7) right from Topaz plant grounds.
Hacktivists of the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance (UCA) and CyberHunta handed over to InformNapalm an email dump of the agent and informer network coordinator with the code name Bagheera. We will also touch upon her contribution to the Russian world cause and on the reward finally granted.
Identification
The subject of this investigation is a former employee of the Topaz military plant in Donetsk, Moiseenko Elena (birth surname Lytovchenko, husband – Moiseenko Sergiy, callsign Bagheera, email: litovchenko_elena@list.ru, social media account). In one of the messages to her curator from the Russian Security Council apparatus (email address: invarde@gmail.com, social media account) Moiseenko provided her detailed CV and an account of the crimes she had committed. The e-mails presented bellow helped us identify the curator from the Russian Security Service (FSB) in the Krasnodar Territory (email 123.rus00@bk.ru).
Click on the photo below to enlarge it.
Curriculum vitae I, Moiseenko Elena Petrovna, was born on May 07, 1969. Registered and permanently reside at: 83005, Donetsk, Pukhova, 37/65. Entered Donetsk Polytechnic School in 1984, graduated in 1988 with the specialty “water supply technician and technologist”. I employed to Topaz plant in 1988, got a reference to Donetsk National Technical University in 1989 by the plant’s management. In 1989 I entered Donetsk National Technical University, School of Automated Control Systems, evening department, as of 1989 worked as a secretary at the Physics Department of Donetsk Polytechnic School, at the Kalinin hospital, as a secretary in medical aviation, at the water supply and sewerage management, as secretary at school No. 57, registered as a private entrepreneur. I worked at the Department of Labor and Social Protection since 2007, studied on an external degree program at Donetsk Institute of Psychology and Management (DIPM), enrolled on the Master’s degree program at DIPM after graduation but did not finish (because of the military conflict). Since 2011 I have been providing legal assistance to the public as a private entrepreneur, acted as an attorney in the original jurisdiction courts, appeals courts, supreme administrative court, supreme court, have an experience in administrative and economic cases. Because of the wartime situation in Donbas started to collect the analytical data on movements of Ukrainian armament and military personnel since May 2014. All the collected data I reported to the Coliseum HQ and to my commanders with callsigns Besheniy (Ed.: Russian for Madman) and Shaitan. My commanders gave me the callsign Bagheera on June 2014 and I have been using it till present time. As analytical data reports turned to be unproductive (sometimes I received intel about active combat or active shelling of a settlement by the enemy) I faced the necessity to acquire skills of coordinates calculation to report them directly to our artillery units. Since approximately August 2014, I worked directly with the artillery of the following units – 1st Slav Brigade, Korsa, Oplot, Vostok, units of Bes, Kerch, Russian Orthodox Army, Somali, Pyatnashka. Since September 2014, together with my team I managed to collect all the necessary information about the location of enemy armament and manpower in the Telmanove area. I reported all the coordinates directly to the HQ and artillery units (knowing the exact artillery locations I was making calculations of the round trajectory distances so to pick the right battery within the range). Generally, I had to work under conditions when enemy artillery was already firing. So I used my spotters to adjust the fire, analytical data and shot timing to detect the distance and direction of enemy artillery positions (I had taught my whole team how to use this method ). After that I calculated coordinates of possible enemy location and reported them immediately to our artillery units for rapid counter fire. I am trying to monitor not only southern direction, but western and northern as well I may say without hesitation that there was not a single time when I had missed. Using my reports with the coordinates of enemy locations our artillery units always hit the targets. It was way harder to detect launches of Tochka-U missile systems. I only reported the possible launcher locations, sometimes even approximate time of launch. Generally, launches were carried out from Kramatorsk, Artemivsk and once from around Telmanove. I planned some artillery shelling operations on my own. For example the Horniak operation. My reconnaissance (people who are not on active duty in any of the DPR or LPR unit but they penetrate the enemy’s rear areas and report on enemy’s locations upon return, sometimes they remain near enemy positions to adjust fire on them) obtained the information about the great buildups of enemy armament and manpower near that settlement. Besides that was the place where one of the four Tochka-U missile systems, delivered to Dnipropetrovsk by two planes, was spotted out. Those missile systems were capable of delivering single missile (the warhead attachments were not identified) and multiple missiles fire. I know for sure, that after I had calculated their coordinates and artillery used them for shelling the missile system’s positions 4 Ural trucks with the kill left for Kurakhove. The whole night after that emergency vehicles were delivering killed and wounded, 90% of all armament, manpower, ammunition and fuel depots were destroyed. I spotted out another Tochka-U missile system near Telmanove. I haven’t located the remaining two missile systems of that kind yet. Otherwise they would have been on my priority for elimination. I’ve also obtained an experience of detecting convoys with armament, ammunition and personnel, as well as plotting safe paths for our units out of blockade. Maryinka area was shelled using my calculations in October or November 2014. It was exactly the time