A major Russian aircraft manufacturer JSC Yakovlev is suing to recover the funds lost after the introduction of the Russian sanctions. More than 600 million rubles (about $6 million) are stuck in the accounts of intermediary companies following botched attempts to purchase Western equipment to service fighters of the Russian Air Force. The story has been dragging on for years.

Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community have obtained the ruling of the Moscow Arbitration Court in the case of JSC Yakovlev vs. OOO Rosaviaspetskomplekt. The ruling was made relatively recently, on October 3, 2024, and is notable primarily because it reveals details of the problems faced by the Russian military-industrial complex because of sanctions. The documents obtained by Cyber Resistance hacktivists show the Russians failing to use a scheme to bypass trade restrictions.

Background

In September 2024, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published a CYBINT investigation into Russia’s attempt to obtain foreign equipment from the French companies THALES and SAFRAN to maintain its fleet of Su-30SM fighters. The key role in this scheme was played by the specialized Russian company Rosaviaspetskomplekt (its name standing for “repair, maintenance, supply of special components for aviation” in Russian). The company involved several intermediaries from Kazakhstan (ARC Group LLC, Aircraft Repair Plant No. 405 JSC) tying to secure access to French equipment and technologies through a parallel import scheme. This scheme succeeded in part. In response to a request from InformNapalm, the French THALES acknowledged that some of the Kazakh specialists involved in the maintenance of Russian combat aircraft had previously been trained in France. At the same time, the French company denied supplying equipment to Kazakhstan, which could subsequently fall into the hands of the Russians.

However, the Kazakh scheme was not the only one that the Russians tried to organize in order to secure access to critically important French equipment. Another attempt was made with the involvement of the same Rosaviaspetskomplekt and the Azerbaijani company Global Force Technology Ltd. This failed deal led to a lawsuit for hundreds of millions of rubles which will be described here.

The essence of the Russian court’s ruling

The Moscow Arbitration Court considered the claim of JSC Yakovlev vs Rosaviaspetskomplekt for the recovery of funds for failure to perform a contract. It was this claim that Judge Andrei Fedotochkin sustained on October 3, 2024. An interesting detail: the representative of Rosaviaspetskomplekt did not appear in court for the announcement of the ruling.

For the full text of the ruling, click this link *.PDF.

As for the general details of the case, JSC Yakovlev demanded that Rosaviaspetskomplekt comply with the ruling of another court – the Mediation Tribunal (a non-governmental court that resolves disputes mainly connected to business agreements) – to recover at least 767 million rubles for failure to perform the terms of contract No. 5-18, concluded back in December 2018. The claim amount consisted of 609 million rubles of advance payment that JSC Yakovlev had made to Rosaviaspetskomplekt, and interest. Notably, JSC Yakovlev claimed more than 1 billion rubles at the Mediation Tribunal.

The tribunal’s ruling does not explain what the subject of the contract was or why Rosaviaspetskomplekt failed to fulfill it. There is only contract number 53/02-18 and a mention of Appendix No. 2 dated 11/29/2021.

However, through documents obtained by the Cyber Resistance hacktivists in cooperation with a source in the arms market, we can fully reconstruct all the relevant details.

Azerbaijani intermediary and sanctions

On its official website, JSC Yakovlev omits any connection wih the Russian military-industrial complex. In the Products section, it advertises only civilian aircraft types, the much hyped “miracles” of Russian import substitution — the Superjet 100 and MC-21. The Yak-152 training aircraft is also on offer.

However, contract 53/02-18 was about he maintenance of French THALES and SAFRAN equipment specifically on Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Armed Forces. This is clearly stated in the draft agreement at the disposal of InformNapalm community.

As evidenced by the document, the agreement is to be made between Irkut Corporation and Rosaviaspetskomplekt. There is no mistake here. Until August 2023, JSC Yakovlev’s official name was Irkut Corporation.

Let us emphasize once again: the document is a draft of a future contract, as evidenced by the absence of the date and by the amendments to the text in different colors proposed by the parties. As follows from court documents, the final version of the contract was signed in December, not October 2018. However, the subject of the contract, namely maintenance of French equipment on the Su-30SM fighters, is obvious. In addition, there is an interesting amendment to Article 1 proposing that “the contractor shall be entitled to involve third parties in the performance of this contract.”

