
On September 12, InformNapalm international intelligence community published a feature based on combined CYBINT / HUMINT investigation pointing at ill-faith actions of Kazakhstani defense contractors aimed at facilitating sanctions avoidance for of maintenance of the French avionics for the Russian military industry companies. The feature dealt with the operations of ARC Group LLC and JSC Aircraft Repair Plant No 405 (ARP 405) acting in the interests of the Russian military aerospace contractor Rosaviaspezkomplekt and Irkutsk Aviation Plant. Companies implicated on the French side were Thales and Safran. In a recent development, we reached out to both French defense companies for comments regarding their potential involvement in the maintenance of the Russian SU-30SM aircraft through their Kazakhstani counterparts. Their responses present a stark contrast.
Thales: proactive and transparent
Thales’ response to our inquiry demonstrated a high level of responsibility. The company informed us that no equipment had been supplied to the implicated ARP 405 in Kazakhstan. While Thales confirmed training some of the personnel, they emphasized that no repairs or spare parts were provided to the Kazakh side. Additionally, they have suspended all contracts with the Kazakhstani plant and are contemplating legal action to terminate the agreement and potentially claim damages.
We welcome this prompt and decisive action by Thales. They have not only confirmed their compliance with international sanctions since 2014, but have also taken proactive steps in response to the specific data published by InformNapalm. Such a responsible stance sets a positive example in the defense industry, especially given the geopolitical sensitivities at play.
Safran: vague and formal
In contrast, Safran’s reply to our queries was far more evasive. While they assured compliance with sanctions since 2014 and laid out generic procedures for export control, they declined to elaborate on any connections with the entities involved in the maintenance activities on the Kazakhstani side, merely stating that they “do not wish to enter in any specifics regarding countries or companies.”
While Safran has stated that they ceased direct deliveries of military equipment to Russia in compliance with sanctions, their response left several crucial questions unanswered. First, when asked about their relationship with ARC Group LLP—the Kazakhstani company claiming exclusive distributorship of Safran’s equipment in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan —they did not clarify whether ARC’s claims were legitimate or lies. If ARC had falsely presented itself as Safran’s exclusive distributor, it would have been simple for Safran to refute this outright. Instead, their silence on this issue raises concerns about whether the company is willing to disclose the extent of cooperation with the ARC Group, or is fully aware of the ARC’s actions behind its back.
Moreover—although asked directly—Safran did not elaborate on any controls put in place to prevent reselling of their equipment to Russia by their Kazakhstani counterpart.
This lack of clarity raises suspicions about the full extent of Safran’s involvement in the sanctions dodging. While they may have adhered to formalities, their unwillingness to engage with the substance of the matter demands further investigation.
At the time of writing, it is also notable that ARC’s website (arcgroup.kz) has been closed to public access. (There is a copy of it in the archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20240913183427/https://arcgroup.kz/index.php/en/)
The Need for Continued Scrutiny
While Thales has demonstrated a commendable level of accountability, Safran’s vague reply only fuels concerns. Further investigation is needed to ensure that no loopholes in the sanctions regime are being exploited to aid Russia’s military efforts, even indirectly. Let us remind that SU-30 fighters are used daily to kill Ukrainian military and civilians in Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
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