when the territory from Alexandrivka to Kurakhove was cleared of the enemy forces. But we were ordered to retreat for unknown reasons (however there were no Ukies there as they suffered an utter defeat). Exactly a week after our reasonless retreat, Ukies returned to their old positions and improved them by building a fortified zone. There they have remained till now. In addition to the reconnaissance, artillery reconnaissance and analytics, together with my team, I conduct sabotage activity, mine planting, mine lifting (under the present circumstances we are forced to be underground in the DPR). The present situation in the Armed Forces at front line and in republics’ authorities force us to apply to you for help in creating really war capable units. Those units should be controlled not by the local corrupt bureaucrats but by organizations with real capabilities to influence the situation. The situation on the DPR and LPR territories leads to the total demoralization of Novorossia Armed Forces and to the loss of combat-readiness of the units. Persecution of soldiers with combat experience has increased significantly in recent months. They are hounded out and expelled from the Armed Forces by any means up to the threats, physical intimidation and firing for alleged absence without leave. The reason for this is the inability of the command to manage the servicemen through their personal standing. Units of company and battalion level are managed through threats and blackmail. Since the majority of the DPR and LPR population have no possibility of legally earning their and their families’ living, they serve in the Novorossia Armed Forces. It’s a shame that under those conditions commanders blackmail and threaten to fire their subordinates and strip them of all kinds of allowances respectively. Money extortion from the personnel in exchange for the problem-free service is a common thing for commanders as well. Theft between local commanders is the norm. These statements are backed by proofs in paper and electronic form. The majority of commanders are no combat offices either by spirit or training. One of the most powerful inner destructive factors for the Army is the presence of the officers with the criminal background who continue to live by the code of the underworld and whose sole motivation in service is to pursue personal enrichment. The uncovered fraud and thievery between the high ranking officials of the Republic (their direct links with Russian fifth column and Ukrainian authorities) already earned the disgust of the people. As there are plenty of unaccounted and captured firearms the possibility of inner clashes between locals becomes more serious. The information about illegal actions of high ranking officials also has documentary proofs. The information leakage about criminal activity of high ranking officials is suppressed by lawless and groundless arrests that happen more and more often. Witness’ testimonies are also available as to such cases. I also have a group of people who conduct inner intelligence aimed to collect documents about officials, whose activity leads to inner destabilization of DPR. For the second time, I have provided the FSB with the materials about the thuggish and negligent conduct of officials of different levels, protection of criminals and other things. On May 06, 2015 I personally delivered documents to Lubianka in Moscow and handed them to the FSB officer named Ivan. I had also provided him with explanations about every case in one of the FSB offices. A part of those documents concerning the Topaz plant case were taken away without any explanations by a FSB lieutenant-colonel named Sergey. The FSB officials noted down my ID information. I also gave them my phone number but nobody called me back or asked any additional questions about those cases. Since May 2014, I have gathered more than 2000 soldiers ready to fulfill any mission perfectly. Also we have common ground with a battalion commander from the Ghost Brigade (call sign 77) to unite the front line and work together. He has approximately 1000 soldiers. The mentioned above facts lead us to the necessity of rapid and qualified reaction to the situation. I believe that creation of combat ready mobile battalion groups under a single HQ coordination and controlled by outside of the republics must be of top priority, as they would be the real Army ready to fulfill any combat task. The necessity to fight fascism has turned from an advertising slogan into Novorossia’s reality.
It is evident that Bagheera’s world view shaped by the Russian world propaganda came at odds with the reality. She runs to extremes: from digging the dirt on the occupation administration and handing it to the officials of the FSB Main Directorate to soliciting support from the curators at the Russian Security Council in creating her own unit. Here is her vision fro her own unit (from a report dated January 25, 2016):
Taking into account the above, I suggest the following:
In order to preserve control and prevent spontaneous formation of illegal military units to start immediately collecting personnel, consisting of patriotically minded fighters of the People’s Militia of Donbas who stood at the origins of the People’s Republics.The army unit should be formed within the Novorossia army corps or, in case of impossibility, as part of the National Republics Union army corps as that the above-mentioned personnel consists of citizens living on the territories of the DPR (about 2000 people), LPR (more than 1000 people) and Zaporizhia Oblast of Ukraine (about 1000 people). The unit shall be organized on the principles, career structures and the statute of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Russian officers who are not on active duty should be engaged as instructors and mentors to the command staff formation. I apply to consider this report and take an appropriate decision. Please inform me by mail litovchenko_elena@list.ru as to your decision.