By the way, Article 9 of the same document states that the parties shall resolve disputes in the Moscow Arbitration Court.

The full text of the draft contract is available here:555.docs [Rus]

Another document mentioned in the ruling of the Moscow Arbitration Court is Appendix No. 2 of November 29, 2021 to the draft contract published here. InformNapalm also received a draft of this document. It dealt not only with maintenance, but also with the supply of equipment to the Russian Federation.

The documents make it clear that JSC Yakovlev planned to receive the necessary equipment by the end of 2021. However, the signing was delayed for a year for unknown reasons, whereas in February 2022, tougher sanctions were introduced against the Russian Federation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In June of the same year, THALES announced its withdrawal from the Russian market. At the same time, the Russians began their attempts to set up sanctions bypassing schemes.

At the end of Appendix No. 2 there is a coded list of equipment that the parties tried to deliver to Russia. Although the codes have not been spelled out, there are only six positions there.

Find the full text of Appendix No. 2 here”Second copy [Rus]

The same list of six positions, but already decoded, is contained in the appendix to another contract under a different number and with other parties. It is the contract between Rosaviaspetskomplekt and Global Force Technology Ltd, which was concluded in December 2021, literally a few days after the signing of Appendix No. 2.

All six coded components are THALES and SAFRAN devices.

• Find the document here: Contract 69-01… [Rus]
• Find the appendices here: Appendix No. 1…[Rus]

Everything went wrong

After the start of a full-scale war and the introduction of new sanctions against Russia, the Azerbaijani company began sending letters to the Russians claiming that the new restrictions would not affect the fulfillment of the deal in any way. In particular, such a letter was sent in June 2022.

The promise than was that the first stage of the contract would be completed “in accordance within the deadlines specified in the contract.” However, this did not happen. A year later, in a similar letter, Global Force Technology Ltd again promised to make the first deliveries, but this time “no later than January 2024.”

It is likely that the work on Su-30 maintenance scheme involving Kazakh intermediaries (which was described in the InformNapalm investigation) began precisely because of the failure of Plan A with an Azerbaijani company.

After January 2024, PJSC Yakovlev apparently gave up trying to receive the French equipment through Rosaviaspetskomplekt, and therefore began legal proceedings to recover the funds. One of the documents from the trial period finally reveals that the deal fell through precisely because of the sanctions.

In order to strengthen its position in court, Rosaviaspetskomplekt appealed to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (CCI) for a confirmation that the sanctions constituted a force majeure, and therefore the contract could not be fulfilled for reasons beyond the company’s control. The CCI did indeed make the requested report, which described the relevant events.

In particular, the document makes it clear that Global Force Technology Ltd involved another intermediary in Spain – Aero Design Systems SL, but after the introduction of sanctions, the Spanish contractor refused to supply the goods.

The Russian CCI recognized the sanctions as force majeure, but not the Russian courts.

Ultimately, this affects the fate of the advance payment of 609 million rubles that JSC Yakovlev once made to Rosaviaspetskomplekt.

Any refunds to Russia must be blocked

According to information available to InformNapalm, JSC Yakovlev and Rosaviaspetskomplekt are currently negotiating the refund of hundreds of millions of rubles in advance payments.

However, this is not easy, because Rosaviaspetskomplekt transferred the money outside the Russian Federation to the accounts of intermediaries. Banking institutions in third-country jurisdictions, in particular in the Arab world, were involved to carry out the transaction.

Russia must not get these funds back. After all, it is obvious that they will be spent on purchasing more readily available equipment for killing Ukrainians. Moreover, the contract between JSC Yakovlev and Rosaviaspetskomplekt is just one of many. There are large amounts of stranded Russian military-industrial complex money in the world. All of these funds must remain blocked or must be seized for further use in the restoration of Ukraine.

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community and Cyber Resistance group continue to monitor the details of this story. Some of the collected information has not yet been published. Anyone who risks participating in financial assistance to the Russian military-industrial complex will first suffer reputational losses and then face legal consequences.

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