Still the creation of the unit was not granted. In one of the letters to her curator, Bagheera despondently complains about the inaction of the officials he represents. Here we come across Khmuriy (read more about him: [1], [2], [3]), as well as see the reasons for the conflict between the leader of the DPR Zakharchenko and the Troy illegal armed group. Drug trafficking from Russia turns out to be the sticking point.
Igor, it’s been almost a year. I’ve conducted an interesting investigation about Mutniy…the former Makiivka commandant. There’s so much criminal stuff about him and the total evidence base about him and his gang. This Mutniy guy has 5 heavy criminal convictions. He gathered about him the same kind of thugs with criminal past, the same ruthless bastards.
They felt super cool as they worked under protection of Varlamova and Khmuriy. And what’s now…they are free and are doing just great.
There are many cases like that, and so what!!! Why nobody hasn’t dealt with the Ministry of Culture yet… why does this Ministry include a wonderful organization – the wives of the ATO, a pastor from the Kiev sect?! Why those one who did everything for development have been in the dungeon for more than a year?! Why the newly arrived storekeeper becomes deputy minister exactly in 2 weeks?! Why the drug trafficking to our territory hasn’t stopped yet? Why nobody who is involved in this in the first place has not been arrested yet?
Troy was right about this and we have proofs, we have seen with our own eyes how the drugs are being brought here and how DPR’s top rank officials are involved in this.
Which cases do you ready to work on?
The naivety of Bagheera is striking. It has long been known that intelligence services use the territories occupied by Russia in Georgia and Moldova as additional sources of illicit income from smuggling, drug trafficking, offshore finances etc. The same pattern is being appied on the occupied territories of Ukraine now.
Judging by the information on Myrotvorets website, Bagheera’s whistleblowing in May 2015 directly to the Main Directorate of the FSB did not turn out so well for her. On 25.07.2015 she was arrested by the counterintelligence unit of the so-called DPR National Guard. She was kept under interrogation for 50 days. Apparently the interrogators were interested in her network of informants both on the occupied territories and on the territory under government control. In the fall of 2015 she had to escape to the territory of the Russian Federation because of the threat of her own life.
Another interesting topic from her correspondence is Kupol-M, the trial model of a radar/jammer station. It is also known as prototype Item No 7, that was constructed at the Donetsk military plant Topaz, where Moiseenko had worked before she became Bagheera. Brief specifications of this hardware:
Item No 7 is an adaptive barrage jammer system effective against all kinds of digital communications, GSM/EDGE,WI-FI,CDMA etc. and analog communication with of 128 channel selectivity and 200 kHz pitch. Also, research and development has been underway to increase the amplifiers power and extend the bands with separation into 11 literal amplifier sections ranging from 10 to 6000 MHz and the possibility to jam analogue radio transmissions with a power higher than 500 watts. The hardware’s tactical designation is the counteraction to all types of electronic warfare (EW) systems and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment of the enemy, as well as jamming of all available means of communication. At the same time, a detachable rack module can be included in the standard equipment for direct attack on the enemy’s personnel with super high and infra low frequency radiation (the irradiation effects include partial paralysis, memory loss, concentration disorders, panic, and in some cases death) to immobilize enemy personnel by through neural shock and partial paralysis of the central nervous system (locomotor apparatus) for a time interval of up to 2 hours. The development of this product started in 2005, but due to lack of funding, further developments were suspended and the project was frozen in 2007. The project was revived later on. The system needs a deployment of 5 to 8 stations for generation of the effective protective shield against enemy EW systems. All stations a capable of providing horizontal angle of deployment from 180° to 360°. The specifications of this hardware exceed those of all Russian EW systems such as Krasukha-2, Krasukha-4, Moskva-1, Rtut, Rychag. Apart from horizontal radiation, this system also generates vertical dome-like radiation up to 10 km. The Kupol item differs from Russian and foreign jammers for it has a high selectivity (128 channels) and adaptability to changes of the repeater stations bandwidth shift. There are no analogs of this system with the same selectivity and adaptability in the world.
With the appropriate financing the plant is ready to produce three versions of this hardware:
– office version with the range of up to 30m;
– reconnaissance and sabotage group backpack version with the range from 350 to 500m;
– vehicle mounted version with the range up to 7,5 km;
There is also a prototype version of the station mounted on KamAZ-4310 chassis.
These are old photos of the prototype that were found in the correspondence. They may differ from the modern version.
Judging by the statement sent to the so-called prosecutor’s office of the DPR from the Topaz acting chairman of the board, on March 1, 2015 the militants from Russian cossack units stole the Kupol-M station. As mentioned at the statement, the prototype was produced in a single copy, the development of all technical documentation had been completed at the end of January 2015. The stolen prototype was fully equipped and ready to use.
To acting Prosecutor General
of Donetsk People’s Republic,
Senior Counsellor in Justice
Spivak A.A.
from Soshko Anrei Leonidovich, born 1980
resident of Donetsk
(ap 65, 22, Avtodorozhna str., mob.
phone: 0956516906Statement.
I have been warned about criminal responsibility for intentionally false denunciation.
_____________(Soshko A.L.)
I’ve been performing duties of the Topaz plant acting head of the board since August 18, 2014. During an interview with the Head of the People’s Democratic Republic Zakharchenko A.V. he informed me that I would start performing duties of the Director of the plant as of March 4, 2015, with an appropriate order to be issued soon afterwards.
Today, on March 1st, 2015 approximately at 10 am, I received a phone call from the head of the 1st Department (access and security) Gorelov Vladimir Semenovich. He informed me about the fact of stealing of the expensive item Kupol-M mounted on KamAZ-4310 chassis from the territory of the plant in an unknown direction by unidentified persons, presumably from among the cossacks who provided the security of the building No 1 of the plant. This item belongs to the category of EW (electronic warfare) systems and has an estimated value of 35,000,000 (thirty five million) UAH.
The plant’s territory is partially mined:
– Entrance checkpoint No 2 (old checkpoint);
– Vehicle entrance checkpoint No 1 (located near the 110 kV substation);
– Building No 1 (workshops No 17 and 20), entrance and exit.
– The section of the drag road adjacent to the spoil tip.
The item was produced in a single copy, the development of all technical documentation had been completed at the end of January 2015. The stolen Kupol-M is fully equipped and ready to use.
This hardware was designed to form stable barrage jamming signal to block all kinds of communications, including digital. There are no analogs of this system in any armed forces or intelligence agencies.
I am appealing to you to give an order to initiate a criminal investigation on this fact, bring the perpetrators to justice and take measures to prevent the possible transportation and sale of this hardware outside the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic as having a special value and significance among the EW systems.
The application has been compiled with my own hand, I have no additions.(Soshko A.L.)
Application accepted by:
Head of Investigation Department
of the Main Military Prosecutor’s office of the Donetsk People’s Republic
Justice Adviser
01.03.2015 Tsupka V.A.
Apparently, the item was stolen right after the technical documentation was completed and the item was fully equipped. As it was discovered, so called cossacks tried to sell the Kupol-M to a representative of the Russian military industrial complex. But Bagheera mobilized all her contacts in the Russian intelligence agencies and aborted the deal. The item was taken away from the cossacks and brought to the Russian territory, to the city of Voronezh.
Four developers took part in the development of the Kupol. Three of them died for one reason or another.
I’ve been hiding the fourth developer for more than a year.
Thaose were cossacks (quartered on the territory of Topaz plant at the time) who stole the Kupol at night from the territory of the plant and brought it out in unknown direction. They tried to sell it for 24 m UAH (although its cost price is 11 m UAH higher).
I had mobilized all my contacts and the Kupol item was found at the border with Ukraine where the act of sale was supposed to take place.
The fact of interrogation is in the materials of the case on Topaz plant. There you may also find reports about the persons involved in the Kupol’s theft and about the time of the crime.
Having common sense and by mutual decision with the then acting director of the Topaz plant (as the cossacks plundered everything wherever they appeared or were stationed), the Kupol was forwarded to Voronez in Russia in order to save this unique piece of armament which has no analogs in the world.
The documents show gradual build-up of frustration and panic of this delusional proponent of the so-called Russian world. Ignoring the true goals of the Kremlin, these people contributed to the destruction of their own world, helped the invaders to kill and rob their own countrymen, not realizing that they could become write-offs at some point.
In fact Kremlin needs people like these only until they start to dream of “their own unit” and independence. No totalitarian regime tolerates dissenters and protesters trying to make changes to the system – it sweeps them away like enemies. В один прекрасный момент самый страстный исполнитель их приказов оказывается один на один с реальностью и попадает в жернова убийственной машины ФСБ-режима, откуда абсолютно никто не собирается его вызволять.
Возможно, коллаборантам на оккупированных территориях Донбасса пришло время задуматься и принять единственно верное решение в этой ситуации…
Disclaimer:
Evidence was provided to InformNapalm on an exclusive basis by the hacktivists of the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance for analysis and processing. InformNapalm Community bears no responsibility for the sources and origin of the data.
This publication was prepared by Mikhail Kuznetsov , translated by Denis Whoknows, edited by Artem Velichko
(CC BY) Information specially prepared for InformNapalm.org site, an active link to the authors and our project is obligatory for any reprint or further use of the material.
No Responses to “Bagheera in the Donbas steppe: military jammer hijacking and collaborator’s fiasco”